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Abstract
Companies that develop new products increasingly outsource product design, a trend that has
prompted much concern but little evidence on its effectiveness. This dissertation uses a
combination of interviews, cross-case analysis, and survey data to examine the meaning,
measurement, and causes of success in one type of outsourced development: design and
innovation consulting. The first study identifies the many dimensions of success and
demonstrates that consultants, clients, and scholars prioritize them differently. Clients emphasize
the value and quality of the deliverable, while consultants prioritize design elegance, novelty,
and commercial success. Client satisfaction, heretofore little used in outsourcing research,
correlates highly with most success dimensions. The second study uses the identified success
measures to assess 134 consulting projects. Rates of product commercialization and market
success compare favorably to results previously reported for in-house development. Client
satisfaction is comparable to that of other service industries but varies greatly across projects.
Most outcome measures are robust to measurement timing but depend strongly on the seniority
of the respondent and the level of anonymity afforded him or her during assessment. The third
study identifies over fifty factors believed to influence project outcomes and distills them into
two pedagogical frameworks. The final study combines these factors with theories of customer
satisfaction and product development to generate explanatory models of client satisfaction and
other project outcomes. Nearly 80% of the observed variation in satisfaction can be explained
after the fact, and 36% predicted before the project begins. Contrary to prior reports, design
consultancies are least effective at radical innovation. Rather, they excel at rapid innovation in
familiar product categories, designing products far more quickly than bureaucratic organizations
and inexperienced start-ups can. Client satisfaction is unaffected by corporate cultural distance
between parties, and actually declined with decreased physical distance and increased
manufacturer involvement, challenging conventional wisdom in product development.
The dissertation contributes to understanding of outsourced product development by clarifying
key concepts such as success, demonstrating the impact of methodological details on its measure,
and developing novel survey methods to gather unique outcome data from a broad range of
respondents.
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1 Overview
1.1 Introduction and Objectives
Firms that develop, brand, and sell new products have long used selective outsourcing of
production and service activities to focus on core capabilities and achieve competitive advantage.
Increasingly, these firms are outsourcing front-end development activities such as product
design, a trend that has prompted concern from scholars and practitioners alike. Business
strategy scholars caution that outsourcing design work may jeopardize the firm's intellectual
property, erode its internal capabilities, and even develop its current suppliers into future
competitors [1-3]. The trade literature suggests that outsourced product development projects are
frequently late, over budget, or fail to meet requirements [4, 5]. Surveys of product development
professionals find that many are suspicious of outsourcing product design [6], with nearly a third
of those at large firms believing that design outsourcing is a net liability to their company [7].
And yet the use of outsourced product development continues to grow [3, 6, 8, 9], presenting an
apparent paradox: Why are firms increasingly outsourcing design if both strategic theory and
operational experience caution against doing so? Perhaps they are simply behaving irrationally.
Or maybe competitive pressure and/or resource constraints leave firms no choice but to
outsource, despite their misgivings. A third explanation is that the reported increase in design
outsourcing may be exaggerated. A fourth possibility, one that this dissertation explores, is that
outsourcing outcomes, and practitioner attitudes towards them, have been misreported. Perhaps
the trade press has painted an unrealistically gloomy picture, by focusing on the wrong measures
of success or by asking the wrong people to evaluate them.
Indeed, close inspection of these reports reveals conceptual and methodological shortcomings
that may compromise their results. Some of the studies do not define their outcome measures,
but rather use vague terms such as "success," "struggled," and "disaster" [4, 10]. Others conflate
the causes of poor outcomes (e.g., "3rd party lacked management ability") with their effects (e.g.,
"project failed to meet requirements") [5]. Few specify the type of design outsourcing they are
referring to or reference baseline data on the outcomes of non-outsourced projects. Most use
survey methods, but the response rates are very low (e.g., 2.7% [5]) or unstated [4, 11], casting
doubt on the representativeness of the responses.
Presumably peer-reviewed academic research would be more rigorous, but to date very little has
been performed on the outcomes of outsourced development projects. Scholars have instead
focused on the motives behind firms' outsourcing behavior. In addition to the strategy literature
cited above, operations management scholars have sought to explain firms' decisions to
outsource particular projects in terms of such factors as product complexity [12], technological
uncertainty [13], and firm and supplier capabilities [13, 14]. They have generally not investigated
the consequences of those decisions, nor, surprisingly, included them in their decision models.
To the author's knowledge, only one academic study has examined outsourced product design
outcomes in detail, and it focused on the atypical case of very small firms that received
government subsidies to hire a design consultant [15].
Given this dearth of reliable information on design outsourcing outcomes, an initial objective of
this dissertation was simply to gather high quality descriptive data. In doing so, it became
apparent that measuring project success is far from simple. For starters, success means different
things to different people. Project benefits may be direct (e.g., a successful new product) or
indirect (e.g., knowledge gained that will benefit future work), and performance can be assessed
in the near term (e.g., schedule and budget performance) or the long term (e.g., the ultimate
return on the client's investment). As a result, practitioners identify many different dimensions of
success. Unfortunately, few firms formally evaluate their outsourced development projects [11].
Assessment by an outside researcher is further complicated by the fact that few firms wish to
draw attention to their outsourcing behavior, given the negative coverage of "outsourcing" in the
popular media.1 In addition, the measurement and public reporting of project outcomes has
personal implications, both political and financial, to most informants that might bias their
responses. As a result, a significant portion of this dissertation focuses on building a foundation
from which to measure project outcomes: clarifying key concepts such as the meaning of
success, developing novel data collection techniques to study what is in many ways a sensitive
1 In supply chain research the term outsourcing simply implies that the activities are performed by a party other than
the firm. In the popular media, outsourcing is often used as shorthand for offshore outsourcing, and has even been
used to refer to offshore insourcing [20].
topic [16], and documenting the effects of methodological choices such as measurement timing
on the results. This foundation constitutes the dissertation's first contribution, and it is hoped that
it will help to spur progress in this field of inquiry.
The second contribution is the descriptive data themselves. They suggest that both project
outcomes and practitioner attitudes are better than previously reported but vary significantly
between individuals, projects, and firms. Past studies have understated this variation, presenting
averages and totals but not ranges or distributions. The present results show that some projects
do very well while others struggle, a finding which begs explanation. The few empirical studies
conducted to date assign blame for poor outcomes to specific supplier and firm errors such as
ignorance of the design brief, poor communication, and lack of commitment to the project [5, 15,
17, 18]. Certainly these do occur in practice, but they may actually be symptoms of underlying
causes such as the client's reason for outsourcing the project. Theoretically richer mechanisms
such as cultural and organizational distance between firm and supplier have been suggested [1,
17, 19], but these lack empirical support in this domain.
Thus, the third contribution of the dissertation is the identification of factors that can account for
the observed variation in project outcomes. Possible explanatory factors are identified from the
literature and via original qualitative research, and then organized into two unifying frameworks
that can help practitioners to better plan and control outsourcing projects. Finally, the identified
factors are combined with theories from two distinct fields of research - new product
development and customer satisfaction - to develop models that accomplish the fourth and final
contribution: explaining project outcomes. The first model illustrates how commonly used
outcome measures relate to one another. This model suggests that client satisfaction is a key
outcome that accounts for many otherwise orthogonal dimensions of success. The second set of
models explains client satisfaction in detail. Two levels of explanation are possible: one can
account for satisfaction after the fact, based on the events that occurred during the project, or one
can attempt to predict satisfaction in advance, based solely on factors known at the start of the
project. The latter would aid practitioners in deciding which projects to outsource and which to
develop in-house, while the former would help them to manage the projects that they do choose
to outsource. The results suggest that 79% of the observed variation in client satisfaction can be
explained expost, and as much as 36% of the variation in satisfaction anticipated ex ante.
To summarize, the objectives of this dissertation are:
1. To clarify the meaning of success in outsourced product development, by identifying its
many dimensions, comparing the perspectives of different types of practitioners, and
demonstrating how the various outcome measures relate to each other
2. To describe the distribution of project outcomes in one particular type of outsourced
product development: design and innovation consulting
3. To identify and characterize factors which influence project outcomes
4. To use the identified factors to explain the observed variation in client satisfaction and, to
the extent possible, predict it in advance
1.2 The Research Setting: Domestic Design Consulting
Part of the confusion about outsourcing effectiveness results from the existence of several
distinct types of outsourced product development [14, 20], each with different objectives,
different risk factors, and possibly different success rates [7]. Figure 1-1 illustrates three
common outsourcing modes. In integrated design-and-production outsourcing a single supplier
designs and produces the product to meet the client firm's general specifications [21] 2 Integrated
design-and-production outsourcing is commonly utilized in the automotive, aerospace, and
electronics industries, and performed by companies such as Magna-Steyr, Hamilton Sundstrand,
and Flextronics. Such companies are often referred to as original design manufacturers (ODMs).
In design consulting (increasingly referred to as design and innovation consulting) design
activities are outsourced to a consultant who does not perform production activities on the
product [22]. Production may be outsourced to a third party contract manufacturer or retained
within the client firm. Design consulting is commonly utilized in consumer, medical, and
industrial products, and performed by consultancies such as Battelle, IDEO, and Wipro.
2 In academic research, the term black box outsourcing has been used to distinguish this practice from more
conventional production-only outsourcing [21]. However, this term is not commonly used in industry.
"Integrated Design-and- "Design Consulting"
Production Outsourcing"
Supplier ] Consultant
P
Client Firm Client Firm Client Firm
Figure 1-1: Three modes of outsourced product development. Circles represent the boundaries of the
respective companies, and the letters "D" and "P" indicate the locations of design and production activities.
Diagram adapted from [141.
A second distinction can be made based on whether or not the client firm and the design service
provider are located in the same country [20]. Thus a client firm could outsource design activities
to a domestic or international design consultant, or a domestic or international ODM. It could
also offshore design activities to a captive (i.e., client-owned) development group. Past studies
on outsourced product development have sometimes failed to identify which of these many
forms of distributed development they are referring to [4, 11, 23, 24], or have commingled them
in analysis [3, 19]. Both approaches are imprecise and may lead to false conclusions.
Although most academic research has focused on integrated design-and-production outsourcing
[2, 12, 13, 25], design consulting may actually be a better context in which to explore the causes
of outsourced design success and failure. First, because design activities are performed
independently of production activities, it is possible to isolate the effects of outsourced design
from those of outsourced production. Second, design consulting is typically applied at a smaller
scale than is integrated design-and-production outsourcing. Project difficulty generally increases
with increasing project size [26]; studying large projects such as an automobile or an airliner
make it difficult to untangle the effects of scale from those of design outsourcing. Finally,
because design consulting projects are relatively small, they turn over quickly, making design
consultancies the "fruit flies" of the design outsourcing world [3] and enabling examination of a
large number of projects within a reasonable amount of time.
Design consulting is practiced in a range of industries, from software [27] to biotechnology [28],
but this dissertation will focus on consumer, medical, and industrial products. Such products are
small enough to be studied yet complex enough to be interesting, requiring the coordination of
expertise from several functional specialties (user research, industrial design, human factors,
mechanical and electrical engineering, etc). Furthermore, the population of consultancies
specializing in these types of products is well-defined [29]. Lastly, the author has personal
experience working on both the client and consultant sides of this industry, which improves
access to research informants and informs his analysis of the data.
1.3 The Research Design
To accomplish the research objectives, while avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued prior
research, this dissertation takes a different approach. First, it is empirically grounded. Theory is
used to frame the questions and interpret the findings, but the results themselves are data-driven.
Second, it focuses on a specific form of outsourced product development, design consulting, as
discussed above. Third, data are collected using multiple methods to balance the shortcomings of
each method. Qualitative techniques are first used to clarify the key concepts and develop
hypotheses, which are then tested using quantitative analysis. Fourth, to improve the reliability of
the data, they are collected from multiple perspectives, both client and consultant, currently and
formerly employed in the industry, at a range of seniority levels. Together, these methodological
choices produce higher quality data, which in turn allows for more valid inference.
The data were collected in three phases. In Phase 1, in-depth semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 36 experienced design consultants and clients. The interviews exposed the many
different dimensions of success, and hinted that they are prioritized differently by the various
types of respondents. The interviews also suggested over one hundred different factors that
influence project outcomes, which were distilled into a process-oriented typology featuring 51
key factors in fifteen steps of the development process (Figure 4-1).
To complement the interview data, a second exploratory phase was performed in which the unit
of analysis shifted from the individual to the project. Through the participation of one
consultancy, thirty projects were studied in detail. Data were gathered as suggested by the
findings of Phase 1, and analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively to reveal patterns and
common themes. The process of gathering the data also served to pre-test the data collection
procedures to be used in the final phase.
Phase 3 consisted of a cross-sectional survey of 104 projects performed by ten design and
innovation consultancies. For each project, data on project characteristics, mid-project events,
and project outcomes were gathered from up to five different client and consultant individuals
who had participated in that project. These data form the primary source for the descriptive
analyses as well as statistical testing of explanatory hypotheses generated from the literature and
the first two research phases.
Table 1-1 summarizes the research approach. The three phases are shown as columns, while the
rows represent the key research objectives. Each cell in the matrix features the analyses that were
performed during that phase (column) to address that research objective (row), along with the
section of the dissertation in which the results are presented. For example, the interview phase
yielded a typology of success dimensions which helped to clarify the meaning of success and is
discussed in Section 2.4. The dissertation is structured topically rather than chronologically, so
that each research objective is addressed in turn. Within each objective, the analysis generally
moves chronologically from Phase 1 to Phase 3.
Table 1-1: Overview of the research design. Entries in the cells indicate the analyses used to accomplish each objective.
Research Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Phases In-Depth Interviews Cross-Case Analysis Benchmarking Survey
Research n = 36 n = 30 projects n = 104 projects
Objectives March - October, 2009 March - September, 2010 October 2010 - June 2011
1. Clarify Success Section 2.4 Section 2.5
- Identify meanings - Typology of success measures - Quantification of meanings
used to evaluate projects
- Compare perspectives - Qualitative client / consultant /- Quantification of practitioner
literature comparison mental models of success
- Prioritize measures - Kano analysis of measures
2. Measure Success Section 3.5.1 Section 3.4 Sections 3.4 and 3.5
- Objective outcomes - Objective project outcomes - Objective project outcomes
- Client satisfaction - Preliminary willingness to - Client satisfaction data
- Consultant satisfaction recommend data - Consultant satisfaction data - Consultant satisfaction data
- Effect of methods - Sample type, respondent type,
measurement timing
3. Identify Success Factors Sections 4.5 and 4.6 Sections 4.5 and 4.6 Section 4.5
- Identify factors - Success factor typology - Clustering analysis
- Prioritize factors - Qualitative FMEA - Quantitative FMEA - Quantitative FMEA
- Unify factors - Failure modes framework
- Outsourcing motivations
framework
4. Explain Project Outcomes Section 5.3 Section 5.3 Section 5.5
- Analyze inter-relationships - Hypothesis generation - Hypothesis generation - Hypothesis testing
- Detailed explanation of - Deductive regression models
client satisfaction - Inductive regression models
1.4 Dissertation Structure
The dissertation is organized around the four major research objectives, each of which receives
its own chapter (Chapters 2 through 5). To avoid overwhelming the reader, motivational
evidence, literature review, and detailed description of methods are not presented all at once at
the start of the dissertation but rather are gradually revealed on an as-needed basis throughout the
four major chapters. For the sake of space, redundant information is generally not repeated, but
references are made to prior chapters as appropriate. Supporting materials, including all
recruitment materials and measurement instruments, are provided as appendices at the end of the
dissertation. Chapter 6 synthesizes the various findings, addresses the strengths and limitations of
the work, and suggests directions for future research.
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2 The Meaning of Success in Outsourced Product
Development: Academic, Consultant, and Client
Perspectives
Prior research on outsourced product development has focused primarily on the motives behind
firms' outsourcing decisions, with less attention paid to the outcomes of those decisions. The few
existing outcome-oriented studies have reported high project failure rates, but little consensus
exists as to what is meant by success and failure and some studies do not define success at all.
Such ambiguity hinders explanation of these findings and makes comparisons between studies
difficult. To provide conceptual clarity, this chapter identifies and characterizes the many
meanings of success in outsourced product development. Academic and practical perspectives
are first identified from the literature and from in-depth interviews of 36 design consultants and
consulting clients. The perspectives are organized into a typology featuring seven key
dimensions of success, and the relative importance of each dimension is determined using a
survey of 194 additional practitioners. The results suggest that past research has generally
focused on the wrong project outcome measures, overstating the impact of problems during
development and the relative importance of return on investment, and omitting key measures
such as working relationship quality, project value, and client satisfaction. While each measure
has it merits, client satisfaction appears to be a promising summary measure.
2.1 Introduction
Firms that develop, brand, and sell products have long used selective outsourcing of production
activities to achieve competitive advantage. Increasingly, these firms are outsourcing front end
product development activities such as industrial design and design engineering as well [1-4].
Although academic research is limited, evidence from the popular and trade literature suggests
that firms struggle when outsourcing design. Outsourcing-related problems on Boeing's 787 cost
the company $2.5 billion dollars in the third quarter of 2009 alone [5], and have delayed the
project by over three years [6]. A nationwide survey of electronics design outsourcing managers
found that 65% had experienced a project that took longer than expected, 46% had experienced
cost overruns, and 21% had received a project that failed to meet requirements [7]. Nearly one
third of managers at large companies reportedly view design outsourcing as a "net liability" to
their companies [8]. Collectively, these cost overruns, schedule delays, and lost opportunities
cost firms dearly. By contrast, successful outsourcing projects can create enormous value.
Reebok's Pump sneaker, developed collaboratively with the design consultancy Continuum, is
said to have generated $1 billion in new sales for Reebok [9]. A better understanding of the
causes of failure and sources of success could turn more outsourced design projects from
liabilities into assets.
Perhaps surprisingly, design outsourcing outcomes have received little scholarly attention.
Research has instead focused on the motives behind firms' decisions to outsource. One stream of
literature considers strategic factors such as the dissemination of the firm's intellectual property,
the potential erosion of the firm's internal capabilities, and the competitive risk of empowering
suppliers [2, 10, 11]. A second, more tactical stream seeks to explain firms' outsourcing
decisions in terms of such factors as product complexity [12], technological uncertainty [13], and
firm and supplier capabilities [13, 14]. These studies are descriptive rather than prescriptive; they
describe what firms actually do, without regard for whether the decisions they make are sound.
The author is aware of only two academic studies that report the outcomes of outsourced design
projects. Amaral and Parker observed that nearly two thirds of outsourced platform design
projects at Fortune 1,000 companies "struggled or failed" [15]. Roy and Potter reported that 27%
of UK manufacturers receiving a grant to hire a design consultant "experienced problems"
during the project [16], and approximately 40% of all projects resulted in a financial loss for the
client firm [17].
Unfortunately, the strength of these findings, along with those in the trade literature, is tempered
by lack of precision in how success is defined and measured. Some studies do not define their
outcome measures, using only abstract terms such as "success" [18], "struggled" and "failed"
[15]. Others conflate the causes of failure (e.g., "3rd party lacked management ability" [7]) with
their effects (e.g., "project failed to meet requirements" [7]). Such ambiguity makes it difficult to
assess the causes of poor project outcomes, and impossible to compare findings between studies.
In addition, all of the studies published to date present only the perspective of the client firm,
reporting neither the meaning of success to the design service provider nor the provider's
perspective on what enables success. While the client perspective is necessary to understanding
these issues, it is insufficient.
As part of a larger effort to document and explain variation in outsourced product development
outcomes, this chapter examines the many meanings of success in this domain. Specific
objectives are to: 1) identify meanings and measures used in past research, 2) identify meanings
and measures commonly used by client and consultant practitioners, 3) organize the identified
meanings into a typology of key success dimensions, 4) describe how practitioners prioritize
these dimensions, and 5) evaluate the suitability of the identified measures for future use in
benchmarking studies and quantitative explanatory analysis. By focusing on the meaning of
success, the chapter lays the foundation for measuring project outcomes (Chapter 3), identifying
success factors (Chapter 4), and explaining variation in outcomes between projects (Chapter 5).
2.2 Literature Perspectives on the Meaning of Success
2.2.1 Outsourced Product Development Literature
Although the concepts of success and failure appear frequently in the design outsourcing
literature, they are defined and operationalized in many different ways:
Commercial/financial Performance
One approach defines success in financial terms, measuring whether the project is
commercialized, whether it is profitable for the client firm, as well as its payback period [16, 17].
While financial returns are certainly the ultimate objective of any for-profit enterprise, the
primary shortcoming of this approach is that few firms track financial performance at the
outsourcing project level [19]. Some may have data for the return on investment of the product
whose design was outsourced (Roy and Potter could obtain this information for 91 of the 221
projects in their sample), but this is influenced by many non-design factors, such as the client
firm's ability to distribute and sell the product [20]. In addition, many firms consider product-
level financials confidential and will not share them with researchers [20, 21]. A second
drawback of the purely financial approach is that it neglects non-financial benefits such as
organizational learning [2], and costs such as the possible impact on employee morale [22]. As a
result, few firms use financial returns as the sole measure of project success [20].
Contractual Performance
A second approach defines success as meeting the project's objectives, particularly with regard
to schedule, budget, and product performance [7]. A drawback with this approach is that such
objectives are typically moving targets, continually renegotiated during the course of the project
[22]. Many projects exceed the initial budget or schedule but this should not be considered a
failure if the client firm agreed to the revised terms, or if the extension contributes to the ultimate
success of the project according to other metrics.
Occurrence of Problems
A third approach assesses the occurrence of "problems" [7, 16] or "interruptions to routine
activity" [23] during the project. This can be a misleading metric, as the occurrence of problems
does not necessarily imply project failure. Indeed, conflict identification and resolution is an
essential aspect of new product development [24]. Learning and design changes are common in
the early phases of a design.
2.2.2 Traditional Product Development Literature
In contrast to outsourced product development, the meaning of success and failure in traditional
(i.e., non-outsourced) product development has been extensively examined. Based on a review of
61 academic studies and a survey of 50 practicing product developers [25], Griffin and Page
identified 75 different success measures used in research and practice and organized them into
five categories:
- Customer-acceptance measures such as customer (i.e., product end-user) satisfaction and
revenue growth.
- Financial-performance measures such as attaining profitability goals and return on
investment.
- Product-level measures such as development cost, time-to-market, and technical
performance.
- Firm-based measures such as the percentage of sales generated by new products.
- Program measures such as the profitability of the firm's entire new product development
program.
In a later paper they recommended particular measures for each of several innovation strategies
and concluded that customer satisfaction was appropriate for them all [26]. Meanwhile, Hultink
and Robbin examined whether the perceived importance of the most commonly used measures
differs depending on whether one takes a short-term or long-term outlook [27]. They too
concluded that customer satisfaction was the most important and robust measure of product
development success.
2.2.3 Customer Satisfaction Literature
Compared to traditional product development, the distinguishing characteristic of outsourced
product development is that a significant portion of the design process has been structured as a
market transaction rather than an organizational hierarchy [28]. This suggests that standard
transaction assessment techniques such as customer satisfaction may be appropriate for
measuring outsourced development success.' Given this fact, and the strong endorsement of
customer (i.e., end-user) satisfaction in the traditional product development literature, it is
surprising that none of the studies of outsourced product development have taken this approach.
The assessment of customer satisfaction is both an academic discipline and an industry unto
itself. Numerous approaches exist, but central to nearly all is the premise that satisfaction results
when the product or service meets or exceeds the customer's expectations [29]. For example, the
American Customer Satisfaction Index considers the customer's overall satisfaction, the extent to
which his expectations were met, and the comparison of his actual experience with a
hypothetical ideal [30].
1 Note that there are at least two key customers in outsourced product development: the client of the design services
and the end-user of the designed product. For clarity, the terms client satisfaction and end-user satisfaction will be
used to refer specifically to these groups. For consistency with the literature, the more general customer satisfaction
will be used to refer to concepts and theories that could apply to either group.
Kano and colleagues argued that customers' expectations differ for various attributes of a
product, and that some attributes may provoke a non-linear response, producing delight if present
but no dissatisfaction if absent, or dissatisfaction if absent but no increase in satisfaction if
present [31]. The so-called Kano diagram, depicted in Figure 2-1, has been widely adopted to
explain end-user satisfaction in product development, but it may also be useful to explain the
satisfaction of the client firm in outsourced product development.
Collectively, these three streams of literature provide useful foundations for measuring
outsourcing success, but also prompt several questions. What measures do practitioners use to
evaluate outsourcing success? What dimensions of success are the Kano performance attributes
for client satisfaction with design services? Which measures should scholars use to assess
success? Which measures are feasible for practice and research?
Customer
Satisfaction
Must-Have
Attributes
Delighter
Performance
Attributes
Figure 2-1: The Kano diagram. For Performance Attributes, customer satisfaction increases linearly with the
extent to which the product delivers the attribute. For Must-Have Attributes, satisfaction declines sharply
with the absence of the attribute. For Delighter Attributes, satisfaction increases sharply with the presence of
the attribute, but absence produces no dissatisfaction.
2.3 Methods
To answer these questions, the present study leverages the collective wisdom of experienced
professionals, using methods that complement or improve upon past research. Prior empirical
studies have primarily surveyed mid-level client personnel [7, 15, 16], but questionnaires are
unlikely to elicit the nuance and multiple meanings of success. In addition, surveying only mid-
level managers reveals a limited perspective: executives and engineers will likely define and
prioritize success differently. Consultants too offer a unique perspective, and may have more
experience upon which to base it. Whereas many client personnel experience just a few
outsourcing projects in their careers, consultants experience that number every few months.
To address these issues, this study used a combination of in-depth interviews, to generate richer
models than surveys can, followed by quantitative analysis of survey data to confirm the models.
In each phase, data were collected from both client and consultant respondents, entry-level
through C-level, currently and formerly employed in the two sides of the industry. Former clients
and consultants should have less of a personal stake in the research findings, and thus may be
more candid. The interviews focused on respondents' general beliefs, while the survey asked
them to evaluate specific projects.
2.3.1 Interview Phase
The population of interest for this phase was the staff of design consultancies specializing in
consumer, medical, and industrial products, as compiled in the BusinessWeek/Core77 Design
Directory [32], and the client personnel with whom they collaborate. To ensure a variety of
perspectives, a statistically non-representative stratified sampling technique [33] was used to
balance variation in employer type, seniority level, and current or former employment status.
Respondents were recruited through a combination of word-of-mouth and targeted solicitation of
thought leaders within the study population. Of the 48 individuals solicited, 36 agreed to
participate, representing a total of 30 companies. Respondents had an average of 14 years
experience with consulting (range 3 to 29 years).
Interviews were conducted between March and October, 2009, using an in-depth, semi-
structured approach [34]. The interview template is included as Appendix A. The interviews
lasted from one to two hours depending on the enthusiasm of the respondent. To encourage
candor, 30 of the 36 interviews were performed in a private office or away from the respondent's
workplace. Interview notes and audio transcripts were coded and analyzed using a grounded
theory approach [35]. Iterative analysis produced the success typology described in Section 2.4.
Direct quotations have been edited slightly for readability and to protect confidentiality.
2.3.2 Survey Phase
In this phase, the unit of analysis shifted from the individual practitioner to the consulting
project. The population consisted of all projects completed within the prior four years by
consultancies specializing in consumer, medical, and industrial product development. Two
different samples were used in an effort to reach all corners of the population. First, nineteen
consultancies were invited to participate in a client satisfaction benchmarking study. Five agreed
to participate, from which a total of 126 recently completed projects were randomly drawn for
study. The consultancies identified one to four client and one to three consultant participants of
each project to solicit feedback from, yielding a total of 184 client and 104 consultant survey
recipients.
The second sample was identified directly by the investigator. Five consultancies were randomly
drawn from the fourteen that declined to participate in the benchmarking study. For these, 230
recently completed projects were identified by searching U.S. patent applications for inventors
publicly known to be employees of the consultancies and then following the network of patent
records to its ends. A total of 784 client inventors on these projects were identified, of which 310
could be located via public records. Of these, 262 were randomly selected to form the patent
sample. Consultant inventors were not included out of respect for their employers' decisions not
to participate in the study. Although the patent sample respondents were non-random in the sense
that their projects had all generated patent applications, analysis of variance of the benchmarking
sample results indicated that projects which generated a patent application differed in no other
significant way from projects that did not generate an application. Including the patent sample
helped to balance the seniority level of the client respondents. The consultancies participating in
the benchmarking study tended to solicit feedback from client project managers and executive
sponsors, whereas the patent sample included many junior-level engineers and designers.
The selected recipients from each sample were mailed an 8-page questionnaire about their
project, which was developed based on the results of the literature review and interviews and is
included as Appendix D. Consultants received a slightly different questionnaire (Appendix E),
which was tailored to their perspective as revealed by the interviews. 82 benchmarking client, 74
benchmarking consultant, and 38 patent surveys were returned. Eighteen patent surveys were
undeliverable, yielding effective response rates of 44.6, 71.1, and 15.6%, respectively. All of the
returned responses were usable, yielding a total sample of 194 practitioners evaluating 104
different projects.
Three distinct analyses were performed, each centered around the same two-part question about
the meaning of success:
To what degree do you consider this project a success?
Notvery O 0 0 O O O O O O O Very
Successful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Successful
Why or why not?
First, the responses to the open-ended question were coded and counted. Next, regression
analysis was performed to determine the effect of the content of the open-ended response on the
numerical success rating. Finally, regression analysis was performed to explain the numerical
rating in terms of other success measures included on the survey. The standardized regression
coefficients were used to judge the relative priority given to each success measure by the
respondents in determining the overall success rating.
All three analyses were performed separately for client and consultant respondents and the
results compared. Client responses from the benchmarking and patent samples did not differ
significantly as to the meanings of success, so these two samples were pooled for the analysis
and presentation of results.
2.4 Interview Results
The interviews suggest that success is multi-faceted and means different things to consultants
and clients. Consultants in particular viewed success as multi-dimensional: a project might do
well on one dimension but poorly on another. Clients tended to view success more narrowly, as
the achievement of their expectations for a reasonable price. In total, seven distinct dimensions
of project success were identified, each having multiple measures. The dimensions and measures
are summarized in Table 2-1 and described in detail below. Direct quotations from the interviews
are used extensively to give the reader a feel for the raw data. More space is devoted to the
consultant perspective, partly because it is more nuanced, but also because it has been under-
represented in prior research.
2.4.1 Consultant Perspectives on the Meaning of Success
Dimension 1: Impact on Client's Business Performance
For the consultants, the ultimate dimension of success is that the project increased the client's
profits, ideally by increasing product revenues, but also by reducing expenditures.
"The biggest measure I use for whether or not we've been successful is, 'did we have
an impact in the marketplace?' For me that's the highest bar. If we didn't have an
impact in the marketplace, did we help the client make the right decision? Because in
some instances, the decision is 'don't go to market.' I think we're great consultants
when we say that. We had some impact on their profits, because they would have been
unsuccessful in pursuing it, but that's not ultimately what you want to hang your hat
on." 
- Consultant CEO
"Our ultimate view is 'does the product reach the market and is it profitable?' but
some of our successes have been helping clients avoid making huge mistakes. Early on,
we're able to show clients 'you know, maybe this isn't going to align to your business
goals like you think it is.' We're able to help the company re-direct."
- Consultant VP of Design
Table 2-1: Dimensions and measures of success. Consultants mentioned far more success measures than either their clients or the outsourcing
literature.
Measures Identified by the:
Product(s) resulting from consulting project commercialized
Product(s) successful in the market
Positive return on client's investment
Consulting project requirements met
Consultant's work implemented in downstream development
Amount of rework required on consultant's deliverable
Product design received patent(s)
Product design received award(s)
Literature
X
X
X
Consultants
X
X
Clients Variable Name
TOMRKT
MRKTSUC
ROI
REQS MET
IMPLMNT
REWORK
PATENT
AWARD
Non-financial
Benefits
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client
Satisfaction
Client learned something new
Project makes client personnel look good n/a
SCHE MET
BUDG MET
VALUE
PROBLEMS
PROBSNR
Consulting project schedule met
Consulting project budget met
Consulting project value to client (benefits relative to cost)
Extent of problems or sub-optimalities
Failure to resolve problems during project
Quality of working relationship
Extent of goodwill trust between client and consultant
Client's expectations met
Closeness of project to hypothetical ideal
Client's overall satisfaction with project
Client's willingness to rehire consultant
Client's willingness to recommend consultant
Occurrence/extent of repeat business
X WORK REL
TRUST
X EXPEC MET
IDEAL
SATISF
REHIRE
RECOMND
REPEAT
Profitability of project for consultant X PROFIT
Extent to which project led to additional business X LEADIN
Consultant Sales and marketing value of project to consultant X PUBLICITY
Benefits Extent to which project enhanced consultant's capabilities X CAPABIL
Impact on consultant staff morale X MORALE
Consultant's overall satisfaction with project X CO SATIS
a Ideality has not previously been suggested as an outsourcing success measure, but is a standard concept in customer satisfaction theory
Dimensions
Business
Impact
Design
Quality
Consultants were quick to note, however, that profitability is not an ideal metric for evaluating
consulting projects. Client firms often consider product-level financials confidential.
Marketplace impact may not be visible in the short term. Success requires no small measure of
luck, as well as the alignment of many factors beyond the consultant's control, such as
manufacturing, distribution, sales, and the quality of the client's original product specification.
Furthermore, some projects are exploratory in nature and not intended to go to market. For these
reasons, consultants aspire to improve their clients' profitability but generally do not evaluate
projects by it.
Dimension 2: Quality of the Product Design
Because profitability is hard to measure and subject to many external factors, the consultants
focus on the one factor they have the most influence over: the quality of the design itself. At a
minimum, the design should meet the client's stated requirements, but consultants are
particularly proud if their work is highly elegant, innovative, or robust.
"One of the ways I look at success is 'how effective were we in coming up with an
innovative solution that met a need, and how quickly and efficiently did we get it
through the debug process and commercialize it?' There's so many things that can go
wrong in that process: the product might get out quickly but as a shadow of what it
was intended to be, or stay close to its intent but take three times longer than it should
have. As an engineer I take a lot ofpride in the efficient transfer of design intent into a
robust manufacturing solution." - Consultant Director of Engineering
"Was the product launch successful? Was the product well received critically? Did the
product make a difference to the end user? We're not in the business of making junk.
Did it win a design award? We don't design to win the award, but it's a nice
acknowledgement." - Consultant Office Director
Objective appraisals such as patents, design awards, and critical or consumer reviews are signs of
design quality but imperfect measures of it, as they generally occur only if the design is
commercialized. In addition, patent and award applications require significant investment of
client and/or consultant resources, which may not be invested even if the design is worthwhile.
In the absence of third party appraisals, assessment of design quality can be subjective.
"Sometimes, what we might consider successful the client might not feel is as
successful. That's mainly in industrial design. We might think we have a really good
design, but then a key [client] person leaves and a new one comes in and since that
person wasn't involved early enough in the process he or she doesn't like the end
result." - Consultant COO
Dimension 3: Non-financial Benefits
Whether or not a project has a direct business impact, it may yield other benefits to the client
firm or individuals within it.
"If the client team feels like they learned something new, to me that's the first level of
success. - Consultant Project Manager
"Client success has always been part of our mission statement. It could be that the
product was a hit in the market, that's the obvious one, but it might also be that our
key contact looked really good, was promoted, was seen as a star within their
organization." - Consultant Director of Engineering
"Success isn't always about coming up with a breakthrough product. Success is
sometimes just helping this individual decide, or facilitate, or shake their culture."
- Consultant Project Manager
Indeed, the expressed purpose of many projects is not to send a product to market but rather to
learn about the market or enabling technologies or even the design process itself.
Dimension 4: Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Development Process
Whereas the first three dimensions concern the products of the consulting engagement, a fourth
focuses on the process. One commonly cited measure of process success is whether or not the
schedule and budget specified in the development contract or otherwise agreed to were met.
Other measures include the quality of the deliverables relative to the project cost (i.e., the value)
or timeline (speed-of-execution), and the smoothness of the process (absence of problems). Two
factors that inhibit success are unanticipated changes in development scope and disagreements as
to when the contractual obligations are fulfilled.
"If there's a lot of R&D, new technology involved, that's when projects start out one
place and end up somewhere else. Success can be difficult to define on those projects
because you don't always end up where the client thought they were going."
- former Consultant Engineering Manager
"There often aren't quantitative specs when you're trying to innovate. 'Give me
something really different and innovative,' but how do you measure that to plus or
minus tolerance? You can't." 
- Consultant Senior Engineer
Most consultants carefully track schedule and budget performance, throughout the project, but
caution that these measures are not as reliable as they might appear to be.
Dimension 5: Quality of the Working Relationship
While satisfaction of the development contract is important, some consultants felt that
satisfaction with the relationship was even more critical.
"If you were to ask the client, 'what do you remember about the project?' I would be
surprised if they said, 'the project was great, it was right on budget, it was right on
time.' I think they'd say, 'the project was great, we did good work, and they're a great
group ofpeople.'" - Consultant Project Manager
Most assess the quality of relationships informally:
"I think a reasonable question is, 'am I exchanging casual emails with this person six
months later?' If you've established a rapport and you have a relationship that can
carry over to other areas, it speaks to the relationship you had on the project."
- Consultant Engineering Manager
Dimension 6: Client Satisfaction
Because objective metrics such as profitability, design quality, and contractual performance can
be difficult to assess, consultants' primary measure of success is client satisfaction.
"Are they delighted with the engagement?" - Consultant COO
"It really all comes down to keeping the client happy." - Consultant Engineer
Satisfaction is typically assessed informally, throughout the project and perhaps in a post-project
lunch or phone call. Few consultancies use formal satisfaction evaluation systems:
"I would have loved if there was some sort of mechanism where six months later there
was actual follow-up. Only on those projects where I was leading it and had a
collaborative relationship was that possible. Most of the times, I'm at the meetings, I
know the people a little bit, but you don't get that feedback."
- former Consultant Program Manager
Client satisfaction is a broad concept, encompassing the product, process, and relationship
dimensions identified above, but it is manifested in two specific ways.
Repeat business
Few consultants mentioned repeat business without prompting, partly because it was obvious to
them,
"I just took that for granted, because one of our missions is long-term relationships,
that's part of our culture." - Consultant COO
but also because it is an imperfect metric for evaluating the success of an individual project. The
client may have been very satisfied with the work but not have need for additional services.
Willingness to rehire or recommend
Most consultants felt that willingness to rehire or recommend is a better indicator of client
satisfaction:
"We're big on recommendation letters around here. So if the client is willing to write a
recommendation letter for us, or if they say 'we're willing to work with you in the
future' we'd consider that a success, regardless of whether the product is successful
[in the market] or not." - Consultant VP of Design
Most consultancies have some process for documenting willingness to recommend on successful
projects, as client references are a common sales tool. Few, however, systematically measure
client satisfaction on all projects. Part of the challenge with self-assessment is that clients may be
reluctant to be forthright if the working relationship was strained:
"Very rarely is a client going to come out and tell you 'that project went great,' or
'man, that was a mess.' You're actually more likely to hear that it went well than it
went poorly, because if it went poorly there was probably some personality issue and
they would prefer not to deal with it again."
- Consultant Director of Engineering
To circumvent this problem, some consultants hire third party audits of client satisfaction, but
most cannot afford to do so frequently.
Dimension 7: Benefits of Project to the Consultancy
A striking result of the consultant interviews was how infrequently they cited the benefits of the
project to their own company. Upon probing, five aspects of consultant success emerged: the
profitability of the project to the consultancy, the extent to which it led to future projects with the
same client, its value in marketing the consultancy's services to other clients, the extent to which
it developed the consultancy's capabilities, and the extent to which it satisfied the staff.
2.4.2 Client Perspectives on the Meaning of Success
In contrast to the wide range of responses provided by the consultants, most client respondents
viewed success as achieving the terms of the contract. Some focused on meeting project
objectives, while others focused on schedule and budget performance or value. In addition to
these, a few respondents mentioned working relationship quality or the fulfillment of their
expectations. None mentioned Business Impact measures or Non-financial Benefits. Exemplary
quotations are provided below, for the two most frequently mentioned dimensions (Design
Quality and Process Efficiency).
Quality of the Product Design
Whereas the consultants prioritized design innovation and elegance, the clients focused on
getting the job done:
"Project success means that the project meets all the criteria specified in the design
standards, to the satisfaction of the review board." - former Client Senior Engineer
"In my book, if 80% of the objectives were met, it was a success."
- Client Project Manager
As these quotes suggest, fulfillment of project requirements is measured formally in some
companies and informally in others. Most were simply looking to get a workable solution,
recognizing that they would have to refine it a bit.
Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Development Process
The most commonly cited measure of process success was schedule and budget performance.
"In my experience, most companies are focused on the narrow project specifics, that
is, did it get completed on time and within budget? The greater divergence from plan is
inversely proportional to how successful the project is regarded."
- Client Project Manager
Beyond simply fulfilling the contract, many respondents focused on the value they had received:
"It all comes down to getting whatyou paid for. To me it's about value."
- Client Manager of Innovation
"One time we explored using another company and we didn't do it because [the
original consultant] was cheaper, so maybe it's just cost. My company is very cost
conscious." - Client Engineering Manager
"The bigger consultancies have a lot more overhead. They offer a very broad depth of
services, but it's going to cost you. Smaller firms, they might be working out of their
house. Better value there. Ifyou're looking for more specialized services, they're more
economical. That's been our experience." -Client Project Manager
Relatively few respondents mentioned broader objectives such as market success or impact on
profitability. This may reflect a view that the typical outsourced project is just a small piece of
the development process. Alternately, the focus on contract performance may result from a
compartmentalization of outsourcing strategy and outsourcing management. Profitability is seen
as a consideration for the decision-to-outsource and the specification of requirements. Once
those decisions have been made, "the project" begins with the briefing of the consultant (see
Figure 4-1), and success requires achieving the specified objectives. For those focusing on value,
the project extends upstream to include the process of selecting a consultant and negotiating the
contract. Success is regarded as the absence of failure, for a reasonable price, much like ordering
a custom machined prototype. Some, however, questioned this approach:
"The problem I see with a narrow focus on budget, schedule, et cetera, is that outside
consultants are too often concerned with literally producing what the customer wants.
I have seen egregious examples where the customer was essentially asking for a stick
in the eye, and the consultants were perfectly happy giving it too them and cashing the
check! Consulting firms often don'tpeel enough layers off the onion to determine what
the customer really wants. To be fair, I've also seen some very arrogant customers
who were entirely dismissive of consultants' attempts to peel back the onion."
- Client Project Manager
Although the small size of the interview sample makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that
client respondents' perspectives on success are shaped by their roles within the firm. Engineers
focus primarily on technical performance, project managers on schedule and budget
performance, and engineering managers on value. In contrast, nearly all the consultant
respondents, whether junior or senior, mentioned multiple dimensions of success. Presumably
they are well aware of all of them, because a challenge for the consultant is how to manage client
satisfaction when satisfaction means different things to different people within the client
organization.
2.5 Confirmatory Survey Results
The interview results reflect respondents' aggregate or abstract conceptualizations of success. In
contrast, the survey asked them to assess the success or failure of particular projects. Shifting the
unit of analysis in this way provided a means to independently confirm the interview-reported
perspectives, and the larger dataset allowed quantification of how they prioritize the various
success dimensions when assessing project success.
2.5.1 Consultant Priorities in Assessing Success
To quantitatively analyze the open-ended "Why or why not a success" question, each individual
response was first abstracted to one or more codes representing the various success measures
embedded in the response. For example, the response "the product is on store shelves and has
won an award" references two measures of success: getting a product to market and winning a
design award. In contrast, the statement "the primary influences that lessen the success of this
project are that the client never allows enough for anything more than cursory design, and the
primary contact was not a great collaborator" indicates failings on two dimensions: the quality
of the design solution and that of the working relationship. In total, the 64 coded responses
generated 144 mentions of 27 different success codes. The codes are listed in the second column
of Table 2-2. Each code is affiliated with one of the success dimensions identified from the
interview phase (left column). No additional dimensions were discovered, but several of the
codes had not been mentioned in the interviews. These are marked in the table with a dagger.
The third column of the table indicates the percentage of responses that mentioned each code.
None of the responses pertained to Non-financial Benefits, and only a few pertained to
Consultant Benefits. The most frequently mentioned codes were Problems in project execution,
the Quality of the design solution, and the Quality of the working relationship. From these data
alone, it is unclear whether these codes were mentioned frequently because they are important to
the consultants or because they occur (or fail to occur, as the case may be) frequently in practice.
Table 2-2: Consultant responses to the open-ended "Why or why not a success?" question. None of the responses mentioned Non-financial Benefits.
Code
Product to market
Product successful in market
Created new product categoryt
Project made client firm successfuli
Percentage of Responses
Mentioning this Code
12.5
6.3
3.1
3.1
Effect on Rating of a
Negative Mention
+ 0.33
- 3.78**
Effect on Rating of a
Positive Mention
+ 1.44
+ 1.36
+ 1.36
- 0.69
Accomplished project objectives
Consultant's work implemented
Amount of rework required
Design met user needs
Design met performance requirements
Quality/elegance of design solution
Novel/revolutionary design
Won a design award
Client proud of design
Project schedule met
Project budget met
Highly efficient process
Good value
"Clutch" performancet
Problems - project planning
Problems - project execution
Quality of working relationship
Earned client's trustt
Met client's expectations
Happy client
Repeat business
Happy consultant
t Not mentioned in interviews
12.5
3.1
3.1
6.3
9.4
18.8
12.5
3.1
6.3
6.3
9.4
9.4
3.1
3.1
12.5
21.9
18.8
3.1
6.3
9.4
15.6
6.3
n = 64 responses
Dimension
Business
Impact
- 1.72
- 3.78**
- 1.77
- 0.69
Design
Quality
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client
Satisfaction
Consultant
+ 0.08
+ 1.36
-0.71
+ 0.87
+ 0.92
+ 1.08
+ 1.36
+ 1.40
+ 0.33
+ 1.08
+ 1.40
+ 1.36
+ 0.33
+ 0.33
- 1.72
-1.88**
-0.30
- 1.10
+ 0.33
+ 0.35
+ 0.33
+ 1.36
+ 1.44
+ 0.64-0.69
- 1.24
**p < 0.01
To address this uncertainty, the second analysis examined the severity of each code's impact on
the respondents' numerical success ratings, calculated as the difference in means between the
ratings of respondents that mentioned the code and those that did not.2 For example, respondents
who mentioned in their open-ended response that the project objectives were accomplished rated
their projects 0.08 points higher (on the 10-point scale) than those who made no mention of
project objectives. In contrast, respondents who noted that the consultant's work was not
implemented had ratings that were, on average, 1.72 points lower than those who did not
mention implementation. The mean differences are listed in the rightmost two columns of Table
2-2, for both positive and negative mentions of the codes. Asterisks in the table indicate whether
the differences are significantly different from zero, as determined using the t-test.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the results for a few of the codes to show the connection to the Kano
satisfaction model. For example, the results suggest that meeting performance requirements is a
Must-Have attribute: failing to meet requirements dropped the success rating by an average of
3.78 points, while mentioning that requirements were met raised it by only 0.87 points. Repeat
business is a mild Performance attribute, as it had a shallow linear effect.
2
1 Product successful in
market
C 00
-$Design met performance
C requirements
* -1
00 C 
-4- -Repeat business
I-D
0 Quality of working
-3 relationship
-4.
Negative mention Positive mention
Figure 2-2: Kano-based representation of codes' effects on numerical success ratings.
2 Equivalently, each difference in means can be thought of as the coefficient of a dummy variable in a linear
regression model explaining the numerical success rating.
The strength of the codes' effects on the numerical success rating hint at how consultants
prioritize the different success dimensions. The codes having the strongest effects were Product
to market, Product success in market, Design met performance requirements, Quality/elegance of
design solution, Problems in project planning, and Happy client. This confirms the interview
finding that consultants prioritize Business Impact, Design Quality, and Customer Satisfaction
over schedule and budget performance or repeat business. A surprising result was the frequency
and severity of problems in project planning. Respondents lamented how much more successful
the project could have been had it been planned such that they could have done their best work.
This stands in contrast to problems in project execution, which are mentioned more frequently
but have little impact on the success rating.
A third way to quantitatively assess consultant priorities is to analyze the numerical success
rating in terms of the other success measures. Table 2-3 presents correlations between the
SUCCESS variable and sixteen other measures that were included on the consultant version of
the survey, while Figure 2-3 presents the same information graphically. SUCCESS is highly
correlated with other holistic measures such as the consultant's own satisfaction with the project
(SATISF), his estimate of the client's satisfaction (ESTSATIS), and his appraisal of how close
the project came to a hypothetical ideal (IDEAL). The correlations with the non-holistic product,
process, and relationship factors are weaker but are generally in the expected directions. To
examine the relative strengths of these factors, controlled for each other, a comprehensive
regression model was constructed (Figure 2-4). All factors were hypothesized to positively
influence SUCCESS, with the exception of unresolved problems (PROBSNR), which should
negatively influence it. IDEAL and SATISF were excluded from the model as they are both
highly correlated with the dependent variable and likely are measuring the same underlying
concept.
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares regression (Table 2-4). The standardized
regression coefficients ("Std Beta") in the fourth column of the table indicate the effect that a one
standard deviation increase in each explanatory variable has on the dependent variable
SUCCESS, measured in standard deviations of the dependent variable.
Table 2-3: Spearman's Rho correlations between success measures, as rated by consultant respondents.
SUCCESS
PUBLICITY
REQSMET
AWARD
SCHEMET
BUDGMET
VALUE
PROBS NR
WORKREL
TRUST
ESTSATIS
PROFIT
LEADIN
CAPABIL
MORALE
IDEAL
SATISF
0.51
0.01
0.41
0.07
0.14
0.33
-0.16
0.33
0.17
0.63
0.14
0.46
0.36
0.53
0.62
0.83
-0.01
0.5
-0.19
-0.05
0.29
0.24
-0.21
-0.17
0.37
0.17
0.47
0.65
0.26
0.14
0.53
0.1
0.06
-0.14
0.31
0
0.01
0.04
-0.01
0.05
0.16
-0.11
-032
-0.15
-0.07
0.05
-0.14
0.28
0.07
-0.01
-0.19
0.15
0.17
0.43
0.36
0.18
0.24
0.52
0.54
-0.06
-0.16
-0.07
0.2
0.03
0.3
-0.01
-0.27
0.09
0.2
0.04
0.02
0.3 1
-0.19
-0.04
0.31
0.26
-0.37
0.02
0.12
0.07
0.09
1
-0.36
0.03
-0.11
0.42
-0.29
0.13
0.09
0.07
0.19
0.24
1
-0.16
-0.42
0.07
-0.05
-0.17
0.29
-0.11
-0.18
0
1
0.38
0.06
-0.08
0.21
-0.05
0.2
0.48
0.32
1
-0.03
0.43
0.11
-0.18
0.17
0.2
0.12
1
-0.1
0.26
0.2
0.36
0.28
0.57
1
0.31
0.35
0.23
0.09
0.06
1
0.38
0.33
0.35
0.54
1
0.49
0.14
0.46
1
0.7
0.7
3 1
0.72 1
p <0.05,p <0.01
IPROFITg REQSMET
SCHEMET
BUDGMET
WORKREL IDEAL
CAPABIL LEADIN
PROBSNR
SUCCESS
AWARD
SATISF
MORALE
p > 0.66
VALUE PUBLICITYp>0.33
p < -0.33
EST SATIS
Figure 2-3: Network representation of Spearman's Rho correlations between success measures, as rated by consultant respondents. Only the strong
correlations are shown.
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Design Award
Schedule Met
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Budget Met
Est. Value to Client - .23
Unresolved Problems -0.30
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Working Relationship
Goodwill Trust
+0.41
Est. Client Satisfaction
Consultant Profit +0.02
Leadin to Future Work +0.08
Capability Development -0.12
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Figure 2-4: A comprehensive model for consultants' definition of success. All variables but unresolved
problems were hypothesized to have a positive effect, as indicated by black arrows. The numbers indicate the
actual standardized regression coefficients: black for positive and red for negative. Thick arrows and bold
numbers were significant with p <0.05.
For example, increasing REQSMET by one standard deviation while holding all other variables
constant increases SUCCESS by 0.062 standard deviations, while increasing PROBS _NR by one
standard deviation decreases SUCCESS by 0.304 standard deviations. The results suggest that
consultants' SUCCESS ratings are driven most strongly by whether the project budget was met,
the quality of the working relationship, their estimate of the client's satisfaction, their appraisal
of the project's publicity value, the occurrence of unresolved problems, and whether the product
won a design award. All of these but PUBLICITY are significant at the 99% confidence level.
These six variables represent six of the seven success dimensions identified from the interviews
(Table 2-1), confirming that the dimensions represent independent aspects of success. Note that
the PUBLICITY variable encompasses elements of both the Business Impact and Design Quality
dimensions: to be useful for publicity, a product must be well designed with significant
consultant input, go to market, and ideally be successful in the market. The consultant version of
the survey did not specifically ask about commercialization or market success because the clients
were expected to be the better source for this information. The data so obtained from the clients
were not included in the consultant success model because the consultants would not have used it
in formulating their answer to the SUCCESS question (they would have used their own
perception of the product's commercial success, which is proxied by the PUBLICITY variable).
Two counterintuitive results are the negative coefficients for SCHEMET and VALUE. The
former is highly correlated with BUDGMET, so the negative coefficient may simply reflect this
multicollinearity. A parsimonious model would leave one of the two out, but both were included
in this case to show which has the stronger effect. The negative relationship between VALUE
and SUCCESS may reflect the inherent trade-off between VALUE and PROFIT. All else equal,
a smaller project budget improves the consultant's perception of the project's value to the client
Table 2-4: Regression output for comprehensive consultant success model.
Dimension Term Estimate Std Beta t Ratio p-value
Intercept -0.763 0 -0.58 0.568
Bus. Impact PUBLICITY 0.436 0.352 2.47 0.023*
Design REQSMET 0.159 0.062 0.73 0.477
Quality AWARD 0.887 0.279 2.90 0.009**
SCHE MET -0.390 -0.252 -2.15 0.045*
Process BUDG MET 0.780 0.462 3.66 0.002**
Efficiency VALUE -0.412 -0.226 -2.02 0.057
PROBSNR -0.895 -0.304 -2.98 0.008**
Relationship WORKREL 0.704 0.410 4.63 0.0002***
Quality TRUST 0.057 0.041 0.39 0.702
Client Satis. EST SATIS 0.443 0.410 3.34 0.0034**
PROFIT 0.027 0.018 0.16 0.877
Consultant LEADIN 0.131 0.083 0.64 0.528
Benefits CAPABIL -0.156 -0.124 -0.92 0.367
MORALE 0.125 0.082 0.78 0.444
n=74 R2 =0.907,R~a;=0.829 * p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001
but decreases consultant profit. Delivering high value increases the workload and stress on the
consultant staff, which could also lower their perception of the project's success. Indeed,
responses to other open-ended survey questions suggest that consultants often rated project value
highly when they felt the client had milked more work out of them than the budget warranted. In
the consultant's mind, the client got great value, but the project was not a complete success
because it did not benefit both parties equally.
2.5.2 Client Priorities in Assessing Success
The analysis used for the consultant responses was repeated for the clients. The results of the
open-ended response analyses are shown in Table 2-5. Compared to the consultants, there were
fewer client responses because many of the clients skipped the open-ended part of the question.
Nonetheless, fewer codes were necessary to abstract the client responses, and a large portion of
the responses focused on Business Impact and Design Quality. This differs somewhat from the
interview results, which prioritized Process Efficiency over Business Impact. Interestingly, very
few of the open-ended client responses mentioned budget or schedule performance, just as
predicted by the consultant project manager on page 34. There were only a few mentions of Non-
financial Benefits, and no mentions of Consultant Benefits.
The strengths of the code effects suggest that Design Quality is the biggest influence on client
success ratings. Accomplishing project objectives appears to be a must-have attribute. The
quality of the design solution is a performance attribute, having strong effects in both the positive
and negative directions. Consultant work that could not be implemented had a strong negative
effect. Most of the other effects were in the directions suggested by the interviews. An exception
was the Novel/original design code. The negative coefficient in the rightmost column resulted
from responses such as "good concepts, but not product ready to drop into our design cycle"
(novel, but requiring extensive rework).
Table 2-5: Client responses to the open-ended "Why or why not a success?" question. None of the responses mentioned Consultant Benefits.
Dimension
Business
Impact
Design
Quality
Non-
financial
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client
Satisfaction
Code
Product to clinical trialsT
Product to markett
Product successful in markett
Accomplished project objectives
Consultant's work implemented
Amount of rework required
Design met user needst
Design proved technical feasibilityt
Design met performance requirements
Quality of design solution
Cost of design solutionT
Novel/original design
Product design delighted usert
Prepared client for downstream
development
Project schedule met
Project budget met
Good value
Problems - project planning
Problems - project execution
Quality of working relationship
Met client's expectations
Repeat business
t Not mentioned in interviews
Percentage of Responses
Mentioning this Code
3.3
20.0
13.3
16.7
10.0
6.7
10.0
3.3
7.4
26.7
10.0
16.7
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
6.7
6.7
3.3
10.0
3.3
10.0
n = 60 responses
Effect on Rating of a
Negative Mention
- 1.02
- 3.34*
- 2.97*
- 3.70**
- 1.89
- 1.76
- 3.50**
- 1.76
+ 0.25
- 1.71
- 1.71
- 3.44*
-0.99
-2.27
- 1.91
Effect on Rating of a
Positive Mention
+ 1.38
+ 1.42
+ 0.89
-0.85
+ 2.41
+ 1.38
+ 0.37
+ 2.16*
+ 2.41
- 0.91
+ 2.41
+ 3.44
+ 0.61
+ 1.00
+ 2.41
+ 1.00
*p <0.05, **p <0.01
Table 2-6 presents correlations between the overall SUCCESS rating and twenty other success
measures included on the client version of the survey, while Figure 2-5 displays the correlation
network visually. Compared to the consultant case, the various success measures are more tightly
intercorrelated. This may suggest that the clients' cognitive models for success are simpler: most
measures of success align with each other, whereas in the consultant case they often do not. In
the consultant's mind, success on one measure does not necessarily imply success on another.
The relationships surrounding SUCCESS are examined in this section, while the other
relationships will be covered in Chapter 5.
Figure 2-6 hypothesizes a fairly comprehensive model of the factors influencing a client
respondent's SUCCESS rating. The various client satisfaction measures (IDEAL, REHIRE,
RECOMND, etc.) were not included as explanatory variables because they likely result from a
perception of success rather than cause it. Each explanatory variable was expected to positively
influence SUCCESS, with the exception of the amount of rework required on the design
(REWORK) and the occurrence of unresolved problems (PROBSNR). The model was
estimated using ordinary least squares regression, with the results shown in Table 2-7. Three
terms - VALUE, REWORK, and TRUST - dominate the model, followed by MRKTSUC and
IMPLMNT. All these effects are in the expected direction and are significant at the 95%
confidence level. Strikingly, several of the measures used in past studies (ROI, SCHEMET,
BUDGMET, and PROBSNR) have small effects after controlling for the other variables. It is
possible that these variables influence the client's trust of the consultant, which does have a
strong effect on the SUCCESS rating. Indeed, the correlations between TRUST and both
SCHEMET and PROBSNR are quite high.
Overall, the quantitative analysis appears to confirm the findings from the interviews: clients
prioritize quality work and good value over most other factors. A notable difference from the
interview results is the greater importance placed on commercialization and market success. One
possible explanation is that the interview format kept the analysis focused tightly on the
consulting engagement. The survey instrument instructed respondents to do the same, but their
responses may have reflected their perceptions of the entire product development project rather
than just the consulted portion.
Table 2-6: Spearman's Rho correlations between success measures, as rated by client respondents.
0
C4H
SUCCESS 1
TOMRKT - 12 1
MRKTSUC 0.56 1
ROI 0.70 0.33 032 1
REQSMET 0.52 0.10 0.44 0.33 1
IMPLEMNT 0.27 0.41 0.37 0.03 1
REWORK -0.39 0.07 -0.34 0.18 -0.21 0.26 1
PATENT -0.09 0 01 -025 0. 10 -0 03 0.09 0.23 1
AWARD -0.05 0.43 0.07 0.17 -0.05 0.25 0.08 0 13 1
SCHEMET 0.57 0 03 0.09 0.24 0.48 -0 03 -0.10 -0.02 0.18 1
BUDGMET 0.43 0 13 -001 0.22 0.29 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.54 1
VALUE 0.71 0.05 0.37 0.38 0.53 o(13 0.02 0.00 0 12 0.42 0.43 1
PROBSNR -0.37 o (10 -0.20 -0.19 -0.32 017 0.02 -002 -0.1 -0.49 -0.44 -0 32 1
WORKREL 0.41 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.35 0)14 -0.22 -0.03 0 15 0.41 020 0.51 -0.36 1
TRUST 0.70 0(0 0.26 0.42 0.49 0,(15 -0. 13 -(.1 ( (0(08 0.53 0.29 0.52 -0.50 0.68 1
EXPECMET 0.80 012 0.56 0.46 0.59 0.24 -0.37 -0.04 0( 1 0.51 0.39 0.61 -0.41 0.58 0.67 1
IDEAL 0.71 0.14 0.57 0.48 0.59 0 15 -0.29 0101 () 1 0.49 0 23 0.53 -0.48 0.64 0.69 0.85 1
SATISF 0.82 0.I1 0.64 0.43 0.61 024 -0.31 003 0.13 0.55 0.40 0.68 -0.47 0.66 0.79 0.89 0.87 1
REHIRE 0.75 0013 0.52 0.24 0.52 0.14 -0.27 -0.14 0.18 0.45 0.28 0.64 -0.53 0.64 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.81 1
RECOMND 0.84 (03 0.66 0.28 0.50 0.18 -0.33 -0.10 0.08 0.41 0.24 0.64 -0.42 0.62 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.86 0.91 1
REPEAT 0.33 -0. 13 018 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.36 -0.05 -0 08 -0.03 -0.30 -0 11 -0.09 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.29 o.19 1
p < 0.05, p <0.01
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Figure 2-5: Network representation of Spearman's Rho correlations between success measures, as rated by client respondents. Only the strong
correlations are shown. The holistic measures EXPECMET, REHIRE, and RECOMND are omitted from the figure to allow better comparison to the
consultant version. These omitted measures are included in the preceding table, and have correlation patterns similar to SATISF and SUCCESS.
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Figure 2-6: A comprehensive model for client's definition of success. All variables but amount of rework and
unresolved problems were hypothesized to have a positive effect, as indicated by black arrows. The numbers
indicate the actual standardized regression coefficients - black for positive and red for negative. Thick
arrows and bold numbers were significant with p < 0.05.
Table 2-7: Regression output for comprehensive client success model.
Term Estimate Std Beta t Ratio
Business Impact
Design Quality
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Client Satis.
n = 120
Intercept
TOMRKT
MRKTSUC
ROI
REQSMET
IMPLMNT
REWORK
PATENT
AWARD
SCHEMET
BUDGMET
VALUE
PROBSNR
WORKREL
TRUST
REPEAT
R2 = 0.839, R2a dj= 0.793
0.954
0.190
0.249
0.321
0.051
0.699
-1.05
-0.133
-0.253
0.042
0.196
0.607
-0.443
0.074
0.395
0.139
0
0.076
0.227
0.106
0.019
0.153
-0.331
-0.042
-0.066
0.027
0.085
0.336
-0.116
0.034
0.245
0.096
*p
0.80
1.14
3.69
1.62
0.26
2.37
-5.29
-0.72
-1.01
0.34
1.22
4.73
-1.52
0.42
2.75
1.63
< 0.05, **p
0.428
0.259
0.0005***
0.112
0.798
0.022*
<0.001***
0.475
0.317
0.732
0.226
<0.001***
0.135
0.673
0.0082**
0.109
< 0.01, ***p < 0.001
2.6 Discussion
The results of the various analyses suggest several themes. First, the interviews revealed that
success has several distinct dimensions, each with many commonly used measures that do not all
correlate with one another, as shown in Table 2-3 and Table 2-6. When interview respondents
were asked to estimate what fraction of projects are successful, most were stymied, hesitating to
answer the question and asking the interviewer to clarify what he meant by "success." Yet
published studies of outsourced product development have often failed to define their measures
of success [15, 18], or have published the results of a subset of measures while implying that
they are sufficient [7, 8, 16, 17]. In contrast, scholars of traditional product development have
acknowledged the many meanings of success [25], and suggested that some may be more
appropriate in certain situations [26, 27]. Unfortunately, many product development studies
continue to use vague measures of success. For example, the well-known Product Development
and Management Association's Best Practices Study reports new product development success
rates in which each respondent answers the question using his own particular definition of
Dimension p-value
success, which itself is not reported [36, 37]. While this acknowledges the diversity of
practitioner priorities, it fails to reveal what they are. In the words of Hart, "much of the
literature aimed at discovering what factors are associated with new product success has skilfully
[sic] side-stepped the issue of what the essence of new product success is" [38]. The same can be
said of more recent research on outsourced product development. The present study brings this
essence to the fore, and the results suggest need for greater precision in measuring and reporting
outsourcing project outcomes.
Three general approaches are possible. The exhaustive approach, which will be used in Chapter
3, is simply to collect and report data using all relevant measures. While comprehensive, this
approach is resource-intensive to gather and time-consuming to interpret. An alternative
approach would be to use a single holistic metric, though preferably one with crisper meaning
than "success," "struggle," or "disaster." Client satisfaction is one such metric, and the results of
the present study suggest that it is highly correlated with most other project outcome measures
and is already part of practitioners' mental models. What's more, the science of measuring
satisfaction is more theoretically and methodologically developed than that of measuring product
development success and failure. Several well-tested instruments already exist, though they have
yet to see extensive use in measuring knowledge-based business-to-business services. Client
satisfaction with design and innovation consulting will be described in detail in the next chapter,
and explained in Chapter 5.
A third approach, intermediate between the exhaustive and the holistic, would be to focus on a
few measures that are particularly important for one reason or another. The Kano model provides
one means to prioritize project outcomes, as it suggests that competition in the design services
market will center around certain performance attributes while other attributes will be necessary
simply to compete. These attributes will differ from one type of outsourcing to another,
depending on the maturity of the market. For low-cost offshoring, simply meeting project
requirements may be a performance attribute, whereas in the higher-end consulting market it is a
must-have. An academic researcher might seek to identify the key performance attributes for the
market of interest and focus on them. For consulting, two current performance attributes appear
to be the quality of the design solution and that of the working relationship (Table 2-5). These
are the measures in most need of academic understanding. A consultancy, on the other hand,
might wish to identify delighter attributes to help distinguish itself from its competitors
(assuming that it is already delivering must-have and performance attributes). Relatively few
delighters were identified in this study, perhaps because the respondents provided the most
manifest reasons when answering the "Why or why not a success?" question. Delighter attributes
often serve latent needs, those that are unknown to the customer until presented to him.
A second way to prioritize project outcomes is to look at how they influence respondents' ratings
of overall project success (Table 2-4 and Table 2-7). The results of these analyses suggest that
much of scholarly work to date has focused on the wrong success measures. For example, very
few respondents mentioned ROI, only two-thirds of the clients could answer whether the project
ROI was positive or not, and even those answers did not appear to strongly influence their
assessments of project success. Instead, they were much more likely to think in terms of project
value, using the quality of the deliverable itself as the numerator rather than some far-off
financial return. Likewise, process efficiency measures such as schedule and budget performance
appear to be less powerful predictors of success than prior work would suggest. Interestingly, the
consultants seemed to put more emphasis on budget performance than did the clients. This is
likely because most projects were contracted on a fixed fee basis. If the budget were exceeded,
the consultancy took the financial hit rather than the client firm. Lastly, the results suggest that
problems are a component of project success but not a large one. Even focusing solely on
unresolved problems, rather than all problems, the measure had little impact on client success
ratings and only a moderate impact on consultant success ratings. The difference in priority
between the two groups may suggest that the consultants are more attuned to what types of
problems are critical and which are merely inconveniences. The results suggest that more
research attention should be devoted to measures of value, working relationship quality, and
client satisfaction. These have likely been ignored to date because of the limited methods and
diversity of respondents used by past research (see Section 2.3).
A third broad theme emerging from the results is the marked difference in how consultants and
clients define success. The clients put far more emphasis on value and design readiness, while
consultants gave more priority to relationship quality and design elegance or novelty. This is
surprising because the consultants compete on satisfying their clients and should therefore be
attuned to what the clients consider successful. The observed differences in priorities may
indicate that the consultants are in fact not well attuned to the client perspective. Indeed, Chapter
5 will show that their estimates of client satisfaction on particular projects are not very accurate.
Perhaps part of the reason the consultants consider so many dimensions of success is that they do
not know exactly which ones they should focus on. They may be working hard to deliver
attributes that the client does not particularly value, such as novelty or elegance. The client ends
up paying twice for unwanted design details: once in the project budget for the consultant's
effort to add them, and then again when the client must rework the deliverable to remove them.
Alternatively, it may be that such outcomes are leading-edge delighters that the clients are not
yet aware of. Latent needs, as it were. A third explanation, perhaps the most likely of all, is that
while design elegance and novelty may not be a priority for the current client, they may be
important for the consultant in marketing its capabilities to future clients. Indeed, the high
priority placed by consultants on product publicity value (Table 2-4) supports this explanation.
A fourth theme is the difference in priorities by respondent role. While the sample is too small to
be certain, there is some evidence of compartmentalization, at both the client firm and the
consultancy. Engineers and designers tended to focus on design quality, project managers on
process efficiency, and project sponsors on value. As one consultant engineer noted when
answering whether the budget was met, "my role in our company is to be immersed in technical
detail, not to worry about the budget." Such role-specific priorities highlight the danger of
gathering project outcome data from a limited cross-section of respondents (unless, of course, the
sample is matched specifically to the research objective). Unfortunately, a larger sample would
be necessary to quantitatively demonstrate differences in priorities between the various client and
consultant roles.
A final theme in the data is the differences that emerged between respondents' cumulative or
abstract definitions of success, as revealed in the interviews, and the priorities they showed in
evaluating specific projects in the survey. For example, client respondents rarely mentioned
commercialization or commercial success in the interviews, but noted them frequently when
evaluating projects. Consultants rarely mentioned the occurrence of problems in the interviews,
but noted them frequently in the survey. This result highlights the importance of collecting data
using multiple methods before attempting to define success.
2.7 Conclusions
Although prior research has reported high failure rates in outsourced product development,
progress in this field has been hindered by lack of consensus as to the meaning and measures of
success at the project level. This ambiguity makes it difficult to evaluate design outsourcing
success rates and explain the causes of failures. This chapter identified the many meanings of
success used in research and practice, organized them into a typology featuring seven distinct
success dimensions (Table 2-1), empirically evaluated their relative importance to client and
consultant practitioners, and began to assess their suitability for use in explanatory modeling.
The study extends the literature by clarifying previously imprecise concepts and by reporting the
perspectives of both the client and the consultant. The results suggest that past research may
have focused on outcome measures that are not particularly important to practitioners.
The validity of the findings is enhanced by the use of a diverse set of respondents as well as
multiple methods of data collection and analysis. As with any research, the study is not perfect.
In particular, the analysis of the effects of the open-ended response codes on the numerical
success rating is statistically weak and sensitive to small changes in the data. A larger dataset
would provide more reliable results. Also, while the study began to explore the effect of
respondent role on success priorities, it did not investigate the effect of functional affiliation.
Finally, the client version of the survey did not contain questions pertaining to Non-financial
Benefits, as no clients had mentioned them in the interviews. Given that none mentioned them in
their open-ended responses to the "why or why not a success" question either, this may not have
been a major omission.
This work sets the stage for measuring project outcomes, which is the topic of the next chapter.
In addition, future research on the meaning of success in outsourced product development might
shed light on lingering questions, such as exactly how the prioritization of success dimensions
differs based on the role or functional affiliation of the respondent, or how the must-have,
performance, and delighter attributes differ between different types of outsourcing. Perhaps most
importantly, need exists to relate project-level definitions of outsourcing success to strategic,
firm-level, definitions. After all, an efficient execution of a poorly considered strategy may be
even worse than a sloppy execution of the right strategy.
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3 The Measure of Success in Outsourced Product
Development: Descriptive Data and Methodological
Effects
Although the risks and rewards of outsourced product development have been argued extensively
in the literature, little hard data on project outcomes exist to inform the discussion, and even
these are methodologically suspect. To address this gap, this chapter measures the distribution
of project outcomes in design consulting, using established concepts and techniques from the
social sciences, and demonstrates how common methodological choices affect these
measurements. The results suggest that consulting outcomes are generally good but vary
significantly between projects. Relative to this variation, methodological details such as the role
of the respondent on the project and the level of anonymity afforded him during assessment have
large effects. Client satisfaction and other subjective measures are positively associated with
respondent seniority and negatively associated with the level of anonymity, while consultant
satisfaction is negatively associated with seniority. Neither client nor consultant satisfaction vary
significantly in the two years following the completion of the project, but assessments of
relationship quality and of the occurrence of problems improve with time. The finding that
methodological effects are of comparable strength to substantive effects highlights the need to
account for them when measuring, analyzing, and reporting outsourcing outcomes.
3.1 Introduction
As product development outsourcing becomes increasingly common, a flurry of articles has
appeared in the academic and popular press to offer managerial guidance. Many provide well-
reasoned analyses of the pros and cons of outsourcing but offer little empirical data upon which
to test their deductions [1-5]. Some ground their recommendations using case studies [6-10] or
expert opinions [11-13]. Only a handful report quantitative data on project outcomes and client
attitudes [14-19], typically under foreboding headlines such as "Design Outsourcing: Beware of
Pitfalls" [17], and "Prevent Disasters in Design Outsourcing" [14]. The former found that a third
of outsourcing managers at large firms view outsourcing as a liability, while the latter suggests
that two-thirds of outsourced design projects at Fortune 1,000 firms struggle or fail.
These results, as well as the skeptical tenor of the entire genre [20, 21], seem to suggest that
firms should limit their outsourcing or at least proceed cautiously, and yet other studies find that
outsourcing continues to grow [19, 22, 23]. One possible explanation of the apparent paradox is
that firms are behaving irrationally. Another is that they have no choice but to outsource, in spite
of the risks. For example, Boeing's ill-fated decision to outsource considerable portions of the
787's design resulted in part because the company could not afford the capital cost of developing
the entire aircraft itself [24]. A third resolution to the paradox is that either the growth in design
outsourcing or the high failure rates have been exaggerated.
Indeed, inspection of the published outcome and attitude reports reveals several methodological
limitations that may compromise the validity of their findings. Some studies did not use a
random sample [15], and those that did achieved very low [16] or unstated [18, 19, 25, 26]
response rates, jeopardizing the representativeness of the results. All the studies collected data
from only the client's perspective, often from mid-level managers. Such respondents might be
excessively critical of outsourcing if they fear it threatens their jobs or if they did not have a say
in the outsourcing decision. The anonymous format of many studies may facilitate such criticism
by shielding the respondents from rebuttal. Another potential source of bias in the attitude-
oriented studies is that they often ask respondents for cumulative impressions of outsourcing
rather than appraisals of specific projects [17, 19], opening the door to hearsay or parroting of
conventional wisdom. In addition, few studies use standard measurement items that have been
tested for validity and reliability. Lastly, none of the reports provide baseline information about
the success or failure of non-outsourced projects. Studies of traditional product development
place the failure rate at about 41% [27], which makes the two-thirds figure for outsourcing, if
true, less bad than it would first appear.
Because of these methodological issues, as well as the conceptual problems discussed in the
previous chapter, very little high-quality data on outsourcing project outcomes exists to inform
academic research or practical decision-making. To begin to fill this gap, the first objective of
this chapter is to document project outcomes in one particular type of outsourcing - design and
innovation consulting - using rigorous methods adapted from the management and social
sciences to avoid the pitfalls that have befallen past research. A random, representative sample
was drawn from a well-defined population and data collected from multiple respondents, both
consultant and client, associated with each project. The survey instruments were developed based
on in-depth interviews with expert practitioners, used standard measurement items from the
product development and customer satisfaction literature, and were extensively pre-tested prior
to use. These details should improve the validity and reliability of the results.
The second objective is to demonstrate how the methodological issues described above can
significantly influence the results. Three specific effects are examined:
- How the data are collected: via a closed-loop client feedback survey administered by the
design consultancies and mediated by the investigator, or directly from anonymous client
respondents
- Who the data are collected from: clients or consultants; project sponsors, project
managers, or project team members
- When the data are collected: immediately after the project up to four years post-project
The third objective is to evaluate whether certain success measures are more robust than others,
and hence more suitable for use in descriptive or explanatory analysis. Whereas the previous
chapter examined the relative priority of success dimensions to determine what should be
measured, this chapter examines their feasibility, to determine what can be measured.
To accomplish these objectives, project outcomes were measured in three distinct samples using
three different techniques. After critically reviewing the literature and describing the research
design in detail, the chapter presents results of the three samples side-by-side to illustrate the
methodological effects, which are then statistically tested and summarized. Collectively, the
three sets of results provide a more complete picture of outsourcing outcomes than has been
presented to date.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Success and Failure in Outsourced Product Development
Only a handful of studies have reported quantitative data on design outsourcing outcomes (Table
3-1). The most rigorous is the work of Roy, Potter, and Bruce [18, 25, 26], who evaluated the
impact of a 1980s British government program to stimulate domestic manufacturing by
providing subsidies for small manufacturers to hire design consultants. The study found that 65%
of the projects were commercialized, with 89% of these generating a positive return on
investment for the client firm [18]. 27% of the firms experienced problems with their
consultants. The occurrence of problems did not impact commercialization rates but slightly
fewer problematic projects made a profit, and those that did had a 20% longer payback period
[26]. Many of the problems stemmed from poor design management by the client firms, 70% of
whom were using designers for the first time, and 30% only because free money was available
[26]. Only 4% of the firms in the sample employed more than 500 people, and none employed
more than 1000 [25]. The study's focus on relatively novice, small firms may compromise the
generalizability of the findings to larger, more experienced firms. In addition, the outcome
measures used may not be the most appropriate. Quantitative financial data could be obtained for
only 91 of the 221 projects in the sample [18]. The study focused heavily on the occurrence of
problems, but the results of the present study indicate that problems are ubiquitous in consulting
(Section 3.4.5) and do not factor strongly in clients' appraisals of project success (Chapter 2).
The only other academic data on outsourced project outcomes come from an ongoing study by
Anderson, Parker, and Davis-Blake [28]. Unfortunately, the results of this work have not been
extensively documented. A 2008 working paper reports mean values and ranges for project
managers' assessments of 55 outsourced product or process development projects [15]. The
managers were somewhat satisfied with their working relationships with the suppliers (mean of
3.8 on a 5-point scale) but less so with the performance, quality, cost, and time-to-market impact
of the project deliverables (3.3, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.0, respectively). Project performance varied
widely, with each measure using the full scale range, but the measures were not strongly
correlated - a project might perform well on one measure but poorly on another.
Table 3-1: Summary of previous studies measuring success and failure in outsourced product development.
Response Success
Study Sample Rate Dimension Success Measure Findings
Amaral & ~ 100 outsourced N "Approximately one-third worked seamlessly"
Para2008 projects at Fortune Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified1,000 companies
Relationship Quality Working relationship * Mean score of 3.8 on subjective 1-5 scale
Anderson, Survey of 55 Performance of Mean score of 3.3 on subjective 1-5 scale
Davis-Blake, outsourced product or Non-random Design/Production deliverable
& Parker, process development sample Quality Quality of deliverable E Mean score of 3.2 on subjective 1-5 scale
2008 projects Cost of deliverable M Mean score of 3.3 on subjective 1-5 scale
Process Efficiency Effect on ramp-up time Mean score of 3.0 on subjective 1-5 scale
D 21% had experienced a project that failed to
elin Quality Wrire tishmeet requirements
Mokhoff & Web survey of 303 Schedule met - 65% had experienced a project that took longer
Wallace, managers involved in 2.75% than expected200 electronics t 46% had experienced a project that cost more00foutsourcing decisions fetthan expected
Problem 59% had experienced communicationProblemsproblems with their design supplier
"Nearly one-third" of respondents from large
companies (sales >$500M) said design
2005satisfaction outsourcing is a "net liability" to their
Raynr, 005 liet Stisfctin Cuulaivecompanies
0 13% of those at small companies (<$1 OM)
considered outsourcing a "net iability"
n 44% agreed that outsourcing improves
-R"Thesthertwo-tirdshsrugglduoreailed
n 600 engineering Unspecified Business Impact Overall financial performance
1998ex sperformance 15% agreed that outsourcing to non-U.S. firms
offers significant advantages
Products to market - 65% of rojects were commercialized
Roy& - 89% of commercialized projects generated a
andter, mediu-sie d UK Business smp Return on investment positive return-on-investment
Roy & anufacturers ich UKBsnssIpc Financials only available for 41% of projects
Potter, 1993 mUnspecified Mean payback period for commercialized
received a subsidy to Payback products was 14.5 months
Bruce, Roy, hire a designNpro benfit s
& Potter, consultant "N y 70% of projects yielded a variety of non-
1995 Benefitsoutsoucing inetl
Process Efficiency Problems 27% of projects experienced problems
Methodological drawbacks to this study include the use of a convenience rather than a random
sample and the pooling together of projects from dramatically different industries such as
aerospace and consumer products. In fairness, the working paper was not intended to describe
project outcomes but rather to relate them to the firms' use of various coordination mechanisms.
However, follow-on articles have made descriptive claims. A brief piece in the Harvard Business
Review noted that nearly two-thirds of the projects "struggled or failed," but did not provide the
evidence supporting that assertion [14]. A more recent article in the Sloan Management Review
implied that outsourcing is problematic but also provided no hard data [6].
A third source of quantitative data on outsourcing outcomes is the surveys frequently conducted
by trade journals and professional associations. These have the benefit of using quasi-random
samples but the response rates are often so low as to cast doubts on their representativeness. For
example, a major study conducted by EE Times and Electronics Supply & Manufacturing invited
11,000 readers to participate and received 303 responses, or just 2.75% [16]. It is possible that
only those with an outsourcing axe to grind, or a lot of time on their hands, took the time to
reply. Nonetheless, the results of these studies offer some insights. The EE Times study found
that 65% of outsourcing managers had at some point experienced schedule delays on a project,
59% had experienced communication problems, 46% cost overruns, and 21% a project that
failed to meet performance requirements [16]. Nearly one-third of those at large companies
(>$500 million annual revenue) viewed outsourcing as a "net liability," compared to just 22% of
those at mid-size firms and 13% of those at small companies (< $1OM) [17]. The author presents
the one-third figure as a cause for concern, but does not state whether the remaining two-thirds
viewed outsourcing as a net asset, were indifferent, or skipped the question altogether. An
ASME survey of engineering executives found that 44% agreed that "outsourcing generally
improves my company's overall financial performance," but only 15% agreed that "outsourcing
to overseas/non-U.S. firms offers significant advantages" [19].
In sum, a small amount of data has been reported in the literature, but its quality is adversely
affected by the use of non-random, non-representative, and/or incongruous samples, limited
respondent perspectives, non-standard and/or inappropriate outcome measures, as well as low
response rates and incomplete reporting of results.
3.2.2 Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Success and Failure
Research on measuring success and failure in new product development has been largely pre-
occupied by the conceptual question of what should be measured [29-32]. Very little
methodological research has been reported on how to go about measuring it, that is, how
methodological choices affect results. The latter question was historically less relevant, as many
companies do not measure product development at all [15, 32]. Now that they are starting to do
so, need exists to understand these effects.
The previous chapter identified a number of success measures that are relevant to design and
innovation consulting, including product design quality, project value, and client satisfaction. Of
these, only satisfaction has a reasonably developed methods literature. Scholars have identified
several important measurement issues. First, customer satisfaction results are always negatively
skewed,I with the majority of respondents highly satisfied [33]. Numerous arguments have been
advanced to explain this phenomenon [33]. Perhaps the most convincing is that customers in
competitive markets have access to information enabling them to avoid unsatisfactory goods and
services, and can switch providers easily if they are still not satisfied [34]. Regardless of the
cause, skewness affects data collection, analysis and reporting of results. While many surveys
use 5- or 7-point scales, others use 10- or 11-point scales to provide better resolution given that
most respondents will only use the upper half of the scale [35, 36]. Skewness also complicates
the use of standard statistical techniques that assume normal distributions. Data transformations
and/or non-parametric methods may be required. In reporting results, mean values are not an
ideal representation of central tendency, but medians and modes show little variation between
groups due to the clustering at the top end of the scale.
Second, the mode of survey administration appears to affect results. Customers surveyed in
person or via telephone report higher satisfaction than those surveyed by mail or self-
administered questionnaire [33]. The reasons for this effect are unclear. Telephone and in-person
surveying may produce greater social desirability bias [37], but that bias does not appear to be
strong in customer satisfaction [33]. The effect of internet-based surveys is not yet well
understood due to their relative novelty and rapid evolution.
1 In statistics, negative skew describes a distribution whose mean is more negative than the bulk of the values.
Third, customer satisfaction typically decreases with time after purchase, in products ranging
from automobiles [33] to medical care [38] to houses [39]. Explanations offered include the
additional information that becomes available after purchase [38], as well as the persistence of
negative memories [33].
Fourth, customer satisfaction results are affected by the questionnaire design. Asking if the
customer is satisfied typically produces higher measures of satisfaction than asking if he is
dissatisfied [33]. The placement of the measurement items relative to other questions can also
impact results [33]. The use of multi-item scales is commonly recommended to improve
reliability [40, 41] and reduce skewness [42], but others feel that these unnecessarily complicate
measurement and interpretation of results [36].
Other factors that have been shown to influence customer satisfaction include the respondent's
age [33], gender [43], cultural origin [44], socio-economic status [43], and mood at the time of
the survey [33], but most of the demographic effects are weak [41]. While in principle these
variables might be measured along with satisfaction and controlled in analysis, such questions
might be viewed as inappropriate on a business-to-business client satisfaction survey. Selection
of a random, representative sample is likely a better way to mitigate these effects.
Less clear is the effect of response bias. Early studies found little correlation between survey
response rates and satisfaction [33], but others have suggested that respondents tend to be more
satisfied than non-respondents [45]. Prevailing wisdom among professional market research
firms seems to be that both highly satisfied and highly dissatisfied customers are more likely to
reply than those with neutral opinions [46].
Lastly, an interesting finding with bearing on the present study is that the source of sponsorship
of a client satisfaction study may have little effect on both response rates and ratings. A study of
patient satisfaction with a medical practice found no differences between two randomized sub-
samples, one of which received the survey on practice letterhead and the other on that of the
university conducting the study [47].
3.3 Methods
The study was conducted in the same research setting described in Chapter 1, using three
sequential phases: in-depth interviews to clarify concepts and develop a questionnaire, followed
a pilot survey phase to pre-test the questionnaire, and finally a large-scale survey. These phases
are described in detail below.
3.3.1 Phase 1: Questionnaire Development
In the first phase, in-depth interviews were conducted with 36 experienced design consultants
and clients to identify seven dimensions of project success (summarized in Table 2-1) as well as
a process model of a prototypical consulting project (Figure 4-1) that formed the organizing
structure for the questionnaire. Measures for the various dimensions were identified from the
interviews as well as the product development and customer satisfaction literature. Wherever
possible, standard survey items were used to allow comparisons to past results. For example, the
client satisfaction dimension was measured using questions from the American Customer
Satisfaction Index [35] and the Net Promoter method [36], the working relationship item was
taken from Anderson et al [15], and the business impact dimension assessed using the same
measures as Roy and Potter [18]. Unfortunately, the exact question wording could not always be
reproduced. Repeated requests for a copy of Roy and Potter's survey instrument were not
acknowledged, so the relevant items were approximated based on wording from their published
articles. In other cases, the existing questions needed adjustment to better suit the consulting
context. For example, Anderson et al's question about deliverable quality references "non-
defective parts," which may be appropriate for an integrated design-and-production supplier but
not for a design consultancy.
While the interviews were primarily exploratory, a small amount of quantitative data was
collected as well. After a few interviews had been conducted, as it became clear that client
satisfaction is a key dimension of success, preliminary data were collected using the Net
Promoter method [36]. Each client respondent was asked how likely he or she would be to
recommend the last three consultants he or she had used. To encourage candor, respondents were
not required to identify the rated consultants.
3.3.2 Phase 2: Pilot Testing
Following the interviews, the draft survey instrument was used to collect data on thirty projects
from one consultancy. The project manager or a project engineer from each project were
identified by the consultancy's study coordinator and asked to complete the questionnaire,
mimicking the method that would be used in the full-scale survey. As each questionnaire was
returned, the respondent was de-briefed by the investigator via phone or in-person interview to
identify misunderstandings and other problems with the instrument. Relatively few changes were
required, so the resulting data are generally comparable to those gathered in the full-scale survey.
However, at least three differences should be noted. First, the respondents were warned of the
de-briefing in advance, so they completed the survey knowing that their responses would not be
anonymous. Second, the projects are somewhat older than those used in the full-scale study. In
an attempt to test the limits of the respondents' recollection, the pilot sample included projects
that had been completed from one to four years prior to the survey. The fraction of "I don't
know" responses began to increase after two years, so the full-scale study included only projects
that finished within two years of the survey. Third, data were collected only from consultant
respondents, as the consultancy was not comfortable extending the survey to its clients. For these
reasons, the pilot sample data are presented throughout the results but kept separate from the
other samples.
3.3.3 Phase 3: Benchmarking and Patent Studies
Sample Selection
The study population for the final phase consisted of all projects completed within the last few
years by U.S. consultancies specializing in consumer, medical, and industrial product
development [48]. Two separate but related samples were used to maximize coverage of the
population. The first sample was implemented as a client satisfaction benchmarking study.
Nineteen consultancies were randomly selected from the consultancy population and invited to
participate. Five agreed to take part. A study coordinator at each consultancy compiled a list of
all projects completed within the prior two years, from which a total of 126 projects (-25%)
were randomly drawn for study. To preserve the confidentiality of the consultancies' clients,
each project was identified to the investigator using an anonymous code. The coordinators
identified one to four client and one to three consultant participants of each project to solicit
feedback from. The coordinators then mailed the questionnaires, included in Appendices D and
E, to 184 client and 104 consultant participants. 82 client and 74 consultant questionnaires were
returned directly to the investigator, yielding response rates of 44.6 and 71.1%, respectively. The
data collected from these groups are referred to as the "Benchmarking Client" and
"Benchmarking Consultant" sub-samples in the results. A total of 62 projects were assessed by at
least one client respondent, 52 by at least one consultant, and 46 by at least one of each type (the
questionnaires had been marked with the project code so that responses about the same project
could be matched by the investigator).
The second sample emerged from an attempt to counter the potential biases in the benchmarking
study. The worst of these would be if the participating consultancies attempted to positively
skew their results by excluding poor projects from the sampling frame or encouraging
respondents to provide positive feedback. Several defenses against such behavior were deployed.
First, mutual non-disclosure agreements were signed to prevent either the consultancy or the
investigator from revealing consultancy-specific results publicly. Second, the consultancies were
reminded that use of the sponsoring university's name without institutional approval would
constitute a trademark violation. Third, they were encouraged to view the study as a learning
opportunity, with the lessons only as valuable as the representativeness of the results. Finally,
they were allowed to add key clients that had not been randomly selected onto the respondent
list. Feedback was gathered from these clients and reported back to consultancy but not included
in these study results.
Nonetheless, at least two other biases remain that could positively skew the results of the
benchmarking sample. First, the consultancies that declined to participate may have done so
because they anticipated poor results. Second, the client respondents may have been charitable in
their responses because they knew that the consultancies would see them. To minimize such bias
the respondents were instructed that all responses would be anonymized and aggregated before
being reported to the consultancies.
These last two biases could be largely eliminated by removing the consultancies from the
sampling process and collecting data directly from the clients. The challenge is locating them.
Design consulting, while growing, is still a relatively small industry, so few practicing product
developers have direct experience with a recent consulting project. In addition, many client firms
prefer not to publicize the fact that they do not design their own products. To randomly locate
consulting clients would require a very large, expensive sample, with pre-screening to separate
the customers from the non-customers. One might narrow the field by surveying members of a
professional association, but few exist that cater specifically to clients of product design services.
In addition, any professional association has its own values and agenda, which might introduce
additional biases to the sample.
Instead, consulting clients were identified directly from public traces left behind by their
projects. Such approaches are commonly used by researchers studying rare or sensitive subjects
[49]. For the present purpose, the best trace evidence was government records, specifically,
patent applications. The pilot data suggested that nearly 45% of projects yielded a U.S. patent or
patent application, which identifies both client and consultant inventors and usually the client
firm (the assignee). Better still, statistical analysis of both the pilot and benchmarking samples
showed that projects which generated a patent record did not significantly differ on any other
dimension from projects that did not generate a patent record. Thus, patent records can provide a
reasonably representative subset of all consulting projects.
To generate the patent sample, five consultancies were randomly selected from the fourteen that
declined to participate in the benchmarking study, to counter the benchmarking non-response
bias. For each consultancy, one or more seed employees were identified from the consultancy's
own web site or public press releases. These names were used to search U.S. patent records for
projects the employee had worked on. Each patent provided names of client inventors as well as
additional consultants, who were used in subsequent searches. Proceeding through the patent
network in this fashion produced a total of 230 projects having patent applications filed within
the past four years. A total of 784 client inventors were identified, of whom the whereabouts of
310 could be confirmed from public records. From these, 262 were randomly selected and
mailed the questionnaire, care of their present employer. Consultant inventors were not included
in the patent sample out of respect for their employers' decisions not to participate in the study.
Unlike the benchmarking questionnaires, the patent questionnaires were not marked, so as to
provide the respondents complete anonymity and counter the "charitable response" bias. 38
completed questionnaires and 18 non-deliverables were returned after one postcard reminder,
yielding an effective return rate of 15.6%.
Non-Response Analysis
Three forms of non-response analysis were performed. First, the benchmarking projects that
produced a client response were contrasted to those that did not on the basis of project
demographic data provided by the consultancies. This analysis suggested that clients from larger
projects were more likely to respond (t-test, p = 0.039 for project length, 0.053 for project
budget, each two-sided), as were clients whose projects preceded later work between the two
companies (Fisher's exact test, p = 0.058, two-sided). In addition, the consultants' estimates of
the clients' satisfaction were significantly lower for the non-responding projects (Wilcoxon rank-
sum, p = 0.004), though their estimates for the responding projects did not correlate strongly
with the clients' actual satisfaction (Spearman's p = 0.027,p = 0.84).
Next, intra-project client response rates were calculated for each of the benchmarking projects
and regressed against all other variables. This analysis suggested that client response rates were
positively associated with repeat business before and after the assessed project (t-test, p = 0.015
for before, 0.004 for after, each two-sided), as well as the client team's experience with
consultants (Pearson's r = 0.64,p = 0.014), the consultancy's experience with the type of product
being developed (r = 0.65, p = 0.006), the consultants' assessment of the stability of
requirements throughout the project (r = 0.58, p = 0.020), and the consultants' perception of the
project's value to the client (r = 0.68,p = 0.004). Response rates were negatively associated with
the consultants' perception of product novelty (r = -0.67,p = 0.004) and unresolved problems (r
= -0.62, p = 0.023). All these effects suggest that clients having a more extensive working
history with the consultancy were significantly more likely to respond.
Lastly, all variables from the benchmarking and patent responses were regressed against
response promptness (number of days from survey mailing to return postmark), under the
assumption that non-respondents are more similar to tardy respondents than to prompt ones.
Later client benchmarking responses were positively associated with the occurrence of problems
(t-test, p = 0.015, two-sided) and negatively associated with project length (r = -0.27, p = 0.043).
These effects suggest that smaller and more problem-ridden projects may have been less likely to
yield a response. Later consultant benchmarking responses were positively associated with the
respondent's involvement in planning the project (r = 0.34, p = 0.039) and negatively associated
with their appraisal of the project's success (r = -0.41, p = 0.012) and their estimates of the
client's satisfaction (r = -0.36, p = 0.027). This suggests that consultants of less successful
projects may have been less likely to respond. The patent sample showed no significant effects,
but it had only half as many observations to estimate from.
Together, the three non-response analyses suggest that the benchmarking sample is likely biased
towards clients with whom the consultancies have an extensive working relationship, is likely
biased towards longer projects, may be biased towards client respondents having more
experience with consulting, and may be biased towards more successful projects. The one form
of non-response analysis that could be performed on the patent sample did not find evidence of
non-response bias.
3.4 Descriptive Results
In this section, descriptive demographic and project outcome data from all three major samples
(Pilot, Benchmarking, and Patent) are presented. For subjective dimensions such as working
relationship quality, consultant and client benchmarking responses are presented separately.
Significant differences between samples are called out inline, and analyzed in Section 3.5.1.
Other measurement effects are analyzed in Sections 3.5.2 through 3.5.4. Because most of the
success measures are ordinal rather than interval, and some are heavily skewed, extensive use is
made of non-parametric statistical techniques such as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (analogous to
the t-test, for showing difference in central tendency), the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (analogous
to the paired t-test) and the Kruskal-Wallis test (analogous to one-way analysis of variance).
3.4.1 Project Demographic Data
Demographic data about the projects in each sample are presented in Table 3-2. Client firms
ranged from small start-ups to Fortune 250 companies (those having revenues > $10B [50]).
About 70% had more than 500 employees (not shown), versus just 4% of those in Roy & Potter's
study [18]. At the same time, the samples contain more small firms than Amaral and Parker's
study of the Fortune 1,000 (2008 revenues >$1.6 billion [51]). The high fraction of projects in
large firms likely reflects the concentration of product development activity nationally.
37 to 56% of the projects involved consumer products, about one-third were medical products,
and the remainder were business-to-business industrial and construction products. About one-
third were new-to-the-world and 30% new-to-the-firm, much higher than the 8 and 17.5% typical
in new product development [27]. 38 to 57% of the projects were to be manufactured by the
client firm, challenging speculation in the literature that outsourced design with internalized
production is a rare form of industrial organization [52]. The distribution of manufacturers
differs significantly between samples (X2 = 19.4, p = 0.004), but only because of the non-
manufactured products in the benchmarking sample. Projects in the pilot sample were somewhat
shorter than the other samples, likely due to non-response bias in the others, but the difference is
not statistically significant (F = 1.28,p = 0.28).
Table 3-2: Key project demographics for the Pilot, Benchmarking, and Patent samples. Only the distribution
of manufacturers differs significantly between samples, due to the non-manufactured products.
Sample
Variable
Client Firm's
Annual
Revenue
Response
< $1 million
$1M to $9.9M
$10M to $99M
$100M to $999M
$1B to $9.9B
> $10 billion
Pilot
16.7%
3.3%
3.3%
20.0%
30.0%
26.7%
Benchmarking
8.8%
5.9%
14.7%
35.3%
17.6%
17.6%
Type of Product
Being
Developed
Product Novelty
Product
Manufacturera
Technical
Disciplines
Involved
(% of Projects
Including these
Disciplines)
Project Scope
(% of Projects
Including these
Activities)
Project Length
(Months)
a X= 19.4,p = 0.004
Consumer durables
Consumer electronics
Consumer non-durables
Industrial & construction
Medical & scientific
Services
New to the world
New to the client firm
New variant on an existing product
Incremental improvement
The client firm
U.S. production supplier
International production supplier
Not a manufactured product
Industrial design
Mechanical engineering
Interaction design & human factors
Design research
Electrical engineering
Other
User research
Concept development
Detail design & analysis
Manufacturing support
Median
Interquartile range
Overall range
n
Patent
5.6%
5.6%
5.6%
27.8%
27.8%
27.8%
20.0%
3.3%
13.3%
33.3%
30.0%
0%
36.7%
26.7%
30.0%
6.7%
56.7%
33.3%
10.0%
0%
50.0%
96.7%
10.0%
6.7%
6.7%
0%
20.0%
56.7%
83.3%
16.7%
4
3-9
1 -24
30
20.6%
26.5%
8.8%
11.8%
26.5%
5.9%
30.9%
33.8%
35.3%
0%
38.2%
16.2%
30.9%
14.7%
85.3%
70.6%
26.5%
19.1%
7.4%
7.4%
36.8%
80.9%
51.5%
19.1%
6
2-17
0.5-31
68
16.7%
16.7%
5.6%
22.2%
38.9%
0%
27.8%
27.8%
38.9%
5.6%
47.2%
19.4%
33.3%
0%
66.7%
66.7%
27.8%
5.6%
0%
16.7%
61.1%
83.3%
69.4%
16.7%
7.75
5.5-12
2-24
36
3.4.2 Respondent Demographic Data
To keep the questionnaires short, interesting, and unintrusive, relatively few respondent
demographic questions were included, all centering around the respondent's seniority and role on
the project (Table 3-3). The pilot sample is skewed towards project managers and team members
because research access was gained through the engineering group rather than business
development. The benchmarking consultant and patent samples are well-distributed, but the
benchmarking client sample is skewed towards the high seniority end. The participating
consultancies were most interested in getting feedback from those making the hiring decisions,
and had more reliable contact information for them for sales purposes. In addition, on several
projects there was more than one client respondent who considered him or herself the project
sponsor.
Table 3-3: Respondent demographics for the Pilot, Benchmarking, and Patent samples.
Sample
Benchmarking Benchmarking
Variable Response Pilot Consultant Client Patent
Project sponsor 6.7% 32.4% 48.8% 21.1%
Role Project manager 53.3% 43.2% 34.1% 31.6%
Projec Project team member 40.0% 24.3% 4.9% 47.4%
Other 0% 0% 12.2% 0%
Involvement in Made the decision ~ ~ 61.0% 18.4%
Selecting the Consulted in decision 24.4% 47.3%
Consultancy Not involved in decision ~ ~ 14.6% 34.2%
Involvement in Led negotiations/planning 20.0% 41.1% - ~
Negotiating & Consulted 56.7% 35.6%
Planning Project Not involved 23.3% 21.9% ~ ~
Read the contract 80.0% 89.2% 80.5% 47.4%
Familiarity withe Read statement of work 16.7% 8.1% 12.2% 21.1%
Did not see either document 3.3% 2.7% 7.3% 31.6%
a X = 34.4, p < 0.001, "Other" excluded n 30 74 82 38
b 2
x.4, p = 0.006
c X = 22.4, p = 0.00 1
3.4.3 Business Impact Measures
Product Commercialization
Figure 3-1 presents the commercialization rates for the three samples. In this and other figures,
percentages are based on the meaningful responses only, disregarding "I don't know" and other
non-applicable responses. Such responses are, however, included as grey bars to the right of the
100% mark to illustrate their relative frequency. As the figure shows, 46 to 58% of projects have
already commercialized one or more products, with another 15 to 46% still in development at the
time of the survey. The benchmarking sample contained fairly recent projects (surveyed zero to
two years post-project, versus one to four years for the pilot sample) so it is not surprising that
many are still in development. Including these pending projects, the three samples are
significantly different (y = 10.0, p = 0.040), but excluding them they are not (X = 2.22, p =
0.33).
Using the very rough assumption that half the projects still in development will eventually
commercialize a product, the overall commercialization rates would be 66 to 69% for the three
samples, quite similar to Roy and Potter's 65% figure (projects surveyed three to six years after
completion) [18], as well as the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA)
Best Practices Study's 70% estimate [26].
Product Commercialization Rates
Pilot 27%
E Benchmarking .8
Patent 18%
0% 100%
EYes 0 Still in development 0 No, project cancelled N Not a project objective 0 Respondent(s) did not know
Figure 3-1: Percentage of projects in each sample that have commercialized one or more products.
Commercial Success
For the products that did go to market, client respondents were asked how well the product
performed relative to their original objectives for it. A 9-point scale was used to provide greater
resolution than traditional binary measures [26, 51-54]. Commercial success varied widely, as
shown in Figure 3-2, and was significantly higher for the benchmarking sample than the patent
sample (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.019, two-sided). The pilot sample was not assessed as the
consultant respondents could not accurately judge the products' performance or the clients'
expectations for them.
As a point of reference, the most recent PDMA Best Practices Study found that 58% of all
commercialized projects are deemed successful by the firm launching them [26]. Assuming that
scores of 5 and up on the 9-point scale constitute success, 92% of the benchmarking and 67% of
the patent sample were successful. If scores of 6 and up constitute success, 71 and 56% were
successful. Note that the PDMA survey asks respondents what percentage of products
commercialized in the previous 5 years were successful, whereas in this case they were
evaluating specific projects, so the measures are only roughly comparable.
Commercial Success
40%-
30%-
20%0 Benchmarking
Mil Patent
0
10%
0% -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fell Far Short of Objectives Far Exceeded Objectives
Figure 3-2: Success of commercialized products in the market, for the Benchmarking and Patent samples.
The Pilot sample was not assessed on this measure because it had only consultant respondents.
Return on Project Investment
Client respondents were also asked whether the project generated a positive return on its cost. As
shown in Figure 3-3, 39% of benchmnarking and 33% of patent sample projects had already paid
for themselves by the time of the survey, while 48 and 44% had not yet done so but might in the
future. 13 and 22% were deemed to have cost the firm more than they would ever benefit it. The
difference between samples is not significant (X = 0.845, p = 0.66 including the "Not yet"
projects, )? = 1.53, p = 0.22 excluding them). For comparison, Roy and Potter found that 58% of
the projects in their sample generated a positive return [18].
Beyond the percentages, a notable finding is how many respondents could not answer the
question, either because their companies do not track return-on-investment (ROI) or because
they did not personally have the data. ROI results are therefore not available for fully one-quarter
and one-third of the benchmarking and patent projects, respectively. What's more, responses
from multiple respondents on the same project often differed. Majority rule was used to produce
the percentages shown below, with ties decided by the most senior respondent's answer. As a
result, these data should be viewed as approximations. They are presented primarily to illustrate
the challenges involved in measuring a project's financial impact. This finding confirms the
experience of Roy and Potter, who could only obtain quantitative financial data for 41% of their
sample and qualitative estimates for 40% more [18].
Positive Return-on-Investment
Benchmarking 13%
0.
E
Patent 2%
0% 100%
NYes M Not yet 0 No N Company does not track ROI 0 Respondent(s) did not know
Figure 3-3: Percentage of projects yielding a positive return-on-investment for the client firm. The Pilot
sample was not assessed on this measure.
3.4.4 Design Quality Measures
Project Requirements Met
Most projects were judged to have met or exceeded the requirements stated in the project
contract (Figure 3-4). 82 to 96% of the projects were rated 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale, by both
consultants and clients. No projects were rated below 3. The four groups do not significantly
differ (Kruskal-Wallis test, K= 4.58,p = 0.21).
Meeting of Project Requirements
80%-
60% a
0 ,.40%-
20%-
0%
1 2 3 4 5
Failed to Meet Requirements Exceeded Requirements
Figure 3-4: Distribution of project requirements performance. The light blue bars represent consultant
assessments of the Benchmarking projects, while the burgundy bars are assessments by the clients.
Implementation and Rework of Consultant's Deliverable
In approximately 85% of projects the consultant's work was implemented in the client's broader
development project (Figure 3-5). Non-implementation occurred primarily in exploratory
projects or in cases in which the broader development project was canceled, halted, or re-scoped
due to a market shift. Only in four projects (all in the benchmarking sample) was non-
implementation due to the quality of the work itself.
Most projects required at least minor rework but projects in the patent sample required
significantly more (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.028, two-sided). Rework data were not collected
for the pilot sample as the consultant respondents did not have reliable knowledge. Most could
say whether their work had been implemented, but lost visibility into the client's operations after
that point.
Consultant's Work Implemented
Pilot
E Benchmarking
Patent 17%
0% UYes 0 No 0 Respondent(s) did not know 100%
Rework Required Relative to Expectations
Benchmarking ' .%13%
E
Patent 7%29%
0% 100%
U None 0 Minor changes 0 Major changes U Not answered 0 Project not implemented
Figure 3-5: Rates of implementation of, and rework required to, consultant's work.
Patents and Design Awards
45% of pilot and 37% of benchmarking sample projects generated a patent record (Figure 3-6).
The pilot sample had more granted patents at the time of the survey because they were older
projects. About 30% of the benchmarking and patent samples won design awards versus just
4.3% of the pilot sample, a significant difference ()? = 6.25,p = 0.044). A possible explanation is
that the projects in the pilot sample were more engineering-focused than those in the other
samples (Table 3-2), and design awards tend to recognize industrial design achievement. Also,
the pilot consultancy tends not to invest heavily in applying for awards. Lastly, the client
respondents of the benchmarking and patent samples were in a better position to observe awards
than the consultant respondents of the pilot sample (see also Section 3.5.2).
Patents
Pilot
E Benchmarking
Patent
0% 100%
N Patent E Patent application 0 None 0 Respondent(s) did not know
Design Awards
Pilot
0.
E Benchmarking
PeU)
Patent
0% 100%
MYes O No 0 Respondent(s) did not know
Figure 3-6: Percentage of projects in which a patent or design award resulted from the consultant's work.
, IM 55%
63%
3.4.5 Process Efficiency Measures
Schedule and Budget Performance
Both consultant and client respondents were asked to assess when the consulting project was
completed relative to the schedule specified in the contract and how much it cost relative to the
specified budget. The results are shown in Figure 3-7. 70 to 85% of projects were rated 3 or
higher on the 5-point schedule scale, suggesting that they were completed on time or ahead of
schedule. None of the four groups are significantly different (Kruskal-Wallis, K = 2.67, p =
0.45). For budget performance, 73 to 92% of projects were rated 3 or higher, suggesting they
came in at or under budget. The high fraction of "3" responses is not surprising given that nearly
two-thirds of the projects used fixed-fee contracts. Again, the four samples are not significantly
different (K= 2.03, p = 0.57).
Perceived Project Value
Respondents were asked to judge the value of the consulting project to the client firm,
considering both the cost of the project and the benefits obtained from it. Because this question is
somewhat subjective, the results are presented on a respondent basis rather than a project basis.
An "unfamiliar with project contract" option was provided for those who did not know the
project cost, which roughly 10% utilized. Although the consultants would not be expected to
know the full benefits of the project to the client firm, they were asked to estimate project value
anyway to allow comparison of perspectives.
Figure 3-7 shows the distributions. Overall, 79 to 91% of consultants and 60 to 88% of clients
rated their project's value 4 or 5. Patent sample respondents rated their projects significantly
lower than the others (Kruskal-Wallis, K = 17.9, p = 0.0005). Benchmarking consultants rated
project value higher than benchmarking clients did, though the difference is not significant.
When their ratings are compared on matched projects, the difference does become significant
(see Section 3.5.2). The pilot sample consultants rated their projects slightly lower than both the
benchmarking clients and consultants, but this effect was also not significant.
Schedule Performance
60%
40%-
20%-
0%
Behind Schedule
0 Pilot
0 Bench. Consultant
0 Bench. Client
0 Patent
4 5
Ahead of Schedule
Budget Performance
80%-
60%-
40%-
20%-
0%O
Over Budget
2 3 4 5
Under Budget
Perceived Project Value
60% -
40% -
20% -
0%
1
Poor Value
2 4
O3 Pilot
- MBench. Consultant
M Bench. Client
M Ptent
5
Excellent Value
Figure 3-7: Distribution of Process Efficiency measures. Note that schedule and budget performance are
reported on a project basis, while the more subjective value ratings are reported per respondent.
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Occurrence and Resolution of Problems
39 to 67% of respondents experienced "Some Problems" on their projects and an additional 0 to
3% reported "Serious Problems." While these categories are somewhat vague, they were used to
allow comparison to Roy and Potter's study, which found that 16.5% of projects encountered
some problems and an additional 10% serious problems [25]. It is not immediately clear why the
respondents in the present study experienced more problems but less severe ones. One possible
explanation is that the projects in Roy and Potter's study were smaller in scale (the government
subsidy only paid for 15 to 30 days of consulting service) but the clients were quite novice (over
two-thirds had never used a consultant before). A methodological explanation is that the
questions were not worded identically (see Section 3.3.1).
Interestingly, consultant respondents in the benchmarking study reported more problems on
those projects than did their clients, though the difference is not significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum,
p = 0.14, two-sided). Likewise, a significantly higher percentage of the patent sample reported
problems than the benchmarking clients (p = 0.020, two-sided). This may indicate biases in the
benchmarking study (see Section 3.5.1). About half and three-quarters of all consultant- and
client-reported problems were eventually resolved. A full analysis is provided in Chapter 4.
Occurrence of Problems
Pilot 47% 50%
Bench. Consultant 54% 43%
E
Bench. Client 59%
Patent
0% 100%
U Serious problems f Some problems 0 No substantial problems U Not answered
Figure 3-8: Percentage of respondents reporting problems on their projects. Blue bars are used for
consultants and red bars for clients. The results are reported on a respondent basis to show the small
minority reporting serious problems, which become muted when the responses are averaged by project.
Problems occurred in nearly all phases of the consulting process (Figure 3-9). Communication
problems during development topped the list, confirming the need for study of interfirm
coordination mechanisms [5]. Patent sample respondents were far more likely than others to flag
problems communicating with the manufacturer, despite the fact that 47% of these products were
produced by the client firm itself. The greater incidence of manufacturing coordination problems
in the patent sample is likely due to these projects being further along in development.
Besides communication, the most problematic phases were those occurring after the formal
completion of the project, when the client firm must accept the consultant's work into its
organization and refine it. These issues have received little attention in past empirical research.
The issues that have been identified, such as poor specification of requirements and development
problems by the consultant, persist but at lower levels than previously reported. This may reflect
a maturation of the industry, or simply the fact that the present study included more experienced
client firms (versus [25]) and more sophisticated design suppliers (versus, e.g., [16]).
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Figure 3-9: Percentage of respondents reporting problems on their project in each phase of the consulting
process. Respondents could, and did, indicate problems in multiple phases.
3.4.6 Relationship Quality Measures
Quality of Working Relationship
Most respondents rate their working relationship with the other party well, with 80 to 90% of
each group scoring it 4 or a 5 on a 5-point scale (Figure 3-10). The mean scores for the pilot,
benchmarking consultant, benchmarking client, and patent groups are 4.27, 4.36, 4.56, and 4.22,
each higher than the 3.8 value reported by Anderson et al [15]. What's more, no respondent in
the present study assigned a score of 1, whereas that did occur in their study. Although
demographic details were not provided, it appears that their study included more international
collaborations, in which the greater physical and cultural distances may have adversely impacted
the working relationships. Likewise, their study appears to have focused on integrated design-
and-manufacturing suppliers rather than design consultants. This may have led to a more arms-
length relationship than the partner-like relationships typical in the present study.
The benchmarking clients rated their relationships significantly better than both the patent clients
(Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.010, two-sided) and the benchmarking consultants (p = 0.050),
suggesting that the benchmarking sample may provide a non-conservative estimate.
Quality of Working Relationship
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Figure 3-10: Quality of working relationship.
Goodwill Trust
Trust takes many forms, from competency trust - the confidence that the other party can do what
it is assigned - to goodwill trust, the confidence that the other party will always act in the first's
best interest [55]. Respondents were asked to evaluate the latter on a 5-point scale, producing the
striking results shown in Figure 3-11. Client respondents generally trusted their consultants,
though the patent sample did so significantly less than the benchmarking sample (Wilcoxon
rank-sum, p = 0.0 19, two-sided). Consultants, on the other hand, were dramatically less trusting
than the benchmarking clients (p < 0.001 for both benchmarking and pilot consultants) and
somewhat less trusting than the patent clients (p = 0.005 for the benchmarking consultants, p =
0.093 for the pilot consultants). This finding contradicts an oft-repeated theme from the
outsourcing strategy literature, that clients should be wary of suppliers "holding up" the
deliverable until a ransom (in the form of increased prices or a contract extension) is paid. It
appears that in the consulting industry the client firms hold the upper hand, which is not
surprising given that design consultancies are small, relatively abundant, and somewhat
interchangeable (in terms of services offered, if not value or quality). Consultant interviewees
told anecdotes of client finns refusing to pay invoices for services rendered, or scapegoating the
consultancy for problems in development. Such egregious acts were relatively rare. More
common were instances of client firms pressuring the consultancies for more work than the
project contract warranted.
Confidence that Other Party will Always Act in Your Best Interest
60% . Pilot
9 M Bench. Consultant
0 Bench. Client
040% - M Patent
0
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Not Very Confident Very Confident
Figure 3-11: Distribution of goodwill trust across the four groups.
3.4.7 Client Satisfaction Measures
Client satisfaction was assessed with the same questions as two widely used measures, the Net
Promoter Score [35] and the American Customer Satisfaction Index [34]. It was also
approximated using the occurrence of repeat business after the assessed project.
Net Promoter Score
Clients were asked how likely they were to recommend their consultancy to a friend or colleague
(Figure 3-12). The benchmarking sample scores are significantly higher than the patent sample
(Wilcoxon rank-sum, p < 0.001, two-sided). The strong negative skew of the benchmarking
distribution is typical of customer satisfaction in competitive markets [33]. The more uniform
distribution of the patent sample is less common and suggests that dissatisfied individuals may
have been more likely to return the survey. 61% of the benchmarking sample and 32% of the
patent sample rated their consultancy a 9 or 10 and would be considered "Promoters" under the
Net Promoter rubric. 10 and 29% provided scores of 6 or lower and would be considered
"Detractors." Subtracting the percentage of Detractors from the percentage of Promoters yields
the Net Promoter Score (NPS), which is +51% for the benchmarking sample and +3% for the
patent sample. These values are very good and fairly poor, respectively, compared to those of
other industries [56]. For example, the brokerage and investments industry has an NPS of +35%,
whereas the health insurance industry trails most others with a score of -5%.
Likeliness to Recommend
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Figure 3-12: Client respondents' likeliness to recommend their consultancy to a friend or colleague.
American Customer Satisfaction Index Measures
Data were also collected using the three measures that comprise the American Customer
Satisfaction Index (ACSI): the extent to which the client's expectations were met, how well the
consulting service compared to a hypothetical ideal, and the client's overall satisfaction with the
consulting service (Figure 3-13). The patent sample significantly lags the benchmarking sample
in all three measures (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.0004, 0.0014, 0.0007, all two-sided).
Although the exact weighting factors used for averaging the three measures to form the ACSI are
industry-specific and proprietary to the survey's developer, they differ minimally from equal
weighting. 2 Using equal weighting, the resulting scores for the benchmarking and patent samples
are 80.7 and 66.7, respectively. Like the Net Promoter scores, these two values differ
significantly (t = 3.35, p = 0.0015, two-sided) and are very good and fairly poor, respectively,
relative to published benchmarks [57]. For example, the most recent ACSI surveys place express
delivery services at 83, full-service restaurants at 81, hospitals 77, the health insurance industry
73, wireless carriers 71, the airline industry and cable television at 66, and the U.S. federal
government at 65. High performing companies such as FedEx and Apple score in the mid to
upper 80s, while low performers such as Comcast and United Airlines score in the low 60s.
Unfortunately, very little data is publicly available for business-to-business services, and even
less for highly customized knowledge-based services such as innovation consulting.
Figure 3-14 presents score distributions for the consultancies participating in the benchmarking
study as well the consultancies used for the patent sample. Two cautions must be made in
interpreting these results. First, consultancies 1, 6, 7, and 9 had only a handful of respondents
each (the exact numbers are withheld to maintain confidentiality). Secondly, different
consultancies had different proportions of client project sponsors, managers and team
2 For example, the U.S. Department of Labor annually publishes weighting factors derived from ACSI data for non-
regulatory federal agencies. In 2010 these averaged 0.33, 0.28, and 0.39 for the Expectations, Ideality, and Overall
Satisfaction measures (http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL6-OOAttach.pdf). Using these values rather than
equal weights alters the results of the present analysis by just 0.2%, an order of magnitude less than the sampling
error. To avoid infringing on proprietary ACSI methods, the present study uses equal weighting of the three
measures, which are themselves in the public domain (Fornell et al, 1996). The resulting index is hereafter referred
to simply as a "Satisfaction Index" and is expressly not an "ACSI score," which can only be calculated by licensees
of ASCI, LLC.
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Figure 3-13: Distribution of the three items comprising the American Customer Satisfaction Index: meeting
of expectations, the ideality of the Project, and overall client satisfaction.
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members. As will be shown in Section 3.5.2, respondent role has a dramatic effect on client
satisfaction. To allow more meaningful comparisons between consultancies, a role-adjusted
version of this figure is presented as Figure 3-15. Disregarding consultancy 1 for small sample
size, the median scores generally range from the upper 60s to the upper 80s.
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Figure 3-14: Variation in client satisfaction between consultancies in the Benchmarking and Patent samples.
Each box plot represents a particular consultancy. The burgundy cross is that consultancy's median score,
the blue horizontal lines represent the 75a' and 25ab percentiles, and the dashed black line the range. The
consultancies are ordered by median score within each sample.
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Figure 3-15: Variation in client satisfaction between consultancies, adjusted for the effect of respondent role.
The consultancies are labeled identically to the previous figure.
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Although not a perfect measure of client satisfaction, repeat business is symptomatic of it [41].
47 to 65% of the projects were followed by additional projects, with an additional 7 to 9%
pending at the time of the survey. The pilot sample had less repeat business than the other two
but the difference is not highly significant (? = 5.13, p = 0.077, pending projects disregarded).
Two factors may explain the difference. First, the non-response analysis suggested that repeat
clients were more likely to respond in the benchmarking sample, potentially skewing that
number upwards. Second, the nature of the pilot consultancy's business is such that it depends
less on repeat business than some of its peers. Some firms strive to develop long-term
relationships with a relatively small number of key clients. Others strive for a broad range of
clients, both to stimulate their staff and to reduce dependence on any one client.
Few benchmarks exist for what constitutes a good level of repeat business from a customer
satisfaction perspective.
Repeat Business
Pilot 53%
E Benchmarking 26%
Patent 31
0% 100%
MYes 0 Pending, negotiations in progress O No 0 Respondent(s) did not know
Figure 3-16: Percentage of projects that preceded additional projects between the two companies. Pilot and
Benchmarking sample data provided by the consultancies, Patent sample data by the patent respondents.
3.4.8 Consultant Benefit Measures
Consultant satisfaction was estimated using adaptations of two of the ACSI measures (Figure
3-17). The resulting distributions are less skewed than is typical for customer satisfaction, but
then these are not customers. If skewness results from choice in a free market, the results suggest
that consultants are less free to choose their clients than clients are to choose them. Other
consultant benefits, such as project profitability and publicity value, were assessed relative to the
"average" project and produced fairly normal (in the statistical sense of the term) distributions
(Figure 3-18).
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Figure 3-17: Distribution of consultant responses to two measures of consultant satisfaction, for the Pilot and
Benchmarking samples. The samples are not statistically different on either measure (Wilcoxon rank-sum,p
= 0.40 for ideality and 0.93 for overall satisfaction).
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Figure 3-18: Three measures of project benefits to the consultancy. The results samples do not differ between
samples, with only capability development approaching significance (Wilcoxon rank-sum,p = 0.14).
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3.5 Methodological Results: the Impact of Measurement Choices
3.5.1 How You Ask: the Effect of Incentives and Consequences
Benchmarking vs. Patent Study
The similarities and differences in the results obtained from the benchmarking and patent
samples in Section 3.4 suggest that measurements of project outcomes are influenced by the
manner in which the data are collected. The two samples differed minimally on project
demographic variables (Table 3-2), and did not differ significantly on objective project outcomes
such as product commercialization rate, implementation of the consultant's work, design awards,
or repeat business (Table 3-4). These facts suggest that the projects in the two samples were
similar. The patent sample did, however, produce significantly worse results on every subjective
outcome measure, such as perceived value, the occurrence of problems, working relationship
quality, and client satisfaction (Table 3-4). Some of the difference between samples can be
attributed to the greater seniority of the benchmarking respondents (Table 3-3), the effect of
which is discussed in Section 3.5.2.
The reasons for the remainder of the difference are less certain. It may be that the consultancies
who chose not to participate in the benchmarking study knew that their clients were less
satisfied, though this seems unlikely given that the patent projects did no worse on objective
measures. The consultancies who did participate may have (intentionally or unintentionally)
solicited feedback from individuals with whom they had particularly good relationships, or those
who were particularly familiar with the projects, whereas the patent sample was chosen
randomly by the investigator. The benchmarking consultancies may have also (intentionally or
unintentionally) done something to encourage more positive responses.
Most likely the difference is due to the different incentives and consequences experienced by the
benchmarking and patent clients. While the explicit incentive was identical - advance access to
these very results to help them benchmark their use of consultants - the benchmarking clients
may have been influenced by an additional, implicit incentive: the opportunity to provide their
consultancy with feedback. The patent clients, whose responses would not be shared with their
consultancies, did not have this opportunity. Perhaps more importantly, their anonymity freed
Table 3-4: Summary of differences between Benchmarking and Patent sample clients. Significant differences
are highlighted in bold.
Success Success Benchmarking Patent
Dimension Measure Mean or % Mean or % nb, n, Test Statistic p-value
TOMRKT 85.7% 75.0% 28, 24 n/a 0.483a
Impact MRKTSUC 6.75 5.33 24, 18 S = 306 
0.037b
ROI 75.0% 60.0% 24, 10 n/a 0.431a
REQSMET 4.08 4.00 62, 27 S = 1222 0.563'
Design IMPLMNT 83.9% 83.3% 62, 36 n/a 0.999a
Quality REWORK 2.03 2.29 49, 23 S = 1054 0.028b
AWARD 30.4% 26.7% 56, 30 n/a 0.806a
SCHEMET 3.20 3.00 62, 27 S= 1154 0.281l
BUDGMET 2.87 3.00 62, 20 S =900 0.350b
Efficiency VALUE 4.28 3.60 79, 30 S = 1237 0.002c
PROBLEMS 1.44 1.67 82, 36 S = 2490 0.020c
PROBSNR 13.2% 22.2% 76, 36 n/a 0.273d
Relationship WORKREL 4.56 4.22 81, 35 S = 1756 0.010c
Quality TRUST 4.22 3.85 82, 26 S = 1127 0.026c
RECOMND 8.71 7.11 82, 38 S = 1643 <0.001c
EXPECT 8.05 6.89 82, 38 S = 1691 <0.001'
Client IDEAL 8.22 6.89 82, 38 S = 1747 0.001c
Satisfaction SATIS 8.51 7.21 82, 38 S = 1713 <0.001c
SATINDEX 80.7 66.7 82, 38 S = 1685 <0.001'
REPEAT 71.0% 61.5% 62, 26 n/a 0.455a
a Fisher's exact test, two-sided, calculated on a project basis, non-applicable and pending projects excluded
b Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, calculated on a project basis
c Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, calculated on a respondent basis
d Fisher's exact test, two-sided, calculated on a respondent basis
them from the consequences of providing a poor rating. The benchmarking clients faced the risk
that the investigator might breach the confidentiality promised them by revealing their project's
identity to the consultancy or the consultancy's identity to the world. Such a breach could bring
harm to the respondent or the consultancy. Even if they trusted the investigator, they may have
been charitable because they knew that the consultants would receive their (anonymized)
feedback, a form of social desirability bias. Either of these considerations (risk or charity) may
have prompted the benchmarking respondents to answer more positively than they otherwise
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would have, or the dissatisfied not to reply to the survey at all. As a result the benchmarking
sample likely overestimates actual client satisfaction.
The patent sample, on the other hand, likely understates satisfaction. The dissatisfied patent
respondent had nothing to lose by participating. No one would know what he said, he could vent
his frustrations, and he would receive results that might help him improve his next consulting
experience. Meanwhile, the satisfied patent client had little to gain from participation. His
consultancy would not receive his feedback, and the study results incentive was less valuable
because he was already satisfied with his present consultancy.
Interview Phase vs. Benchmarking/Patent Phase
To further test the effect of anonymity and consequence, the benchmarking and patent study
results were compared to results obtained from the interview phase, in which the client
respondents rated a total of eighteen consulting projects without providing any clue to the
consultants' identities (Figure 3-19). Their ratings were significantly lower than those from the
benchmarking sample (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.005, two-sided) but no different from those
from the patent sample (p = 0.79), which seems to confirm the effect.
Likeliness to Recommend
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Figure 3-19: Client likeliness to recommend the design consultancy, for the Benchmarking, Patent, and
Interview samples.
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3.5.2 Who You Ask: the Difference between Consultant and Client Views
Differences between consultant and client respondents were discussed throughout Section 3.4,
but were more precisely tested by analyzing the subset of 46 projects having both client and
consultant respondents (Table 3-5). Paired analysis of the objective, project-level outcomes
suggests that consultants rate the completion of requirements slightly higher, clients are
significantly more likely to indicate that the project won a design award, and both groups rate
schedule and budget performance similarly. These results are not terribly surprising, as the client
is more likely to know about awards received after the consulting engagement ended, and
schedule and budget performance are relatively unambiguous.
The more subjective, individual-level outcomes such as trust and satisfaction could not be
meaningfully paired. Averaging responses by project tended to attenuate the differences, while
pairing all possible combinations of client and consultant respondents for each project magnified
them. As such, these outcomes were tested using the Wilcoxon rank-sum (pooled variance) test.
The results suggest that consultants rate the project value significantly higher than clients, trust
the clients significantly less, and are significantly less satisfied. The trust difference was
discussed in Section 3.4.6. The difference in perceived value is not particularly surprising. The
Table 3-5: Comparisons of consultant and client evaluations of identical projects. Only the measures that
were assessed by both groups are shown. Significant effects are highlighted in bold.
Success Success Consultant Client Test
Dimension Measure Mean or % Mean or % n Statistic p-value
Design Quality REQS MET 4.17 4.02 46 S= 42.5 0.064aAWARD 0.25 0.28 46 S = 10.5 0.031a
SCHEMET 2.96 3.01 46 S= 21.5 0.758a
BUDGMET 2.80 2.78 46 S= 3.5 0.943a
Process Efficiency VALUE 4.54 4.16 56,63 S = 3928 0 .00 2b
PROBLEMS 1.56 1.42 68, 66 S= 4161 0.135b
PROBS_NR 30.0% 15.9% 60, 63 n/a 0.085C
Relationship WORKREL 4.45 4.56 68, 65 S= 4215 0.218b
Quality TRUST 3.18 4.12 68,66 S = 5583 <0.001b
Client/Consultant IDEAL 6.38 8.09 68,66 S = 5541 <0.001"
Satisfaction SATIS 7.26 8.36 68,66 S = 5317 <0.001"
a Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided, paired projects
b Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, n = 68 consultant and 66 client respondents
' Fisher's exact test, two-sided, n = 60 consultant and 63 client respondents
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interview phase suggested that clients often consider only the direct cost of the project, which is
nominally higher than internal development, but fail to consider the indirect costs of internal
development such as hiring and training the necessary resources.
The difference in satisfaction is interesting and can be explained by several factors. First, as
mentioned in Section 3.4.8, the consultants are not customers and have less choice over who they
work with. Second, the two groups form their expectations for the project from different sets of
experience. The consultants' comparison set consists of other consulting projects, much like
those in this study. The clients' set may include projects with other types of design service
providers, such as independent contractors and low-cost offshore providers. If these other
elements in the reference set perform worse than the consultancies, it may elevate the clients'
evaluations relative to those of the consultants, who are only evaluating consulting projects.
Third, the consultants experienced different incentives and consequences for participating in the
study. In particular, the consultants were instructed that their anonymized responses would be
shared with their employer but not with the clients. A breach of this confidentiality was less
likely than it was for the client benchmarking respondents, since the investigator did not know
the identities of the client firms. Thus, the consultants did not need to worry about offending
their clients and could be more forthright.
3.5.3 Who You Ask: the Effect of Respondent Role
The results of many success measures were significantly affected by the respondent's role on the
project. Client appraisals generally improved with seniority - project sponsors were more
satisfied, less likely to indicate problems, etc. - while consultant appraisals improved with
seniority on some measures and worsened with seniority on others. The effects are illustrated in
Figure 3-20 through Figure 3-24. Results of statistical tests for differences are provided in Table
3-6.
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Design Quality Measures
Design quality measures were only moderately affected by respondent role (Figure 3-20). Senior
client benchmarking respondents rated requirements performance higher and rework lower.
Meeting of Requirements
-U-Consult. Bench.
-4-Client Bench.
A Patent
4
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor
Rework Required Relative to Expectations
Other
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor Other
Figure 3-20: Comparison of design quality assessments by respondent role, type, and sample. Note that a
higher score means "better" for meeting requirements but "worse" for rework required. For the rework
measure, "1" indicates no rework, "2" indicates minor rework, and "3" indicates major rework, all relative to
the respondent's expectations.
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Process Efficiency Measures
The effects of role on process efficiency measures are complex (Figure 3-21), though some of
the variation is measurement noise due to small sample sizes, particularly in the patent sample.
Two interesting effects stand out. First are the favorable ratings provided by respondents in the
benchmarking sample who indicated their role on the project as "Other." These individuals were
generally senior client managers (e.g., a functional department manager) who were not on the
core project team but held a stake in the project's outcome. Second, consultant evaluations of
both value and problems decline with seniority. Presumably the team members are in a better
position to observe problems, and more confident of the value of their work product.
Perceived Project Value
-U-Consult. Bench.
-4-Client Bench.
A Patent
A
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor
Percentage of Respondents Indicating at Least Some Problems
-U-Consult. Bench.
--- Client Bench.
-&- Patent
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor Other
Figure 3-21: Comparison of process efficiency measures by respondent role, type, and sample.
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Relationship Quality Measures
As shown in Figure 3-22, the effect of role on working relationship quality was quite similar to
that of perceived project value, but the level of trust differed notably in one regard: consultant
team members were less trusting than any other type of respondent. The reasons for this result
are uncertain. It may be that the team members bear the brunt of clients' untrustworthy actions
(e.g., sudden changes of client requirements that demand revision of the consultant team
members' work) but have little power to influence them. In the interview phase, junior
consultants were often more cynical than their seniors, and former consultants particularly so.
They may simply have been less guarded, or perhaps the cynics leave the industry before rising
to positions of seniority.
Quality of Working Relationship
AA
-U-Consult. Bench.
--- Client Bench.
A Patent
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor
Goodwill Trust
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor Other
Figure 3-22: Comparison of relationship quality measures by respondent role, type, and sample.
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Satisfaction Measures
Client satisfaction generally improved with role in both samples, but the patent scores were
lower at every seniority level (Figure 3-23 and Figure 3-24). The effect of role on client
satisfaction is examined in detail in Chapter 5. The difference in Satisfaction Index between team
members and sponsors is roughly 10 points, which is large relative to the variation that has been
reported between companies and industries (Section 3.4.7).
For reasons that are not completely clear, consultant satisfaction declined significantly with
seniority (Kruskal-Wallis, K = 6.36, p = 0.042).
Overall Satisfaction
AMNN -- &-Consult. Bench.
--- Client Bench.
A Patent
Team Member Project Manager Project Sponsor Other
Figure 3-23: Comparison of overall satisfaction by respondent role, type, and sample.
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Figure 3-24: Comparison of client satisfaction index by role and sample.
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Table 3-6: Test statistics for the effects of respondent role on each success measure. The effects themselves are
illustrated on the previous four pages. The number of observations varies from test to test due to "I don't
know" and other non-applicable responses. Cells marked with a "-" were not tested because that type of
respondent did not evaluate that measure.
Success Success
Dimension Measure
TOMRKT
Business MRKT_SUC
ROI
Consultant
n Statistic p-value
Client
n Statistic
a
51 K= 4.57
a
Design
Quality
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client &
Consultant
Satisfaction
REQSMET
IMPLMNT
REWORK
PATENT
AWARD
SCHEMET
BUDG MET
VALUE
PROBLEMS
PROBS_NR
WORKREL
TRUST
RECOMND
EXPECT
SAT_INDEX
IDEAL
SATIS
71 K=0.845
52 X=0.219
K= 0.290
K= 3.74
K = 4.97
K= 4.99
X' = 3.24
0.896c
0.235"
0.155"
0.084"
0.083"
0.1 9 8d
K = 11.6 0.003"
K = 3.95 0.139"
K = 7.75
K = 6.36
0. 0 2 1 b
0.042 b
110
118
93
78
99
112
99
110
117
K= 13.1
?=5.85
K= 9.63
= 4.35
X2 = 3.78
K= 7.36
K= 0.986
K= 24.7
K= 8.58
a
118 K=26.1
108 K= 36.6
120
120
120
120
120
K= 36.3
K= 16.8
K = 20.0
K= 15.9
K= 22.8
PROFIT 54 K= 14.2 < 0 .0 0 1b
LEADIN 72 K = 1.84 0 .3 9 8  ~Consutnt PUBLICITY 71 K =2.93 0 .2 3 2  ~
CAPABILITY 71 K 3.45 0.178 ~
MORALE 70 K =11.5 0.003"
a test could not be computed in these cases because of low expected cell counts
b Kruskal-Wallis test
x test, non-applicable and pending responses excluded
d 2 test
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p-value
0.004"
0.119C
0.022b
0.114c
0.286c
0.061b
0.805b
<0.001"
0.035"
< 0 .0 0 1 b
< 0 .0 0 1 b
< 0 . 0 0 1 b
< 0 . 0 0 1 b
< 0 . 0 0 1 b
0.001"
< 0 . 0 0 1b
3.5.4 When You Ask: the Effect of Measurement Timing
Of all the outcome measures, only a few were significantly influenced by the timing of the
measurement (Table 3-7). Increasing the length of time between the end of the project and the
assessment increased the likelihood that the project had received an award but decreased the
likelihood that the consultant's work had been implemented. 3 Presumably the clients only
indicated non-implementation once enough time had passed for them to be certain the work
would not be utilized. Increasing the measurement lapse also decreased the reporting of problems
(both total and unresolved) by both clients and consultants, improved both parties' appraisals of
their working relationship, and increased the consultants' trust of the clients. These effects
suggest that respondents' memories of their projects improve with time, as minor problems and
relationship difficulties are forgotten. Other variables showing such a ripening effect included
the clients' perception of the product's novelty, the unity of the client stakeholders during the
project (as perceived by both clients and consultants), and the consultants' appraisals of the
client teams' technical, managerial, and communication skills.
Measurement timing had very little effect on other success measures, particularly the satisfaction
measures. The fact that client satisfaction remained constant while the identification of problems
decreased with time seems to confirm a finding from Chapter 2: problems do not factor heavily
in clients' appraisals of project success. The factors that were shown to influence perceptions of
success - value, rework, and trust - all show little relationship with measurement timing. Thus, it
appears that the measurement of client satisfaction is relatively robust to timing, at least within
two years post-project. While it is possible that a lurking variable suppressed an actual effect, the
fact that very few explanatory variables were significantly affected by timing makes this
unlikely.
3 Dichotomous outcomes were estimated using logistic regression, which is more reliable but less intuitive than
ordinary linear regression. The effect strength can be assessed as follows: the antilog of the estimated regression
coefficient shown in the table is equivalent to the factor by which the odds of the outcome occurring increase with a
one month delay in measurement timing. For example, a one month delay increases the odds that a project has won
an award by e""' = 1.102 times. A year's delay increases the odds by 1.102 = 3.21 times.
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Table 3-7: Effect of measurement timing on the various success measures, for the Benchmarking sample. The
estimated coefficients represent the effect of a one month delay in measurement on the mean response. The
coefficients are not directly comparable because different measures used different scales. Estimates in italics
are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported rather than test statistics because the linear
and logistic regression techniques use non-comparable statistics.
Success Success
Dimension Measure
TO_MRKT
Business MRKT
Impact RI
ROI
REQSMET
IMPLMNT
Design REWORK
Quality PATENT
AWARD
Process
Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client &
Consultant
Satisfaction
SCHEMET
BUDGMET
VALUE
PROBLEMS
PROBS_NR
WORKREL
TRUST
RECOMND
EXPECT
SAT_INDEX
REPEAT
IDEAL
SATIS
Consultant
Estimate Std Error
-0.0047 0.0101
0.0710 0.0653
0.0069
-0.0001
-0.0143
-0.134
-0.0855
0.0179
0.0196
0.0133
0.0432
0.0461
p-value Estimate
-0.0132
0.0020
0.0293
0.6 4 2b -0.0050
-0.116
-0.0149
0.0202
0.256a 0.0972
0.700b
0.995 b
0.287c
< 0.001d
0.0637 e
0.0029
0.0004
0.0073
-0.101
-0.208
Client
Std Error
0.0391
0.0510
0.0391
0.0081
0.0594
0.0102
0.0417
0.0495
0.0194
0.0124
0.0112
0.0377
0.0816
0.0528 0.0135 <0.001' 0.0259 0.0114
0.0425 0.0176 0.018c 0.0144 0.0167
0.0794
0.0558
0.0408
0.0349
0.055c
0.115C
0.0073
0.0019
0.0850
-0.0476
0.0101
0.0110
0.0235
0.0237
0.256
0.0465
0.0241
0.0259
p-value
0.736a
0.968 b
0.453 a
0.545 b
0.036a
0.151lb
0.627a
0.040a
0.882 b
0.978 b
0.515c
0. 0 0 5 d
0.011e
0.026c
0.391c
0.756
0.937
0.741c
0.300a
0.676c
0.673C
PROFIT 0.0455 0.0223 0 .0 4 7 b
LEADIN 0.0359 0.0184 0 .0 5 7bConsultant PUBLICITY 
-0.0024 0.0206 0 .9 0 8b
Benefits
CAPABIL -0.0050 0.0232 0 .8 3 0 b
MORALE 0.0235 0.0182 0 .2 0 2b
a Logistic regression, estimated on a project basis. Pending projects treated as No's for TO MRKT and ROI.
b Ordinary least squares regression, estimated on a project basis
c Ordinary least squares regression, estimated on a respondent basis
d Logistic regression, estimated on a respondent basis. Treated as dichotomous to simplify interpretation.
e Logistic regression, estimated on a respondent basis.
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3.5.5 Summary of Measurement Effects
Nearly every success measure was influenced by one or more of the investigated measurement
effects (Table 3-8). A notable exception was return-on-investment, but many respondents could
not meaningfully answer this item, and the inter-rater agreement of those that did was only fair.
Budget performance appears robust but there was little variation on this measure.
Table 3-8: Summary of which measurement effects impact which measures. Significant effects are marked
with an "X" and marginally significant effects with an "x". Entries marked with a tilde ("~") were not tested.
Success Success Benchmarking Consultant Respondent Measurement
Dimension Measure vs. Patent vs. Client Role Timing
TO MRKT
Business Impact MRKTSUC X
ROI
Design Quality
Process Efficiency
Relationship
Quality
Client Satisfaction
Client/Consultant
Satisfaction
Consultant
Benefits
REQSMET
IMPLMNT
REWORK
PATENT
AWARD
SCHEMET
BUDGMET
VALUE
PROBLEMS
PROBSNR
WORKREL
TRUST
RECOMND
EXPECT
SAT INDEX
REPEAT
IDEAL
SATIS
PROFIT
LEADIN
PUBLICITY
CAPABIL
MORALE
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3.6 Discussion
The descriptive and methodological results suggest several important findings. First, despite
implications to the contrary in the popular press, outsourced product development is not
necessarily a "disaster." This study examined one particular type of outsourcing - design
consulting - and found that rates of product commercialization and market success compared
favorably to benchmarks from traditional product development. Even the patent sample, which
likely underestimated satisfaction due to non-response bias, produced scores comparable to those
of major industries such as the airlines and cable television. Customers may well grumble about
the airlines, but they continue to fly, and usually get to their destinations in one piece. Few would
characterize the airline industry as a disaster, and neither is the domestic design consulting
industry.
Having said that, the data do indicate large and significant variation in outcomes between
projects. Even within projects, some respondents were far less satisfied than others. Prior reports
have generally obscured this variation by presenting limited summary data. The variation is
significant because it suggests that the poor project outcomes can be improved upon, by better
project management and/or better project planning (i.e., deciding which projects are well-suited
for outsourcing and which are not). These topics are addressed in turn in the next two chapters.
One aspect of project management is responding to problems. Prior research has focused on
problems as a success measure, but may have overstated their impact. The present results suggest
that problems are abundant but not necessarily detrimental. Indeed, a project that is entirely
absent of problems is either solving a trivial need or is over-resourced and inefficient. While the
product development literature has disparaged over-use of "fire-fighting" [60], limited use of
fire-fighting is generally more cost-effective than complete prevention. The relative scarcity of
"serious problems" suggests that the developers were able to suppress most of the problems that
did ignite. Likewise, the fact that consultants reported more problems than clients may indicate
that the consultants resolved them before the clients noticed. Nonetheless, about one-third of
problems went unresolved, suggesting opportunity for improvement. The next chapter examines
the issue of problem generation and resolution in more detail.
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The relatively small size of this study makes it difficult to pinpoint precise values for any of the
measurements, but the benchmarking and patent samples likely represent upper and lower
bounds, respectively. All the biases in the benchmarking study push it towards over-estimating
success, while most of those in the patent study lead to under-estimation.
The magnitude of the difference between the benchmarking and patent samples is large relative
to the variation within the samples and represents the study's most significant methodological
finding. Despite examining ostensibly the same class of projects, the two samples produced
client satisfaction results at the upper and lower edges of what is normally observed in the ACSI
for companies and industries. For explanatory research, this is something of a boon. Use of the
two samples enabled collection of data with much greater variation than would have been
gathered from either one alone, making regression and other explanatory analyses much more
powerful. For descriptive research, the power of sampling design is more troubling. Results
depend heavily on the incentive structure and must be interpreted accordingly. Design service
providers should be aware that third-party audits of client satisfaction will likely produce
optimistic estimates, particularly if inadequate incentives and protections are offered to the
dissatisfied. Self-administered customer feedback systems will likely be even more biased.
Similar implications apply to the next-most powerful methodological effect, the role of the
respondent. Project sponsors rated projects significantly better than project team members on
several measures. This is a significant finding because much of prior research has used a fairly
limited cross-section of respondents. A review of 47 studies of traditional product development
performance found that none compared the responses from different levels within the
organization [61]. Scholars commonly target senior managers on the grounds that they have
more autonomy to participate and a broader view of the relevant issues. Surveys in the trade
press generally gather data from lower-level employees who are more likely to be reading such
magazines. The results of the present study show that surveying either group exclusively
introduces bias. At a minimum, researchers should report the roles of their informants to aid
readers in interpreting their results. Better yet would be to gather feedback from multiple
respondents to get a more complete picture. Practitioners looking to assess customer satisfaction
would also be wise to solicit feedback from multiple levels. While project sponsors have the
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most direct influence on future hiring decisions, most project managers and some team members
indicated that they had been consulted in the decision, so their opinions do matter. More research
is needed to tell if the junior clients' dissatisfaction is due to something the consultancies can
correct, or if it is the inevitable result of these individuals' lesser role in the hiring decision. It is
also unclear whether the junior respondents carry negative attitudes forward as they progress in
their careers. An interesting comment came from a patent respondent whose project was actually
several years older than its application date suggested: "I was a very junior person at the time of
the project, but have learned from it now."
The results obtained from consultant and client respondents differed considerably for subjective
measures such as satisfaction, perceived project value, and trust, but far less so for measures of
working relationship quality and contractual performance. Studies using client respondents
exclusively may generate reliable estimates for these outcomes, assuming that respondent role is
accounted for. Nonetheless, the supplier perspective remains under-represented throughout
extended enterprise research and merits further exploration.
Finally, measurement timing has some effect on results. Assessments of working relationship
quality and the occurrence of problems generally improved with time. The latter suggests that
Roy and Potter's survey, conducted three to six years post project, likely under-stated the actual
rate of problem occurrence. On the other hand, the present study's estimates of
commercialization rates and return-on-investment are imprecise due to the large number of
projects still in development. This presents a challenge to the researcher: late measurement
timing provides a better view of the projects' effect on the business, but near-term measurement
yields better insight into the causes of those effects. Longitudinal study designs, with multiple
measurements during and after the project, would be ideal, but few have been utilized in
quantitative product development research to date.
Overall, the results highlight the many challenges inherent in measuring success and failure.
Despite its growth, design consulting remains relatively rare and its customers hard to locate,
making it difficult to achieve the scale needed for highly accurate results. Rigorous customer
satisfaction measures such as the ACSI strive for 250 respondents for each rated company [35],
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but a typical consultancy might only perform forty projects per year. Even when customers can
be located, data collection is often frustrated by companies' failure to track project outcomes and
reluctance to disclose what information they do have. Another challenge is that success and
failure is a sensitive topic whose measure has consequences for the research informants. A
concern in the benchmarking sample was that consultant project managers might view the study
as a means for their employer to evaluate their performance, and therefore be tempted to
influence the results. To mitigate this risk, project manager identities were not collected, even
though this has been shown to be a strong explanatory factor in other research, and the results
were thoroughly anonymized before being reported back to the consultancies.
Lastly, the analysis of results is made difficult by the dearth of comparable data in the literature.
Results from the trade literature are suspect for all the methodological reasons listed above.
Scholars of product development have largely eschewed descriptive quantitative research,
perhaps because it is so challenging. The PDMA study, while ground-breaking and highly useful,
may be criticized for its heavy reliance on respondents' cumulative recollections. For example,
the finding that product development success rates have been fixed at 58-59% for the last twenty
years may simply be a measurement artifact: if half the respondents answered 50% and half two-
thirds, the result would be 58.4%. Criticisms aside, the PDMA is a non-profit organization with
noble intentions. Customer satisfaction research, on the other hand, has been largely co-opted by
for-profit satisfaction consultants and market research firms. Although the ACSI was originally
developed at the University of Michigan, its proprietary nature prevents its widespread use. The
Net Promoter method, while a commercial enterprise in its own right, has at least been
completely open with its methodology [62], inviting others to use the technique freely and only
charging for the accessories. Market research firms likely have the knowledge to resolve open
academic questions such as the nature of customer satisfaction response bias, but they aren't
publishing their secrets. The present study, while imperfect, publicly reports data and
methodological findings to begin to fill this void. It is the investigator's hope that it might help
future researchers further advance the state of knowledge.
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3.7 Conclusions
Whereas Chapter 2 examined the importance of conceptual clarity when measuring and reporting
project outcomes, this chapter examined the methodological issues, by critically reviewing past
research, identifying best practices from the social and management sciences, gathering original
empirical data, and then using that data to demonstrate the sizable influence of measurement
choices on results. The work contributes to scholarship by providing relatively unique data for
both the product development community, which has not measured outsourced product
development success extensively, as well as the customer satisfaction community, which has
only begun to investigate knowledge-based business-to-business professional services. The study
also developed a novel indirect method of identifying research informants via trace evidence in
public records. The results contribute to practice by providing a public domain source of baseline
project outcome data, and by demonstrating the strong methodological effects that must be
considered when measuring customer satisfaction.
The chief limitation of the study is its small size, which compromises the accuracy of the results.
A second limitation is that the patent sample projects, while not statistically different from the
benchmarking projects on demographic measures, are not truly representative of all consulting
projects. Sampling from patent applications excludes projects that did not go well enough to
yield anything worth patenting, as well as those whose scope did not include technical or
aesthetic invention. More and more, design consultancies are focusing on front-end user research
and design strategy activities. While these may generate insights that eventually lead to a patent,
the detailed design is so far downstream that the consultant researchers are rarely listed as
inventors, so these projects would not have been located. A third limitation is the somewhat low
response rate of the patent sample. Two points should be made. First, the addresses used for the
respondents were identified from sales directories and similarly sources and not confirmed
before mailing. Many consisted of simply the respondent's name, company name, and the
investigator's best guess as to which of the company's many locations he or she worked at.
While some of the invalidly addressed ones were returned as undeliverable, others probably were
not, so the actual response rate may have been somewhat higher. Second, due to limited funds
and a desire not to unduly harass the respondents, only one postcard reminder was used after the
initial questionnaire mailing. Best practices recommend at least three reminders, the second of
116
which should include a duplicate copy of the questionnaire [63]. Nonetheless, even the 15.6%
response rate obtained compares reasonably with other research. Hart achieved only 18.7% [31]
and the PDMA just 2.7% [53]. A leading market research firm finds that response rates of 10-
25% are common in business-to-business satisfaction surveys [46]. A final limitation of the study
is that the client satisfaction measures used were developed primarily for business-to-consumer
products and services, and may not be ideal for business-to-business. Unfortunately, few
standards exist in this area.
The study suggests several avenues of future research. Additional data would improve accuracy
and may provide additional insights. More rigorous testing should be performed to ensure the
reliability of the measures used. The present study focused on design consulting, which is only
one form of outsourced product development. Useful comparisons could be made to other types,
such as integrated design-and-manufacturing outsourcing or low-cost offshoring. Comparisons
also need be made to traditional, non-outsourced, product development. A useful question might
be to ask client respondents if the project would have been more or less successful if it had been
performed in-house. It would also be interesting to apply some of the less conventional measures
to traditional product development. How would client respondents rate their trust of their co-
workers? How satisfied are product development directors with their own teams? What fraction
of in-house product development projects experience problems?
Most importantly, need exists to explain the causes of the substantial variation in outcomes
between projects. The next chapter begins to do so, by identifying success factors, which are then
tested in Chapter 5.
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4 Factors Influencing Project Outcomes
Design consulting outcomes are highly variable but the causes of this variation are not well
understood, in part because past research has presented only the client's view of the problem.
Consideration of the consultant's perspective offers additional insights and improved
understanding of root causes. This chapter summarizes the findings of three dozen in-depth
interviews with both design consultants and clients. The results confirm some previous findings
(internal divisions within the client firm, poor communication between parties), identify new
ones (inadequate client capabilities, failure to transfer design intent), and combine them into a
comprehensive model of outsourced development that includes negotiating project scope,
continuously managing expectations, and carefully re-integrating the design output into the
client firm's operations. The model is corroborated by analyzing the problems reported by
consultant and client respondents in a survey of over one hundred projects. From there, two
conceptual frameworks are developed to offer insight into the mechanisms underlying commonly
reported problems. These models illustrate how the single-sided perspective can lead to
misdiagnosis of causes, and suggest that past research has greatly understated the influence of
client firm characteristics and outsourcing motivations on project outcomes.
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters focused on the meaning and measure of success in outsourced product
development and found that design consulting outcomes are generally good but vary
significantly between projects. The current chapter starts to explain this variation, by identifying
factors that may influence project outcomes from the literature as well as original empirical
research. The identified factors will be formally tested on the measured outcomes in the next
chapter.
While speculation on the sources of success and causes of failure abounds, only three academic
studies have empirically assigned causes to the outcomes of specific projects. Roy and Potter, in
their study of U.K. design consultants [1], found that "the problems most associated with project
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failure were inadequate briefing of the consultant and internal disagreements [within the client
firm] about the aims or value of the projects." Amaral and Parker found that the most common
reasons for failure in outsourced platform design projects were misaligned objectives within the
client firm or between the firm and its design service provider,I unanticipated rivalries between
multiple vendors, and poor version control [2]. Anderson, Davis-Blake, and Parker, in an
ongoing study of interfirm coordination mechanisms [3], report complex and sometimes
conflicting relationships between communication intensity and several project outcome
measures. For example, co-locating employees was found to improve product quality but worsen
schedule performance.
The strength of these findings is tempered by a key methodological detail: all three studies
gathered data from client personnel exclusively. While the client perspective is critical to
understanding the problem, the other side of the story - the design service provider's perspective
- was not represented. This is significant for several reasons. First, client personnel have a
limited view of the outsourcing engagement. From their vantage point they can observe the
effects of variation in project and provider characteristics but not the effects of variation between
client firms. Second, they may base their judgments on a small number of observations. Most
client personnel have experienced only a handful of outsourcing projects in their careers,
whereas design service providers perform that many every few months. Third, client personnel
may be unduly critical of outsourcing if they fear it threatens their jobs. Thus, the results of these
studies may be biased.
Client-side bias is also evident in reader surveys conducted by the trade press [e.g., 4]. These
studies typically blame poor outsourcing outcomes on failings by the design service provider,
such as poor communication or lack of project management ability [5]. Certainly these do occur,
but they may be symptoms of more systemic, structural phenomena such as geographic or
cultural barriers. The assignment of blame to actors rather than structure is likely an artifact of
the survey format, which is unlikely to produce complex or nuanced explanations.
Amaral and Parker's paper, like many others, did not specify whether the projects were outsourced to consultants
or original design manufacturers. The term design service provider (orprovider for short) will be used as a catch-all,
when it is unclear which type of company the literature is referring to, or when the statements could apply equally
well to both.
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While largely absent from the trade surveys, the provider perspective is voiced via journalistic
interviews [6, 7] and consultant-authored books and articles [8-10]. These provide richer
accounts but are no less biased. The interviewees or authors are typically founders and
spokespeople of major design consultancies. They naturally want to represent the outsourcing
model in the best possible light.
Thus, all research to date has taken either the client or the provider perspective exclusively, but
neither can present a complete picture by itself. The present study uses a joint perspective to
elucidate a richer understanding. In-depth interviews were conducted with both client and
consultant personnel in order to identify the most significant factors influencing project success
and failure, compare and contrast the client and consultant perspectives, and develop conceptual
frameworks to help scholars and practitioners understand and improve project outcomes.
The findings are organized using a process model of design outsourcing, described in the next
section. After introducing this model, the results of the literature review and interviews are
presented in turn. Between the two, over fifty major factors were identified and characterized.
While comprehensive, the list is somewhat unwieldy. To improve understanding, two different
conceptual models are developed that abstract the factors to simpler frameworks. The first
focuses on the activities performed during the process, identifying a handful of characteristic
failure modes and illustrating how a single-sided perspective can lead to misdiagnoses. The
second framework focuses on the actors performing the process, particularly the client firm. Root
cause analysis suggests that many pitfalls can be traced back to the client's motivation for
outsourcing the project. The framework identifies several paradigms (need for extra capacity,
specific technical expertise, or a fresh perspective) and highlights the particular hazards
associated with each. Confirmatory analysis of thirty projects suggests that some paradigms may
be more successful than others.
Overall, the results confirm many previous findings but suggest that existing literature
understates several important factors, including characteristics of the client firm, contract
negotiations, and the transfer and reintegration of the design at the end of the project.
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4.2 A Process Model of Outsourced Product Development
Both the literature review and the empirical results are structured using a prototypical model of
outsourced development (Figure 4-1). The Client Firm starts with a Vision for the project and
Specifies it into Requirements. The firm identifies a Design Provider, Negotiates a contract, and
Briefs the provider on the requirements (in some cases, requirements are specified jointly during
negotiation). The provider Develops a Design, Coordinating as necessary with the Production
Supplier(s). Meanwhile, the requirements may Drift due to external (e.g., actions by competitors)
or internal (e.g., a change in management) factors. Continuous Feedback helps ensure alignment
of Expectations and development but is complicated by Distance (physical, cultural, etc.)
between parties. After development the provider Transfers the design back to the client firm,
which Reintegrates it into its organization and Refines it as necessary. The firm then Releases
completed Specifications to the production supplier. Ideally, Follow-Up between all parties
occurs throughout this process. The literature suggests that problems can occur in several of
these stages, but the results of the present study indicate that problems occur in them all.
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Figure 4-1: A prototypical process model of outsourced product development. In the case of integrated
design-and-production outsourcing, the Design Provider and the Production Supplier are the same company.
Not all events necessarily occur in every project.
4.3 Literature Review
Prior empirical research has focused on factors related to the specification of requirements, the
capabilities of the design provider (consultant or original design manufacturer, depending on the
study), the quality of the briefing, and the extent of feedback during development. Theoretical
literature on product development and systems engineering suggest additional factors related to
distance, feedback, and reintegration. In the following review, the identified factors are
organized topically, based on the concepts shown in Figure 4-1.
4.3.1 Factors related to the Client Firm
Client firm size may affect project outcomes, but the nature of the relationship is unclear. Roy
and Potter [1] found that severe problems "were much more likely to occur in the firms with
under 50 employees and especially affected the smallest firms with under 10 employees." The
authors attributed this to lack of experience and lack of time on the part of the employees. On the
other hand, Rayner [4] reported that managers at large firms (sales >$500 million) view design
outsourcing less favorably than those at mid-sized ($10 million to $500 million) and small
companies. He attributed this to the fact that larger firms were more likely to outsource complete
systems, partner with original design manufacturers rather than consultancies, and outsource
overseas rather than domestically. Although not stated, the implication is that outsourcing of
partial systems, to design consultants and domestic providers, is viewed more favorably.
4.3.2 Factors related to the Specification of Requirements
Poor specification of requirements has been frequently cited as a cause of poor project outcomes.
The client firm must know what it wants to accomplish [7], develop mature specifications [6,
11], and achieve consensus about both the product specifications and the objectives of the
outsourcing engagement [1, 2].
127
4.3.3 Factors related to the Design Service Provider
The trade literature in particular assigns blame for poor outcomes to inadequate technical,
managerial, and communication capabilities on the part of the design provider [5-7]. Numerous
articles advise client firms to "shop around" and choose their provider carefully [1, 6, 7, 12], but
the interview results presented later in this chapter indicate that shopping for the best price can
be counter-productive.
4.3.4 Factors related to the Distance between Parties
Knowledge transfer theory suggests that increasing the distance between the client firm and the
design service provider will adversely affect project outcomes. Physical distance hinders
communication [13], as do language barriers. Cultural distance complicates coordination because
each party may be unfamiliar with the other's norms and values, while organizational distance
weakens project management by disabling mechanisms such as hierarchy, standard procedures,
and management by objective [14]. Organizational barriers may also reduce mutual respect and
trust between parties, limiting information flow across firm boundaries [12].
4.3.5 Factors related to the Briefing
Related to specification, poor transfer of requirements to the design provider compromises
development. None of the projects in Roy and Potter's sample that had a "poor" design brief
were implemented profitably, a finding echoed anecdotally [6, 7, 12].
4.3.6 Factors related to Discontinuities in Development Team Membership
Consistent project team membership is critical for in-house product development [15], and is no
less so for outsourced development. Several companies in Roy and Potter's study expressed
concern that they had briefed the project with senior consultant personnel, who then passed the
work on to "an inexperienced junior person." Arguing from a theoretical basis, Baldwin and
Clark [16] note the risk that a design provider will reassign its personnel to other clients at the
conclusion of development, making follow-up or re-engagement with the original team difficult.
128
4.3.7 Factors related to Development
Roy and Potter report that only 20% of projects in which design work was "poor" were
implemented profitably by the client firm. Problems with the work included failing to satisfy the
brief, being impractical to manufacture, or exceeding the project schedule.
4.3.8 Factors related to Drift in Requirements
Anecdotal evidence suggests that client firms' requirements often shift during the course of the
project. "A common problem is that a company will see a competitor bring out a new product,
which inclines them to bring out a copycat version" (Paul Priestman, quoted in [7]). Internally,
the client firm may undergo a change in senor management or a financial downturn [17].
4.3.9 Factors related to Feedback
"Poor communication" is an oft-repeated theme that deserves clarification. To manage
expectations, the design provider must continuously communicate the status of development,
including the inevitable changes that occur as initial uncertainty is resolved [1, 6, 7].
Simultaneously, the client must continuously communicate the status of its expectations,
especially any changes in project requirements [ibid., also 12]. The use of boundary spanning
objects [18] and personnel [19], as well as information technology tools [14], have been
recommended to improve coordination across organizational barriers. In an ongoing project,
Anderson and colleagues [3] are specifically investigating the effects of various coordination
mechanisms on project outcomes.
4.3.10 Factors related to Reintegration
The reintegration of the design into the client firm can be hindered by both personal and
organizational resistance. "Just bringing in an outside designer without preparing the
organization for this, which is what some companies do, can work very badly. The 'not-
invented-here' syndrome often means that [outside] designer-inspired ideas are rejected" [7]. In
addition, the firm may unwittingly reject the design if its architecture does not match that of the
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organization [20]. Sanchez and Mahoney [21] noted that "although organizations ostensibly
design products, it can be argued that products design organizations, because the coordination
tasks implicit in specific product designs largely determine the feasible organization designs for
developing and producing those products." If the product design developed by the design service
provider does not match the existing organization design, either the organization must adapt to
the product - a challenge, given that organizations are slow to change [22] - or the product will
be altered to match the organization, perhaps losing essential architectural structure or the
originality which motivated outsourcing its design in the first place.
4.3.11 Factors related to Refinement
Lastly, project success is favored by the client firm's commitment to carrying it through. Roy
and Potter [1] observed several examples of projects "which only yielded commercial returns
because the firm was willing to persist with the work even when the consultant's proposed
design was unsatisfactory."
4.4 Methods
The study was conducted using the same research setting and design described in previous
chapters. In the interview phase respondents were first asked several open-ended questions
intended to reveal factors that influence project outcomes for better or for worse. They were then
surveyed using a closed-form questionnaire, which asked how frequently they encountered
various pitfalls suggested by the literature. This allowed assessment of factors that the
respondents deemed unimportant or had forgotten to mention in the interview. The interview
template and questionnaire are included as Appendix A.
Interview notes and audio transcripts were coded and analyzed using grounded theory [23]. Both
direct and indirect responses were considered. For instance, a respondent might deny the
occurrence of a particular problem but note the measures taken to prevent it. The indirect
responses help to provide a more complete picture, hinting at latent beliefs as well as those that
the respondent withheld because of gamesmanship or social desirability bias. The author's thesis
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supervisor reviewed the emergent coding schema and resulting theory throughout the process to
provide an objective second opinion.
The coded interview data and the questionnaire results were then analyzed to identify the most
significant factors influencing project success and failure. In the spirit of failure modes and
effects analysis, the frequency, severity, and likelihood of detection were all considered in rating
factors as Significant, Moderate, or Minor risks. Explanatory models were then derived from
these results as well as from existing theory.
Data from the pilot (Phase 2) and benchmarking/patent (Phase 3) studies were used to validate
and quantify the findings from the interview phase. The problems reported in each study were
compiled and compared to the list of risk factors identified from the interviews. To validate the
explanatory frameworks, the responses of highly dissatisfied clients and their consultants were
examined in greater detail to determine the origins of their dissatisfaction.
4.5 Identification of Factors Influencing Project Outcomes
4.5.1 Interview Results
The interview participants identified dozens of factors that influence project outcomes. Figure
4-2 depicts the fifteen most frequently mentioned. For ease of interpretation, all are worded as
risk factors, but the original comments were actually a mix of cautions and positive
recommendations. Consultants focused on the management of the client's expectations, as well
as the challenges posed by novice clients. Clients focused on traditional supply chain concerns
such as the consultant's capability, the quality of the specification, and physical distance between
parties. The consultants tended to mention more factors each, so the fraction of consultants
mentioning any particular factor is generally higher than for the clients.
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Most Common Open-Ended Responses
Consultant fails to
manage expectations
Product requirements
under-defined
Geographic distance I
between parties
Consultant lacks tech. capability
or domain experience
Client over-manages innovation;
inflexible and risk-averse
Client overly aggressive
on project cost
Internal divisions
within client firm
Client lacks technical capability
or domain experience
Misunderstandings about
project objectives
Client lacks capability,
experience managing NPD
Client not a knowledgeable
buyer of design services
Consultant fails to engage
clients in collaboration
Consultant oversells
capabilities
Client inadequately
involved - lack of time
"Blue-sky"
project
0.0 0.2 0.4
Fraction of Respondents
N Direct mentions
Figure 4-2: Frequently cited factors. Dark shades indicate direct menti
For each item, the upper (blue) bar indicates consultant responses and
0.6 0.8
Mentioning Each Factor
o Indirect mentions
)ns and light shades indirect mentions.
the lower (red) bar client responses.
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Many of these factors were also rated highly in the closed-form questionnaire (Figure 4-3). A
striking finding is that most of the highly-rated factors are directed at the client firm rather than
the consultancy. Both consultant and client respondents considered the client's project
management, communication, commitment, and stakeholder unity to be more of a concern than
those of the consultancy.
Given the small sample size, these figures should be considered illustrative rather than definitive.
In addition, many other factors were identified beyond those shown in the figures. Rather than
attempt to quantify them, the factors were organized typologically and assessed qualitatively.
Table 4-1 compiles 51 of the more significant factors reported by the empirical literature and by
the consultant and client informants. The relative risk of each factor is presented, allowing
comparisons to be made between the three perspectives. The interviews confirm many of the
factors reported in the literature, refine others, and add new ones. Those that significantly extend
or refine the literature are discussed in further detail in the subsequent sections. Direct quotations
from the interviews are used extensively to give the reader a feel for the raw data. They have
been edited slightly for readability and to protect confidentiality.
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Highest-Rated Questionnaire Items
Client overly aggressive
on project cost
Misunderstandings about
project objectives
Client overly aggressive
on project schedule
Uncertainty - difficult to
price project accurately
Client not a
knowledgeable buyer
Unexpected
changes of scope
Product requirements
under-defined
Poor project
management by client
Client inadequately
involved - lack of time
Client fails to perform
necessary follow-on work
Poor communication
by client
Poor
design brief
Intemal divisions
within client firm
Decisions
not documented
Consultant
oversells services
0.4 0.6 0.8
Fraction of Respondents
N Nearly always 0 Frequently
Figure 4-3: Most frequently encountered risk factors. Dark shades indicate the fraction of respondents
choosing "5" and light shades "4" on the 5-point scale. Blue bars indicate consultants and red bars clients.
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Table 4-1: Risk factors in outsourced product development. Empty cells were not mentioned, while cells
marked with a dash were deemed to be negligible risk.
According to the: Literature Consultants Clients
Client Firm
- Lacks capability, experience, and/or processes for managing
new product development
- Lacks experience with, is not a knowledgeable buyer of, design
services
- Attempts to over-manage, over-schedule innovation; is inflexible
and overly risk-averse
- Lacks technical capabilities and/or domain experience
- Project team does not include or consult all stakeholders
- Project team lacks leadership, authority, and/or influence within
client organization
- Client firm is very large or very small
Specification of Requirements
- Project lacks definition; client cannot specify what it wants
- Divisions within the client firm over project objectives
- Project is about blue sky, radical innovation
- Project has high technical risk; over-constrained requirements
Negotiation
- Client is overly focused on cost and schedule, neglecting quality
- Misunderstandings about project objectives
- Inherent development uncertainty; difficult to price project
- Consultant oversells their capabilities or the likelihood of project
success
Consultant
- Lacks technical capabilities and/or domain experience
- Lacks project management capability
Distance between Client Firm and Consultant
- Geographic distance
- Corporate cultural distance
- Organizational distance: standard processes, incentives
- Misalignment of objectives
International distance
Briefing
- Poor briefing, due to difficulty of encapsulating client's tacit
knowledge
- Poor briefing, due to client ignorance or carelessness
- Poor briefing, due to client deliberately withholding information
so as not to constrain creativity
Significant Significant
Significant Significant
Moderate Significant
Moderate Moderate
[1] Moderate Moderate
Moderate Minor
[1, 4]
[1, 6, 7]
[1, 2, 7]
Significant
Significant
Minor
Moderate
Significant
Significant
Significant
16] Moderate
[5, 6]
[1, 5]
[1]
[12]
[1, 21
[6]
Moderate
Minor
Minor
Moderate
Moderate
Minor
Significant
Moderate
Moderate
Significant
Significant
Significant
Minor
Moderate
Significant
Minor
Minor
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate Significant
[1, 6, 7] Moderate
Moderate
Minor
Minor
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Risk factors in outsourced product development (continued).
According to the: Literature Consultants
Discontinuities in Team Membership
- Discontinuities in client project team
- Discontinuities in consultant project team
Development
- Unexpected changes of scope
- Consultant personnel insufficiently engaged due to lack of time
- Design impractical; ignores constraints
- Design work poor
- Consultant ignores the brief, "does own thing"
- Rivalries between multiple vendors
Drift in Requirements
- Client adds or changes requirements, compromising budget;
scope creep
- Changes in client's senior management or financial situation
Feedback
- Client does not communicate frequently enough, police the
brief, and/or provide prompt replies to questions
- Consultant does not communicate frequently enough and/or
manage client's expectations
- Client inadequately involved due to lack of time
- Client inadequately involved because consultant and/or client
personnel do not enjoy collaboration
- Personality conflicts; poor working relationship
- Development decisions and/or scope changes not documented
- Poor version control
Transfer of Design to Client Firm
- Deliverable does not include design history or intent
- Transfer of design too abrupt, a handoff mentality
- Poor transfer due to consultant negligence
Reintegration of Design into Client Firm
- Client personnel resist design; Not-Invented-Here
- Client organization resists design
Refinement of Design by Client Firm
- Client fails to perform necessary follow-on work
- Client makes changes that compromise the design intent
Follow-up with Consultant
- Client fails to involve the consultant after the design transfer
Li]
[7]
[1, 12]
[1, 12]
[11
[1, 12]
[21
Moderate
Minor
Moderate
Moderate
Minor
[7] Moderate
[7, 17]
[1,6, 7,
Minor
Significant
[1, 5-7] Significant
Minor
Minor
Moderate
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Moderate
Moderate
[1] Moderate Significant
Moderate Minor
Moderate Moderate
Moderate Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Minor
Moderate
Minor
Moderate
[7] Moderate Moderate
Moderate Moderate
[1I] Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Minor
Production Supplier
- Consultant not put in contact with supplier early in project Moderate Moderate
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Clients
Factors related to the Client Firm
Capabilities. Respondents noted three client capabilities that improve the likelihood of project
success: capability in managing new product development, experience with outsourced product
development, and technical expertise sufficient to specify requirements, monitor development,
and refine the delivered design. Firms lacking these capabilities include start-ups and holding
companies, as well as established process- and service-driven companies with little experience in
physical product development.
Corporate culture. While novice firms lack experience, established firms may suffer from
several cultural factors. Client respondents in particular noted that highly structured companies
try to overly prescribe or schedule creative innovation:
"Everyone's gone to a Six Sigma mindset, where you try to make sure that eight of ten
projects actually go to market. That's a good approach for line extensions, but if you
really want explosive innovation it's not going to get you there."
- former Client Project Manager
Consultants stressed that innovation is an iterative, free-flowing activity, and that success is
favored by a client culture that is flexible, open-minded, and trusting:
"Our process is very open and flexible and we need a client who works that way too. A
lot of it is apparent during the sales process. If they're really focused on cost and
deliverables from the get-go, that's a big warning sign to me... The clients that are the
most rigid actually need our help the most, but they may not be receptive to the way
that we work." -Consultant Project Manager
"Certainly we have to put schedules together, but if their anxiety and fear compel them
to micromanage the process, it's not going to be a successful engagement."
- Consultant Project Manager
Both consultants and clients noted that large bureaucratic client firms often are not nimble
enough to keep up with the smaller consultancy. In particular, some firms tend to involve too
many people in decision making.
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Project team. Although development is outsourced, the composition of the client-side project
team remains critical. All key stakeholders must be included or at least consulted.
"It's having the right people in the meetings. When there's supposed to be someone
who's providing technical depth on their side, they have technical depth. They're
familiar with the company, it's not just some new person. I think a clear sign that
failure is going to happen is when it's just the marketing posse, or some subset of their
organization that itself doesn't have the power to make it happen."
- former Consultant Project Manager
To mitigate the risk that the project will not ultimately be accepted by the client organization, the
client's team should include a "diplomat" who is deeply familiar with, and ideally powerful
within, the organization and its politics. Strong client team leadership is also critical. Problems
often occur when the consultant's key contact is not the true decision maker.
"Too many clients have project managers, not project leaders. I say it that way for a
reason. Ifyou're going to be successful you have to drive the project with a leader. In
larger companies project managers are basically schedule facilitators and
documentation providers to management. Status updates, budget updates, meeting
minutes. They're not the one who is going to drive actual decisions. When there's a
disagreement between disciplines, they're not in a position of authority to manage that
conflict and negotiate a consensus decision." - Consultant Engineering Director
A "heavyweight project manager" [24] is often more effective.
Factors related to the Specification of Requirements
Internal divisions. Prior studies noted internal divisions within the client over project objectives,
but the interviews suggest that divisions run much deeper. In many firms, functional specialists
do not even communicate with each other, let alone achieve consensus on project objectives:
"It doesn't even seem to be necessarily endemic to larger companies. We've worked
with some very small start-ups, there may only be a handful of people. Those people
don't communicate. How hard is it? You're right there! There are only three of you!
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But you'll get different answers from different people, whoever happens to pick up the
phone is going to give you a different answer." - Consultant Design Director
"The only time the whole [client] team gets together is when we [the consultancy] hold
a design review. We joke that we should sell our services as 'design mediators' or
management consultants." - Consultant Engineering Director
"Blue sky" projects. Firms often engage a consultant when they seek a dramatically original,
"outside the box" solution, but the respondents noted that these projects often disappoint. The
client firm may overestimate the likelihood of success. The lack of constraints makes it difficult
for the consultant to manage the client's expectations. Even if the consultant develops a radically
innovative solution, the client firm may be unable or unwilling to reorganize sufficiently to
implement it [20].
High technical risk projects. Whereas "blue sky" projects have too few constraints, high
technical risk projects have too many. In extreme cases, the client's vision may defy the laws of
physics. In others, the vision may be achievable, but only with the application of significant
resources. Given that consultants are usually costlier than in-house development resources, such
projects may not offer good value. A third type of technical risk involves "needle in a haystack"
projects, in which the solution lies with locating just the right material or production vendor to
meet the requirements. The "right material" may not actually exist, but the client may feel that
the consultant simply did not look hard enough.
Factors related to the Negotiation
Excessive costfocus. While the literature emphasizes the importance of "shopping around" for a
suitable consultant [1, 7, 12], both consultants and clients agreed that client firms compromise
development quality by focusing on cost rather than value during contract negotiation. Some
treat design services as a commodity, considering only the price of the contract to the exclusion
of factors such as consultant capability or prior history with the firm.
"Clients shop for design services like they're shopping at Wal-Mart."
- Consultant Senior Engineer
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"Whoever signed the proposal may not have even read it. They skip to the last page
where it shows the cost. Proposals average three to eight pages, depending on the
program. That's their chance to see that we understand what they've asked us to do.
We don't ever get a lot of back and forth on the language of the proposal, it's just
numbers. 'You need to take $5,000 off this program.'"
- Consultant Engineering Director
In extreme cases, respondents told stories of clients using reverse auctions to solicit bids for
contracts. Others use strong-arm purchasing tactics to drive down costs.
"The issue I would run into was getting what I thought was a realistic estimate [from
the consultant] and then automatically being told [by client management] to go back
and tell them they had to cut 20% off the cost." - former Client Project Manager
The trouble with this approach is that the consulting market is competitive to begin with. Many
consultancies claim to offer similar services (if not quality), and the competition between them
generally keeps price gouging in check. Consultants rarely pad quotes because jobs are bid out to
multiple competitors. When the prospective client demands a price cut, the consultant must
remove design, prototyping, and/or testing iterations, increasing project risk.
Aggressive project schedule. As with insufficient budget, client respondents reported that
projects often fail because their firms allot too little time for development.
Misunderstandings aboutproject objectives. While the literature highlights misaligned objectives
between client and consultant, simple misunderstandings are even more frequent. The parties
must invest significant effort during the negotiation, briefing, and early development phases to
ensure that the client's vision has been adequately specified and transferred. The better
consultancies formalize this into their processes, using alignment phases, boundary box
exercises, and the like.
Uncertainty. Given the inherent uncertainties in innovation and product development, it can be
difficult to price the project appropriately. Some consultants bid uncertain projects on a time-
and-materials basis, or on a per-phase basis, with the upfront understanding that later phases will
have to be re-bid after initial development. Transaction cost economists would caution the client
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against the risk of hold-up, but this appears to be rare in this industry due to the relatively low
asset specificity and the great number of seemingly well-qualified alternative suppliers.
Consultant oversells. Former consultants observed that their firms sometimes overstated the
likelihood of innovation success, particularly on blue sky projects.
"Certain firms hire a lot of really good salespeople, not just the people who are
drumming up new business, but well-spoken practice leaders who can go in and sell
you anything. There's a lot of those at [consultancy withheld], and I think that's why it
can command top dollar." - former Consultant Engineering Director
Currently-employed consultants accused their competitors of overselling their capabilities:
"I think a lot of companies have been burned expecting more out of their consultants
than their consultants were expecting to provide."
- Consultant Vice President of Design
Factors related to the Distance between Parties
Geographic distance. Clients in particular stated that geographic distance between parties
compromises coordination. Some choose to use only local consultants.
"Even though we work in a fairly 24-hour world, the fact that you can just drop in
rather than emailing and making PowerPoints, I think you get to a solution faster with
the local guys, or within a day's travel." - Client Senior Engineer
Cultural distance. Significant differences in corporate culture make it difficult for clients and
consultants to relate to one another, impairing trust and communication:
"We're a fairly conservative company, and one of the consultants had a mohawk, and
they were lying on the floor during the meeting to 'get a different perspective. 'It was a
little goofy, and of course people were looking at that and wondering 'what are we
spending our money on?'" - former Client Project Manager
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Factors related to the Briefing
Use of "blinders " to foster creativity. The literature attributes poor briefing to client ignorance or
carelessness. The interview respondents confirmed this, but identified an additional problem:
clients will sometimes deliberately withhold information so as not to constrain the consultant's
creativity. This practice appears to create more problems than it solves.
"A lot of clients will come in, 'we're hiring you guys because you're an innovation
firm, we're hiring you for fresh thinking, so we don't want to tell you anything, just
dream' and we say 'no, that will be a disaster unless you're really looking for all the
possibilities.' Our philosophy is that if we do that, we're going to come up with some
wow-bang idea that doesn't move your business."
- Consultant Chief Operating Officer
To be sure, excessive constraints can suppress creativity, but this effect is less due to the
awareness of the constraint than it is to organizational pressure to adhere to the constraint:
"Even people who are prone to being creative can find themselves limited [by
managerial pressure]. So we don't even push the boundaries anymore. Because the
last twenty times we were slapped down for pushing it."
- Client Senior Industrial Designer
Consultant personnel are less stifled by the client's history and political pressures; they are more
likely to challenge constraints than let them limit their creativity. However, if the consultant is
unaware of rigid constraints, he or she will likely propose something that the client considers
"impractical" [1]. A good balance is to provide the constraints, but encourage the consultant to
propose both conservative and free-thinking solutions.
Factors related to Discontinuities in Development Team Membership
Client-side Discontinuities. Both empirical and theoretical literature stress the risk of
discontinuities on the consultant side, but the interviews suggest that discontinuities on the client
side are more frequent and more serious.
"You may start off talking to the president of the company, and once you shake hands
and they sign the check, you never see that person again, and now you're dealing with
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a project manager or director of engineering, somebody who's down in the trenches
and has a very different idea of what this project should be."
- Consultant Design Director
"Client turnover is a huge problem for us. Marketing teams churn so frequently, you
can go through three marketing directors in one project. The vision for the project
came from the first, then the next guy comes in and he's got a completely different
vision, and then the third person is not even sure the project should be done at all."
- Consultant Engineering Director
Factors related to Feedback
Client involvement. Infrequent communication and poor expectations management are significant
problems, but true success requires more than frequent status reports and design reviews:
"We're really looking for collaboration with the client. It's great to have the clients
that really get in there and want to be a part of what's going on, versus the ones that
don't give you much feedback, and you don't know until ten years later whether they
liked working with you or they didn't." - Consultant Engineering Director
Unfortunately, several factors work against extensive client involvement. For example,
"Customers can get lazy. Management thinks 'I'm spending all this money to have this
taken care of,' so they start to expect that it's taken care of, and don't put a lot of
resources, a lot of thought to it. What management doesn't see is the amount of effort I
have to put in. For it to work well, I still have to spend a lot of time on it."
- Client Project Manager
To address this, some consultancies contractually stipulate the level at which key client
personnel must be dedicated to the project. A more troubling finding is that some consultants do
not enjoy the collaboration that they espouse publicly:
"A lot of people at [consultancy withheld] talk about collaboration, but don't actually
like collaborating with the client. They don't like the intensity of that much time with
them, they don't like to travel, they like the lifestyle of 'you give us the brief, we do our
magic, and then we hand it off to you.'" - former Consultant Project Manager
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Clients should emphasize their desire to be involved and select consultants who will do so. Other
things being equal, use of a local consultancy makes client involvement much easier.
Decisions not documented. Even if feedback is sufficient, problems occur if it is not documented:
"Scope changes are inevitable. But when they get the bill, they tend to forget about
those re-directions, and that sets up conflict." - Consultant Project Manager
Some consultants use formal documentation programs, particularly for medical projects, but:
"No one wants to pay for that! And it's really boring. And you turn into an [aerospace
subcontractor, identity withheld], where everything has an ECO, and everything takes
longer, and everything's expensive." 
- Consultant Project Manager
If nothing else, major development decisions should be documented in email or meeting minutes.
Factors related to the Transfer of the Design
Prior research has stressed the importance of the briefing in transferring knowledge from client
to consultant at the start of the project, but has largely neglected several factors related to
knowledge transfer at the end of the project, from consultant to client. The consultant may
develop an excellent design, but if it is transferred poorly the client may not fully understand it,
causing them to question its value or experience difficulty in refining it. Two issues are common:
Transfer too abrupt. Ideally, the transfer of knowledge and responsibility is gradual, but budget
and time pressures may reduce it to a design review and handoff of CAD files:
"I always feel that it's very abrupt. It's like 'here's the packet of stuff, here are the
files' and then the door is closed. It's not as collaborative as I would like it to be."
- Client Senior Industrial Designer
"When it gets to this phase, you're typically out of budget. There's never a 'knowledge
transfer'phase in the budget, but there should be." - Consultant Engineering Director
Some consultancies do include "deployment" phases in the budget, but these are among the first
things cut if the client demands a sharpening of the quote.
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Deliverables do not include design history or intent. The problem with abrupt, "throw it over the
wall" handoffs is that typical design transfer media such as engineering drawings, CAD models,
and prototypes are inadequate to fully capture the consultant's developed knowledge. They
readily convey form, but are less able to describe function, let alone design intent:
"I have no clue what their design thoughts were when they came up with it. It had five
gears. Why five? Why not six? Why not a belt? Did they analyze the fatigue stress? I
have no idea!" - Client Project Manager
Some consultancies make a point to deliver more comprehensive information, including meeting
minutes, bills-of-materials, email correspondence, etc. Others stressed the impossibility of
transferring so much data, or questioned whether the client would even want it:
"How do you teach all that? Until you've walked a mile in my shoes? It's not like I
would sit down and write a document saying 'this is all the stuff we thought about.' I
don't know that there's an intent to teach them everything we've learned. They didn't
hire us for that. They hired us for a thing, the design."
- Consultant Engineering Director
The difficulty of transferring design history ex post highlights the importance of client
involvement during the development:
"Constant engagement, ask their opinion, get their input, get them to help make
decisions, those are all key. Communicate the theory, not just the solution. When you
develop a concept, what are the benefits, what are the risks? Detailing those,
articulating those, constantly reminding your client why this makes sense, why it's a
robust solution and why that robustness or innovation are worth some of the potential
trade-offs or risks that you're taking to achieve it. And how decisions that they might
make [later] will impact that." - Consultant Engineering Director
Factors related to Reintegration
Organizational inertia. Even if the consultant develops a suitable design and transfers it well, it
may be rejected by the client firm because of resistance by the personnel or by the structure of
the organization itself. Rejection is likely if the design is transferred to the wrong part of the
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organization, or requires refinement by a group other than the one sponsoring the project, or
novel coordination between parts of the organization, or the creation of a new group altogether:
"It has so much to do with who your audience is. We did some fairly innovative
development work, and had a great result, because we delivered it to the 'Advanced
Concepts Group,' whose sole purpose was to go out and discover new technologies. If
we had given that same presentation to the engineering group, who were the CAD guys
and the quality people, it would have been dead on arrival. There wouldn't have been
any interest." 
- former Consultant Engineering Director
"The reason one project didn't get implemented was that the organizational power for
new product development resided in R&D. We were working with an innovation group
that was based in Marketing. We proved that it was a new, novel idea for their
category, but no one within R&D was willing to back it up, so the project failed."
- Consultant Project Manager
"The consultancy will come up with a service design or user experience concept and
they'll have a beautiful scenario drawn out with all the various touch points laid out,
but the reality is that it the current user experience is such a mess because of how the
company has sliced and diced itself And unless that company - and I've never seen it
happen - reorganizes itself around the experience of the customer, it's not going to
work because their silos aren't structured properly."
- former Consultant Project Manager
Such organizational issues can be the most difficult to solve. As a start, clients should do a better
job of mapping their organization and its constraints at the beginning of the project, so that the
consultant has an idea of what is possible and what is not.
Factors related to Refinement
Client compromises the design intent. Consultants lamented that clients sometimes hurt the
commercial success of products by making changes that compromise the design:
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"I think clients are a lot better at executing to cost than they are to holistic design
intent. And it's not just the aesthetics [that get compromised], it's the brand, it's
usability and ergonomics, it's line logic. And there are lots of reasons why it happens.
The engineers on the client team don't recognize that it's the right thing to do, they
haven't been exposed to it, they don't value it. It makes their lives more difficult. They
don't have a budget for it. Their management staff doesn't promote it. You can do the
best job in the world transferring the design intent, but ifyou don't have management
buy-in, and technical team buy-in, your chance of success goes down."
- Consultant Engineering Director
In addition to impacting market success, these changes are wasteful in that they discard
consultant effort that the client already paid for. Minimizing this waste requires consistency on
the client's side. If it truly values only certain aspects of the design, this should be communicated
during negotiation so that the consultant can reduce the cost of the contract. Alternately, if the
client does value the design intent, it must incentivize its own downstream personnel to preserve
it.
Factors related to Follow-Up
Client fails to involve consultant. Consultants stressed that many of the problems discussed
above can be mitigated by continuing to involve them, even at a low level, during downstream
development, but some clients view projects as transactional rather than relational:
"Some clients deal with you like a deli-counter. They place their order and take it to
go. They don't really see you as a partner in it, it's none ofyour business. So you hand
it off and you have no clue what happens later." - Consultant Project Manager
"The expectation is that it's a one night stand. You don't expect a phone call in the
morning." - Client Senior Engineer
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Factors related to the Production Supplier
Consultant not put in contact with supplier. To keep designs practical and speed downstream
development, the client should put the consultant in touch with the intended production supplier
(or internal production resource) as early in the process as possible. Clients sometimes defer
identification of a production supplier, intending to "shop the design around" to several contract
manufacturers after development, but this prevents the designer from optimizing the design for
the supplier's capabilities. A related problem occurs when the client encourages the consultant to
identify suppliers on its own, but does not provide its approved vendors list. Development is
performed with the assistance of a supplier who may not ultimately be involved in production.
4.5.2 Confirmatory Results: Phase 2 Pilot Study
To corroborate the interview results, the thirty pilot survey respondents were asked to describe
any problems they had experienced on their project, as well as the problems' relative severity on
a 5-point scale and whether or not each problem was resolved (Table 4-2). Many of the risk
factors from Table 4-1 are represented, and only a few new ones added. One respondent noted
that the basic product concept was fundamentally unmarketable. Similar comments were made in
the interviews, though not frequently enough to merit inclusion in Table 4-1. Another project
experienced trouble during prototype testing when it was realized that the product requirements
contained an erroneous specification. The client accepted the blame and extended the project to
fix the design. A third respondent cited a colleague's stubbornness for delays in development.
Two projects generated complaints that the client personnel were not interested in the project.
Similar comments were made during the interviews, but an item on the questionnaire asking
about client indifference was rated lowly by both client and consultant respondents. Lastly, one
respondent on a cost-down project noted that the client never implemented their
recommendations because the client engineers were too busy fighting other fires.
Severity scores ranged from 2 to 5, and twelve of the 26 problems were eventually resolved.
Given the small number of observations, it is impossible to meaningfully quantify the relative
risk of the factors. It is clear, though, that problems are diverse in origin. The 26 identified
problems stem from eighteen different risk factors.
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Table 4-2: Problems identified in the Phase 2 pilot study projects. Problem severity was assessed on a 5-point
scale, with "5" indicating "very severe" and "1" indicating "not very severe."
Number of Average Fraction
Mentions Severity Resolved
Client Firm
- Lacks capability, experience, and/or processes for managing 1 5 0
new product development
Specification of Requirements
- Project is about blue sky, radical innovation 2 3.5 0.5
- Product direction fundamentally flawed from a marketing
perspectivet
- Specification contained erroneous information 1 4 1
- Project has high technical risk; over-constrained requirements 1 3 1
Consultant
- Lacks technical capabilities and/or domain experience 2 3.5 0.5
Inflexible, unwilling to consider alternative solutions 1 3 1
Briefing
Poor briefing, due to client deliberately withholding 2 3.5 0.5
information so as not to constrain creativity
Poor briefing, due to client ignorance or carelessness 1 2 1
Development
- Design work poor 2 3.5 0.5
Feedback
Client inadequately involved due to lack of interestt 2 4 0.5
Personality conflicts; poor working relationship 1 4 0
Client inadequately involved due to lack of time 1 3 1
Reintegration of Design into Client Firm
- Client personnel resist design; Not-Invented-Here 1 3 1
Refinement of Design by Client Firm
Client fails to perform necessary follow-on work 2 3.5 0
Client makes changes that compromise the design intent 2 2.5 0
Client never implements designt  1 3 0
Production Supplier
Consultant not put in contact with supplier early in project 2 3 0.5
t Not listed in Table 4-1.
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4.5.3 Quantification of Risk Factors: Benchmarking/Patent Study Results
In an attempt to quantify the risk factors, the 94 problems reported by respondents in the Phase 3
benchmarking/patent study were compiled (Table 4-3). As in the pilot study, the results are very
diverse. This is not particularly surprising, as any problem occurring frequently would be
recognized by the consultants over time and controlled for. Nonetheless, several themes emerge.
Many of the problems identified by consultants related to requirements - their specification and
stability - or feedback. Client complaints were often about specific design details, for example
the use of metric rather than English fasteners. Interestingly, few client interview respondents
identified design quality as a problem, but when client survey respondents were asked to assess
particular projects they frequently identified flaws in the consultant's design work.
It is instructive to note which problems could be resolved and which could not. Among the latter
were under-defined requirements, internal divisions within the client firm, Discontinuities in
team membership, poor communication by the consultant, poor management of expectations, and
poor refinement by the client. Poor design work by the consultant was resolved in slightly less
than half of the cases. In contrast, many of the problems that occurred early in the process, such
as inadequate briefing, were resolved, though doing so may have compromised project budget or
schedule. Overall, 64% of problems rated 4 or 5 in severity were resolved, 69% of those rated 3
were resolved, and 85% of those rated 1 or 2 were resolved.
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Table 4-3: Problems reported in benchmarking/patent study projects by consultant and client respondents.
The numeric columns have the same meanings and units as in the previous table.
Consultant Client
# Sev. Res.
Client Firm
- Lacks capability, experience, and/or processes for
managing new product development
Specification of Requirements
- Project lacks definition; client cannot specify what it
wants
- Project has high technical risk; over-constrained
requirements
- Divisions within the client firm over project
objectives
- Product direction fundamentally flawed from a
marketing perspective
Negotiation
- High project cost relative to deliverablest
- Unclear how best to add valuet
Consultant
- Lacks technical capabilities and/or domain experience
Distance between Client Firm and Consultant
- Organizational distance: standard processes
Briefing
- Poor briefing, due to difficulty of encapsulating
client's tacit knowledge
Discontinuities in Team Membership
- Discontinuities in client project team
- Discontinuities in consultant project team
Development
- Consultant's design work poor
- Design impractical/costly to manufacture
- Poor project management by consultantt
- Development work performed out of ordert
- Problems with client's development workt
- Consultant staff overloadedt
- Client's preferred consultant staff unavailablet
- Unspecified development problemst
Drift in Requirements
- Client adds or changes requirements, compromising
budget; scope creep
t Not listed in Table 4-1.
1 4 1
4 3.25 0.25
3 3.5 1
1 3 0
1 2 1
1 4 1
1 3 0
2 4 0.5
# Sev. Res.
1 1 1
2 4 1
1 4 1
1 3 1
1 2 1
2 4 0.5
1 4 1
2 1.5 1
1 5 0
3.73
3.5
4
3
5
0.45
0.5
1
1
1
6 3.5 0.6
2 2.5 1
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Problems reported in benchmarking/patent study projects (continued).
Consultant
# Sev. Res.
Feedback
- Consultant does not communicate frequently enough
and/or manage client's expectations
- Client inadequately involved due to lack of time
- Client inadequately involved because client personnel
did not wish to collaborate
- Personality conflicts; poor working relationship
- Disagreements between parties on substantive issuest
- Coordination of multiple designers difficultt
- Poor decision making by clientt
- Micromanaging by clientt
Transfer of Design into Client Firm
- Misaligned expectations about degree of
completeness t
- Deliverable does not include design history or intent
- CAD problems
Reintegration of Design into Client Firm
- Client personnel bitter about outsourcing t
- Client personnel resist design; Not-Invented-Here
- Client attempts to assimilate design to fit pre-
conceived expectationst
Refinement of Design by Client Firm
Client makes changes that compromise the design
intent
- Other poor design work by clientt
Production Supplier
- Consultant not put in contact with supplier early in
project
- Chosen supplier could not produce design t
- Poor work by manufacturert
- Communication problems with manufacturert
Unspecified manufacturing problemst
1 4 1
1 3 1
1 3 0
3 4 0.5
1 3 1
1 4 0
# Sev. Res.# Re. #
1 5
1 3
1 3
1 4
1 3
1 2 1
2 4.5 1
1 3 1
2 1
4.5 0
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4.6 Explanatory Models
The typological approach utilized in Section 4.5 is fairly exhaustive, but with over fifty major
factors as well as dozens of minor ones not depicted in Table 4-1, it is a bit unwieldy. To
improve understanding it is helpful to abstract reality to generate streamlined models. Two
approaches are presented. The first, referred to below as the Failure Modes Framework,
emphasizes the actions or activity stages of the process depicted in Figure 4-1 on page 126 (i.e.,
the verbs in italic text). Conceiving the process as a sequence of activities facilitates
understanding by allowing one to focus on the subset of factors relevant to each stage in turn.
The second approach, referred to as the Outsourcing Motivations Framework, emphasizes the
actors and structure in Figure 4-1 (i.e., the non-italicized nouns). This approach conceives the
myriad factors as stemming from a much smaller number of root causes.
4.6.1 Failure Modes Framework
Conceptual Development
Chapter 2 indicated that client satisfaction is highly correlated with most project outcomes as
well as the client's overall rating of project success. Starting from the common assumption that
satisfaction results when expectations are met or exceeded [25], Figure 4-1 can be simplified into
a chain of activities linking the client's expectations to its understanding of the consultant's
design (Figure 4-4). In a successful project, the client firm specifies its vision into requirements
and briefs the consultant appropriately. The consultant forms an interpretation of the
requirements and develops a design. Any drift in the client's expectations or the design
development is continuously managed by extensive feedback. Finally, the design is transferred
back to the client firm and the client's understanding of it compares favorably with its
expectations, creating satisfaction.
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C0 Interpretation Design
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Figure 4-4: A simplified process model illustrating the chain of activities linking client expectations and
consultant deliverables. In this case the client's vision of a generic cube is successfully specified, briefed,
developed, and transferred, while drift of their expectations is minimized through feedback.
In less ideal cases, missteps in any of the activities lead to a discrepancy between expectations
and understanding, creating dissatisfaction. Figure 4-5 depicts several possible failure modes.
Solid arrows represent well-executed process steps, while dashed arrows represent a misstep that
breaks the chain between expectations and understanding. According to this model, nearly all
failure modes can be mitigated or eliminated by proper use of feedback during development.
Some failure modes result from several distinct causes. For example, a misstep can occur during
development because the consultant lacks capability, or because of the emergence of technical
problems not anticipated by either party at the outset of the project. Likewise, drift of client
expectations may be caused by unanticipated shifts in the marketplace [7], or because of turnover
within the client project team. Accurate diagnosis of failure modes by a single party can be
difficult, as certain modes can resemble others from certain vantage points. For example, from
the client's perspective poor briefing, poor development, and poor design transfer all look the
same. As depicted in Figure 4-5, the client asks for a cube and seems to get back a cylinder. This
may explain why surveys of client personnel frequently indicate problems with the design
provider's work (e.g., Table 4-3 or [5]). To ascertain the true cause of failure, both parties'
perspectives should be considered.
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Figure 4-5: Common failure modes in design consulting and their causes. In each case the client's
understanding of the consultant's design does not equal its expectations for it. The cube and cylinder are
abstract representations of the vision, requirements, design, etc.
155
Empirical Evidence
The interview and survey results both suggest that each of the illustrated failure modes occurs in
practice. To demonstrate how the modes can be misdiagnosed, Table 4-4 compares the
perspectives of seven highly dissatisfied benchmarking study clients to those of the consultants
on the same projects. The clients complained of poor development work by the consultancy, but
the consultants generally attributed cause to poor specifications or insufficient feedback. Note
that the consultants did not know what the clients had said at the time they completed the survey.
Table 4-4: Comparison of perspectives on the origins of client dissatisfaction. The left column presents the
views of seven clients who were highly dissatisfied, while the right column presents those of their consultants.
Client's
Development:
2 Development:
View of Failure Mode
behind schedule, ideas not
innovative enough
some functionality not
executed
Transfer: did not convey design intene
3 Development: performed out-of-order
Feedback: consultants are poor listeners
4 Development:
5 Development:
design impractical to
manufacture
ideas not innovative enough
Consultants' View of Failure Mode
Specification:
Feedback:
over-constrained'
insufficient feedback from client
Specification: over-constrained, divisions within
client over what to prioritize
Feedback: client technical functions
inadequately involved
Development: client is cheap, project budget
only allows for cursory design
Feedback: key client contact was a poor
collaborator
Specification:
Development:
Feedback:
Specification:
over-constrained
development by client EE poor
client team unwilling to
collaborate
over-constrained, unrealistic;
client very naive about product
development
6 Feedback: very little communication
from consultant
7 Development: poor work by consultant
Feedback: poor project mgmt. by
consultant
[Consultant was unaware of any problems]
Specification: under-defined, divisions within
client
Feedback: different management styles
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'A second client respondent on this project also noted that the client firm's vision for the project was "aggressive
yet vague, with perhaps unrealistic expectations"
2 A second client respondent on this project noted that problems occurred in translating the concepts into a design
due to an "internal performance issue"
4.6.2 Outsourcing Motivations Framework
Conceptual Development
A second approach to improve understanding of the factors influencing project outcomes is to
distill the symptoms of failure down to their root causes. Table 4-5 does so for just one of the
commonly cited problems, poor design work by the consultant, using the "5 Why" technique
[26]. For example, poor design work may result if the consultant is not qualified for the job,
which may in turn result because the client firm is not a knowledgeable buyer of design services,
which may in turn by due to the fact that the client does not outsource routinely. Alternatively,
poor design work may result from a poor brief, which may result from lack of time by the client,
due to a shortage of resources. Thus, while poor design work is ostensibly the fault of the
consultant, its causes can often be traced back to characteristics of the client firm, its reasons for
outsourcing, and the inherent nature of product development. The same is true for many other
symptoms of failure, though the full analysis is not included for the sake of space. This analysis
suggests the possibility of identifying common outsourcing archetypes and focusing attention on
the particular hazards associated with each.
Client motivations for outsourcing are varied, but most stem from the root causes identified in
Table 4-5. Some need additional development resources [15, 27-29]. Others need specialized
expertise [30, 31]. These two cases have been previously referred to as outsourcing for capacity
and outsourcing for knowledge, respectively [11]. Unlike production outsourcing, however,
design outsourcing may also be motivated by a deliberate desire to disconnect the design from
the client's organizational and product legacies so as to encourage innovation. Prior research
suggests that a firm's organization evolves to match the architecture of its primary products [20].
Communication channels, information filters, and strategies develop that help the organization
handle complexity but may prevent it from conceiving or even recognizing new product
architectures [ibid.]. Similarly, a firm's values and cost structure [32], core capabilities [33], and
design process bureaucracy [24, 34] may all inhibit innovation. In light of these tendencies, a
client may choose to hire a design consultant even when it has the capacity and knowledge
necessary to do the work itself. It is outsourcing for originality or a fresh perspective.
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Table 4-5: Root cause analysis for poor design work by the consultant. Each successive column offers possible
explanations for the issues cited in the column to the left of it.
Original issue
- Consultant
design was work
poor
First Why?
- Consultant was
not qualified for
the job
Second Why?
- Client chose
wrong
consultant
Third Why?
- Client is not a
knowledgeable
buyer of design
services
Fourth Why?
Client does not
outsource
routinely
- Consultant - Consultant was - Workflow is
oversold hungry for work unsteady
capabilities
* n * Inherent
y
qualifications
not well
understood
uncertainty of
product
develooment
- Problem was - Problem poorly - Client lacks
over-constrained, specified technical
intractable capabilities
- Client lacked - Client short on
time to do it well resources
- Internal divisions - Organizational
w/in client firm politics, etc.
- Inherent
uncertainty
- Consultant was - Client lacked - Client was short
not well briefed time to do well on resources
on project - Client did not - Client sought a - Organizational
requirements and wish to over- fresh perspective inertia, values,
constraints constrain culture, etc.
- Inherent
challenges of
knowledge
transfer
- Insufficient * Client * Client is not a * Client does not
schedule or prioritized cost knowledgeable outsource
budget allotted over quality buyer routinely
for project * Client prioritizes m Organizational
wrong metrics management
systems
- Internal divisions m Client did not * Client lacked * Client short on
within the actively police time to do so resources
consultancy development * Client did not * Client does not
know better outsource
routinely
- Consultant was * Client chose * Client is not a * Client does not
negligent wrong knowledgeable outsource
consultant buyer routinely
- Inherent
uncertainty of
product
development
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Objective View Required
Outsourcing for Audit J Outsourcing for Originality
Routine Activities Non-Routine Activities
Outsourcing for Capacity Outsourcing for Knowledge
Objective View Irrelevant
Figure 4-6: Common motivations for outsourcing product development activities.
Other situations in which a client firm possessing knowledge and capacity might hire a design
consultant include need for an independent second opinion or audit, or a desire to leverage the
prestige of the designer [31]. Figure 4-6 classifies the outsourcing motivations according to how
routine the work is and the degree to which it requires an objective, outside view. The
dimensions are meant to be continuous rather than binary, and combinations of motivations are
possible.
The root cause analysis suggests that each outsourcing motivation entails certain risks (Figure
4-7). A client outsourcing for additional capacity is competent but is likely to be short on time,
which may compromise involvement of all stakeholders, as well as the quality of the
specification, briefing, feedback, design transfer, and refinement. Because the firm has internal
development capabilities, it may be unfamiliar with hiring design services, may take its own
knowledge for granted during briefing, and may resist reintegration of a design that does not
adhere to its standard practices. If its outsourcing motivation is to save money, it may
shortchange the project budget or partner with an incompetent low-bid consultant.
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Originality
- Poor briefing, due to difficulty of encapsulating
client's tacit knowledge
- Poor briefing, due to lack of time
- Client is overly focused on cost and schedule,
compromises quality
- Client inadequately involved due to lack of time
- Client project team does not include or consult
all stakeholders
- Design impractical
- Client does not communicate frequently enough,
police the brief, and/or provide prompt replies to
questions
- Client personnel resist design; Not-Invented-
Here
- Client is not a knowledgeable buyer of design
services
" Client makes changes that compromise the
design intent
kCapacity
Figure 4-7: Particular risks associated with outsourcing for capacity, knowledge, and originality. Factors in overlapping areas are shared by more than
one outsourcing motivation. Outsourcing for audit or prestige are not shown due to their relative rarity.
/100-
- Client attempts to over-manage, over-schedule
innovation; inflexible and risk-averse
- Client team lacks influence within client
organization
- Divisions within the client firm over project
objectives
- Project is about blue sky, radical innovation
- Poor briefing, due to client deliberately
withholding information
- Client organization resists design
- Project lacks definition; client cannot specify
what it wants
- Consultant oversells capabilities
. Consultant does not manage expectations
. Consultant not put in contact with supplier early
in project
- Client lacks experience with managing new
product development
- Client lacks technical capabilities and/or domain
experience
- Project has high technical risk; over-constrained
requirements
- Poor briefing, due to ignorance
- Client fails to perform necessary follow-on work
- Client fails to involve consultant after the design
transfer
Knowledge
In contrast, a client outsourcing for technical knowledge may have difficulty specifying
requirements, choosing a suitable consultant, briefing and guiding development, and refining the
design. Misunderstandings during negotiations are likely due to the knowledge gap between
parties. The consultant may overstate its expertise, either because the client cannot articulate
exactly what it needs, or because an unscrupulous consultant takes advantage of the client's
limited knowledge. The client firm may be unfamiliar with the product development process,
requiring additional guidance from the consultant before and after the transfer of the design.
A client who is knowledgeable and has sufficient capacity but is outsourcing for originality
likely suffers from internal strife or excessive organizational inertia. The project may originate
from one part of the organization but lack universal support. The vision may be vague, and the
client may overestimate the likelihood of radical innovation, or the consultant may overstate it.
The client may withhold important constraints during the briefing or fail to re-direct the
consultant from wrong paths during development. The consultant may fail to exploit the client's
expertise or manage its expectations, perhaps yielding a design the client considers impractical.
Finally, the client's organizational inertia may limit its ability to re-integrate and implement the
design after the project.
By identifying the client's motivation for outsourcing at the start of the project, both client and
consultant can be aware of the particular risks associated with it, simplifying project
management and improving the chance of a successful project.
Empirical Evidence
To corroborate the outsourcing motivation framework the projects in the pilot study were first
examined qualitatively to see if the categories of outsourcing for capacity, knowledge, and
originality were valid and comprehensive. Twenty-five of the thirty projects clearly fit one of
these three categories. Most were outsourcing for knowledge. Ten were from companies with
little product development experience (start-ups and a large financial services company). Eight
others were experienced with product development but needed industrial design (four projects)
or mechanical engineering expertise (four projects). Three projects were clearly capacity-driven.
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The clients could have done the work but the necessary personnel were already fully booked.
Four projects were from knowledgeable clients seeking an original perspective.
The remaining five projects did not perfectly fit any of the three paradigms. Two were a mix of
knowledge and capacity: the client needed industrial design expertise and mechanical
engineering capacity. The final three looked like capacity projects but respondent comments
made it clear that they were motivated not just by need for additional resources but for resources
that could move faster than the client organization was capable of. Development in large
organizations is often slowed by bureaucracy, over-reliance on standard processes, internal
politics, and the like, whereas the smaller, nimbler consultancies can move much faster. In such
situations a client firm might outsource development for speed.
The qualitative analysis confirmed that the framework is reasonably comprehensive, but its
validity was unproven as the investigator might simply have been seeing the patterns in the data
that he was looking for. For a more objective test, agglomerative hierarchical clustering was used
to group the thirty projects into self-similar clusters based only on the explanatory (i.e., non-
outcome) variables from the survey (e.g., client firm size, experience with product development
and consulting, product novelty, extent of product requirements known at the start of the project,
etc.). The resulting dendogram is shown in Figure 4-8. The algorithm quickly recognized
projects from the same client firm (likely due to the company demographic variables) and
grouped them together early in the agglomeration process. Four of the five biggest clusters, each
shown in a different color in the figure, are recognizable as particular outsourcing paradigms.
The clients in the lower three clusters all sought product development process expertise. The
blue cluster consists of projects from the aforementioned financial services company, the orange
are physician-inventors, and the teal are all start-ups. The green cluster includes engineering
capacity and speed projects, though projects S and Q4 were motivated by need for technical
expertise. The red cluster is a bit of a mix. The lowest three projects were all originality-driven,
while the rest were primarily seeking industrial design expertise. An exception is project H,
which was technical and speed-driven. All the red projects were for large client firms. Although
the classifications are not perfect, the clustering algorithm identified similar groups to the
qualitative analysis.
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Figure 4-8: Dendogram produced by hierarchical clustering of the projects in the pilot study, using the Ward
distance algorithm and all independent variables. Projects are identified using a letter to represent the client
firm and a number if that firm had multiple projects in the sample. The sharp knee in the scree plot at
bottom suggests five distinct clusters, which are indicated by color. The highlighting of observation A at the
top is a software artifact and is not intended to convey any meaning.
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To examine whether the framework has predictive power, the identified clusters were compared
on the occurrence of problems and the consultant's appraisal of project success (Figure 4-9 and
Figure 4-10, respectively). Note that none of the project outcome variables had been used to
form the clusters in the first place. Two clusters in particular stand out as having poor outcomes.
Projects K and P (the lowest two in the red cluster, both blue sky projects for large client firms)
both experienced problems and were rated quite poorly by the consultants. The teal cluster,
comprised entirely of start-ups, also fared poorly. In contrast, the two other knowledge-driven
clusters, the large financial services company (blue cluster) and the physician-inventors (orange),
did quite well. Comments made by the respondents suggest possible reasons for the difference.
First, because the stakes were much higher for the start-ups, the client personnel were more
emotionally invested and tended to over-react to minor setbacks. Second, the start-ups were more
likely to meddle in development or second-guess the consultants' decisions. The physician-
inventors and the financial services company seemed to be more aware of the relative expertise
that each party brought to the project and respected the consultant's recommendations.
Red-upper (ID Knowledge)
Red-lower (Originality)
Green (Technical
Capacity/Speed)
Blue (NPD Knowledge -
Financial)
Orange (NPD Knowledge -
Doctors)
Teal (NPD Knowledge -
Start-Ups)
0% M Serious problems o Some problems 0No substantial problems
Figure 4-9: Occurrence of problems by cluster. Projects K and P were split out of the Red cluster on
theoretical grounds and are referred to as the "Red-lower" cluster.
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Figure 4-10: Project success by cluster. Each dot represents one of the thirty projects.
The clustering results suggest that the outsourcing motivation framework might be refined
slightly for better predictive power. Start-ups might be split out from the knowledge group, and
the originality group split into blue sky projects and those that are more tightly focused. Doing so
suggests that outsourcing motivation does influence project outcomes (Figure 4-11, Figure 4-12).
Projects in which the consultant added unique value (Speed, Knowledge, or Well-Focused
Originality) did better than those in which the contribution was less unique (Capacity,
Knowledge/Capacity), ill-defined (Blue-sky Originality), or unappreciated by the client firm
(Start-ups). These results echo the opinions of the interview participants, who felt that
outsourcing for knowledge was more likely to produce success than outsourcing for capacity or
originality (Figure 4-13). The effect of outsourcing motivation on project outcomes will be more
rigorously tested using the benchmarking/patent study data in the next chapter.
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Knowledge - established
Occurrence of ProblemsI 3 67%
31% 69%
firms
Knowledge - start-ups 80%0
O Knowledge/Capacity 50%
I-
40
0 Capacity % 33%
Originality - well-focused 100%
Originality - blue-sky 100%
0% U Serious problems 0 Some problems O No substantial problems 100%
Figure 4-11: Occurrence of problems by outsourcing motivation, with Knowledge and Originality split into
two distinct subgroups suggested by the clustering analysis.
Speed Established Start-ups
Knowedge
KnowiCap. Capacity Wel-focused Blue-sky
Orignality
Figure 4-12: Project success by outsourcing motivation, with Knowledge and Originality split into two
distinct subgroups suggested by the clustering analysis.
166
Likelihood of Project Success
Outsourcing for
Capacity
Outsourcing for
Knowledge
Outsourcing for
Originality
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Fraction of Respondents
MVery likely 0 Likely
Figure 4-13: Perceived likelihood of success of each of the three major outsourcing motivations, according to
the interview participants. Dark shades indicate the fraction of participants answering "5" and light shades
"4" on the 5-point scale. For each item, the upper (blue) bar indicates consultant responses and the lower
(red) bar client responses.
4.7 Conclusions
Drawing from the wisdom of experienced design professionals, this chapter developed a process
model of outsourced product development and used it to organize the factors influencing project
success and failure. Although the superficial manifestations of failure are highly idiosyncratic,
most stem from a small number of root causes. To maximize success, a client firm should: 1)
invest the time to carefully specify project requirements and objectives, 2) negotiate with the
consultant as a partner rather than a vendor, 3) provide the consultant with all of the design
constraints (including its own organizational structure and politics), 4) actively participate in the
development process, and 5) commit to shepherding the innovation back into its organization.
Consultants must foster these activities, and in particular strive to enfranchise client personnel
throughout the development process.
The failure mode framework provides a simple tool for clients and consultants to focus their
development efforts. The ultimate objective throughout the project should be to align client
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expectations and consultant deliverables. At each stage of the process, particular attention can be
paid to the risk factors called out for that stage in Table 4-1. Admittedly, actual development
projects are less linear than suggested by Figure 4-1, but the fundamental principles still apply.
Similarly, the outsourcing motivation framework provides a means to filter the list of risk factors
to those relevant to a given project. The pilot study results suggest that each of the outsourcing
motivations can yield success, though start-up clients may require special attention.
The validity of the findings is supported by the use of multiple data collection techniques and
diverse respondents, as well as the general agreement with prior research. In particular, the
results confirm previous findings that internal divisions within the client firm, poor specification
and briefing of requirements, and insufficient communication between parties are all significant
risk factors. Discrepancies between the present findings and those of past studies are likely due
to the significant differences between study populations. The present study found more evidence
of reintegration problems than did Roy and Potter [1], but they were expressly studying small
and medium-sized client firms for whom organizational inertia would be low. Conversely, the
present study found less evidence of consultant incompetence, perhaps because the design
consulting industry has matured in the last twenty years. The results did not replicate Amaral and
Parker's findings of version control problems and vendor rivalries [2]. Their article does not
define their research setting precisely, but it appears to have included highly complex projects
with many suppliers. Their finding may be particular to that type of outsourced development.
The study extends the literature in several ways. First, it organizes previously disparate findings
into a comprehensive typology and distills them to mechanistic conceptual models. The
outsourcing motivation framework extends Fine and Whitney's model by adding a second
dimension (the need for objectivity) that is relevant to design outsourcing but not production
outsourcing. Second, the results offer a relatively rare look at the consultant's perspective on the
causes of success and failure. Prior academic research has focused exclusively on the client's
perspective. The joint view taken in this study enabled identification of under-reported risk
factors (e.g., client inexperience, excessive cost focus) and generation of alternative explanations
for previous observations. For example, consultants are often accused of creating "impractical"
designs. The traditional, client-centric perspective attributes this to poor work by the consultant,
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or perhaps an inadequate briefing by the client. From the joint perspective, an impractical design
is also a symptom of an inflexible client. That is, the underlying problem may be the client
organization's inability to adapt to what the market demands. Similar alternative explanations
can be developed by inverting the traditional wisdom for other phenomena. A poor briefing may
be caused by the client's negligence, but it could also be caused by the consultant's failure to
explain what it needs to know. All of these phenomena were observed in the interview and
questionnaire data.
The nuance offered by the joint perspective and the detail obtained from in-depth interviewing
are the study's greatest strengths. Its chief limitations are the risks of recollection error or
deliberate deception by the respondents. Recollection error was mitigated by validating the
interview findings with project data from the benchmarking/pilot study. Deliberate deception
was mitigated by including both current and former employees in the interview sample. Those no
longer selling or buying consulting services should have less interest in promoting or criticizing
the consulting model. A secondary limitation is that the study population consists primarily of
domestic consultants and clients. While international outsourcing may bring additional
challenges, it certainly does not diminish those identified herein.
The project risk factors identified in this study suggest several broader themes. First, client firms
often turn to outsourcing to address their internal limitations - of capacity, expertise, or
organizational agility - but these very limitations are what compromise outsourcing outcomes.
The client firm that is short on resources may be unable to effectively manage the consultant's
progress, the firm short on expertise will be unlikely to refine the consultant's design, and the
firm seeking to escape its own inertia will be re-confronted with it when it attempts to reintegrate
the design. Outsourced product development is a tool, not a panacea. Second, the difficulties that
firms have in pre-specifying requirements, and the need they exhibit for constant collaboration,
call attention to the limitations of traditional systems engineering approaches to multi-party
development. If firms struggle to specify requirements on relatively simple consumer and
medical products, one can imagine the challenge of doing so for highly complex products. Even
the proponents of modularity concede that design rules can only be formulated ex ante for
relatively mature product categories [16]. The traditional solution for new-to-the-world products
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has been physical co-location and concurrent engineering [27], but these are not always feasible.
Thus, need exists for new approaches for performing dynamic product development in a
distributed manner.
A start is to recognize that outsourced design is incompatible with traditional purchasing
approaches. Many of the identified risk factors stem from arms-length, transaction-based
engagements and the commoditization of design. The findings suggest that innovative design
cannot be pre-specified, cannot be modularized [16], cannot be handed off. Rather, consultant
and client must maintain a constant dialog throughout the project. Perhaps the key to improving
outcomes in outsourced product development is not to think of them as outsourced, but as
collaborative. The findings suggest that collaborative projects succeed where outsourced design
projects fail.
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5 Explaining Project Outcomes
Prior chapters have identified dozens of outsourced product development success measures and
scores of factors that may influence success. To begin to explain the outcomes of particular
projects, a conceptual framework is first developed that hypothesizes causal relationships
between the project outcomes themselves. Empirical testing using quantitative survey data
confirms 17 of 27 hypothesized relationships, accounting for as much as 68% of the variation
observed in each outcome measure. Because client satisfaction is both a central concept in the
framework and an under-studied outcome in the literature, detailed models are developed that
use intermediate outcomes such as project value and working relationship quality as well as
exogenous factors such as the client's reason for outsourcing the project to explain nearly 80%
of the observed variation in client satisfaction. The models confirm predictions from customer
satisfaction theory (namely that perceived value is the most powerful influence on satisfaction)
but challenge conventional wisdom about new product development. In particular, the results
suggest that organizational, cultural, and physical distance between parties is not necessarily
detrimental, and may even help. Although design consultancies have been widely portrayed as
"creativity experts," clients outsourcing for originality had lower satisfaction than those
outsourcing for other reasons. The consultancies were much more effective at rapid innovation,
developing familiar products far more quickly than bureaucratic organizations and
inexperienced start-ups can.
5.1 Introduction
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to explain success and failure in outsourced product
development. The results of the preceding chapters hint at the complexity of doing so. Chapter 2
identified seven dimensions of success, each having several commonly used measures. Chapter 4
identified over fifty different factors that are believed to influence success. A comprehensive
explanation would examine the effect of each success factor on each success measure (e.g., the
effect of client stakeholder unity on product commercialization, the effect of physical proximity
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on schedule performance, etc.) but this would require consideration of over a thousand first order
effects, to say nothing of higher order interactions. Such an approach would be neither efficient
for the investigator nor practical for the audience. Need exists for parsimonious models that
provide fundamental yet actionable understanding of key effects, while avoiding the
oversimplification that has plagued past research (e.g., the use of binary unidimensional
measures of "success"). The previous chapter provided three means of organizing the success
factors: typological classification, process-based failure modes, and root-cause-derived
outsourcing paradigms. The present chapter organizes the success measures into an integrated
framework and then explains the central element - client satisfaction - in detail.
The framework reduces the complexity of explanation by assuming that the success measures are
not independent but rather are causally interrelated. For example, the occurrence of problems
during development may adversely impact schedule performance, which may in turn impact the
commercial success of the product, and so forth. Such relationships are hypothesized from
existing theory and qualitative interviews and combined into a causal network model that is
simple enough to be readily understood yet rich enough to capture the multi-dimensional nature
of success. The framework is tested using quantitative data from the benchmarking study,
suggesting that the endogenous relationships between success measures account for up to 68% of
their variation, depending on the measure. To account for the remaining variation, exogenous
success factors can be added as appropriate to form more detailed models.
While each success measure has its merits, client satisfaction is the logical place to begin the
detailed explanation. First, it is the linchpin of the causal framework, relating traditional product
development foci such as process and product performance to outsourcing-specific concerns
such as project value and repeat business. Second, the results of Chapter 2 suggest that client
satisfaction is a holistic measure, highly correlated with most other measures of success. Third,
customer satisfaction is an established field of inquiry with sophisticated conceptual models and
well-tested measurement approaches. Fourth, client satisfaction is highly relevant to
practitioners. Clients implicitly seek to maximize their own satisfaction, while consultants
explicitly try to optimize it parallel to their own interests. To do so they must be able to estimate
client satisfaction accurately, yet data from the benchmarking study described in Chapter 3
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suggest that consultants' current estimates are poor, explaining just 3% of the variation in actual
satisfaction. Improved models would help them to better estimate and manage client satisfaction.
Finally, the science of customer satisfaction would benefit from the investigation, as it has
focused little on business-to-business professional services to date.
Two approaches are taken to explain client satisfaction. First, a parsimonious model is
hypothesized from customer satisfaction theory and tested using the survey data. The model
explains 73% of the variation, impressive by academic standards but somewhat impractical in
that the key explanatory variables are no easier to measure than satisfaction itself. To provide
greater utility, key exogenous factors are identified from the survey data and verified using
cross-validation. The resulting models suggest that nearly 80% of the variation in client
satisfaction can be explained after the fact using data obtained from both client and consultant
respondents. 72% can be explained using data provided by the consultants alone, yielding
estimates with half as much error as current practice. Lastly, 36% can be explained using only
factors that would be known to the client and consultant at the start of the project. This prediction
model can help client and consultant practitioners to assess project risk and plan accordingly for
it.
5.2 Literature Review
Given that most of the success measures identified in Chapter 2 have analogs in traditional
product development and customer satisfaction, it is possible to hypothesize relationships
between measures based on past research.
5.2.1 Traditional Product Development Literature
Scholars of new product development have identified and utilized scores of success measures
[1], but are only beginning to understand the relationships between them. Early research tended
to consider the objectives of single technical functions in isolation [2]. While exploring a range
of explanatory variables, many studies used just a single measure of project success [3]. Such a
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narrow focus is surprising given that scholars have long preached to practitioners the need to
consider multiple perspectives [4].
Nonetheless, early studies connected product performance (then conceived as an explanatory
variable rather than an outcome in and of itself) with commercial success [5-7]. Later work
confirmed this finding and showed that product performance (i.e., design quality) is also
positively associated with end-user satisfaction [2]. Others were quick to note that product
performance does not come for free, but must be traded off against development process
measures. Increasing product performance generally requires more development resources, and
thus may worsen schedule performance, product unit cost, and development cost [5].
Another stream of research examined the effects of development process performance on
commercial performance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, reducing product unit cost increases sales [2].
The marketing literature has emphasized the impact of speed-to-market on market share [6, 7],
while technology management scholars counter that shortened development schedules
compromise product performance [8] and may offer no overall commercial benefit [9].
Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss found that faster time-to-market improved end-user satisfaction
but not, paradoxically, sales [2].
Recent work has attempted to unite these findings into comprehensive causal models. Loch,
Stein, and Terwiesch conceived a sequential model in which development process performance
influences development outcome performance, which in turn influences business performance
[10]. Mallick and Schroeder adapted the model to the project level and found empirical support
for four of ten hypothesized relationships [11]. Increased development time was positively
associated with product unit cost, which was in turn negatively associated with project return-on-
investment (ROI) and market share. Market share was positively linked to overall commercial
success, which was conceived as a separate and ultimate outcome in the framework. Table 5-1
summarizes the empirically tested relationships between various process, product, and
commercial performance measures.
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Table 5-1: Empirically tested relationships between various success measures in traditional product
development. The "+" symbol indicates a positive association, the "-" symbol a negative association, and "0"
a null result. Outcomes higher in the table are thought to influence those lower in the table. The numbers in
square brackets are citations to the study that tested the relationship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Development
cost
2 Time-to-
market
3 Product
performance
4 Product unit
cost
5 Value to
customer
6 Customer
satisfaction
7 Market
share
8 Met sales
goals
9 ROI
10 Product
profitability
11 Overall
commercial
success
x
0O[ill 0 [ill X
0 [11] + [11]
- [2] + [21
+ [12]
0 [11]
0 [2] + [12]
+ [2]
+[12]
0 [11]
+ [121
+ [131
0 [9]
0 [2]
- [2]
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+
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5.2.2 Outsourced Product Development Literature
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, scholars of outsourced product development are just beginning
to understand how to define and measure success in this domain. As a result there is little reliable
data on project outcomes, and nearly no evidence on the relationships between success measures.
Several clues can be obtained by scrutinizing what few results have been published. Secondary
analysis of Roy and Potter's data [14] suggests that projects experiencing problems were no less
likely to commercialize their products (X2 = 0.028,p = 0.866, based on Table 2a), and were only
somewhat less likely to generate a positive ROI (x = 0.535, p = 0.465). However, projects in
which the consultant's design work was poor were significantly less likely to generate a positive
ROI (x = 6.58,p = 0.010).
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Anderson, Davis-Blake, and Parker have reported preliminary data on the effects of various
interfirm coordination mechanisms on several project outcomes measures [15]. Although they do
not report the correlations between their outcome measures, the different coordination
mechanism effects reported for each suggests that the outcomes are interrelated in complex
ways. For example, the use of co-located personnel was associated with reduced project cost but
increased project duration, which suggests the counter-intuitive result that project cost and
duration are negatively correlated with each other. Other coordination mechanisms had strong
effects on some outcomes but no effect on others. In light of these surprising results, it is
unfortunate that the interrelationships between outcome measures have not been reported.
5.2.3 Customer Satisfaction Literature
Scholars of customer satisfaction have extensively examined the relationships between key
concepts such as customer expectations, product performance, satisfaction, and loyalty but only
partial consensus has been reached. The widely-used confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm
posits that satisfaction results when the customer's perception of product (or service)
performance meets or exceeds his expectations [16].1 The pure formulation is somewhat flawed
in that it predicts that a customer who expects poor performance and receives it will be satisfied.
Two types of adjustments are commonly made to improve the model. One is to replace or
supplement expectations (predictions of what will happen) with other comparison standards [17],
such as experience-based norms (what could potentially happen, in the best-case) [18] or ideals
(what should happen, based on considerations of fairness of exchange) [19]. The second
adjustment is to add direct causal links from expectations to satisfaction [20], perceived
performance to satisfaction [21], and/or expectations to perceived performance [22], as shown in
Figure 5-1. Debate over these details has consumed the literature for thirty years, and it seems
that no one model fits all situations [21]. The relative strengths of the various paths depend on
the type of product or service and the customer's experience with it [22].
Using the standard terminology, confirmation occurs when performance exactly meets expectations.
Disconfirmation results from a difference between performance and expectations. Performance exceeding
expectations generates positive disconfirmation, while performance falling short of expectations produces the
grammatically awkward but nonetheless standard negative disconfirmation.
180
Expectations + , Perceived
Performance
Disconfirmation
Customer
Satisfaction
Figure 5-1: Antecedents of customer satisfaction. The basic confirmation/disconfirmation model consists of
the three central paths. More refined models add one or more of the three peripheral paths.
For example, all three paths to satisfaction might be active in a frequently consumed but
heterogeneously delivered service such as restaurant table service. Customers have well-formed
expectations and can evaluate performance accurately, leading to possible disconfirmation. In
more complex situations such as automobile repair or medical care, performance is harder for the
customer to evaluate (flat tires and extreme pain notwithstanding), so satisfaction judgments
derive heavily from expectations, which might be formed directly from experience or indirectly
from advertising or hearsay. Confirmation/disconfirmation models have performed well for
many consumer products and services but appear to break down in situations in which the
customer does not have well-formed expectations [23].
An alternative paradigm, value-percept disparity theory, eliminates the expectations and
disconfirmation constructs and posits that satisfaction results directly from the perceived value of
the product or service to the customer [24]. Johnson, Nader, and Fornell demonstrated that a
simple value-percept based model explained customer satisfaction with bank loans much better
than a disconfirmation model [23]. They argued that because bank loans are complex, intangible,
heterogeneous, and infrequently consumed, the consumer could not form meaningful
expectations.
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Compared to the variety of models proposed to explain the antecedents of satisfaction, the
consequences of satisfaction are more generally agreed upon. Customer satisfaction is positively
associated with loyalty (i.e., repeat business), though the association is not perfect as a satisfied
customer may not have need for future consumption or a dissatisfied customer may be trapped
by a lack of alternatives [16]. More precisely, satisfaction influences behavioral intention (i.e.,
willingness to repurchase) [20], which in turn influences actual repurchase behavior. Other
consequences of dissatisfaction include complaints, either directly to the product or service
provider, or to friends and colleagues (i.e., word-of-mouth) [16]. The relationships between
complaints, complaint management, and loyalty are an active subject of debate [25].
In sum, past research on product development, outsourced product development, and customer
satisfaction suggests concepts and relationships pertinent to the present study. These are utilized
to frame specific hypotheses in Section 5.3.
5.3 Conceptual Framework & Propositions
5.3.1 Relationships between Success Measures
Causal relationships identified from the three streams of literature are now combined with
understanding gained from exploratory interviews to model the relationships between key
success measures identified in Chapter 2. The hypothesized causal network, depicted in Figure
5-2, is organized along two dimensions. Horizontally it consists of two interconnected halves:
the left side includes measures common to traditional product development while the right
includes measures unique to outsourced development. Vertically the measures are grouped into
approximately sequential stages, as suggested by product development and customer satisfaction
theory. Following the model of Loch et al. [10], measures of product development performance
are expected to influence measures of development outcome performance, which in turn
influence measures of business performance.
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Figure 5-2: Causal relationships hypothesized between project success measures. Black arrows represent a
hypothesized positive association, while red arrows represent a hypothesized negative association. Measures
to the left of the dashed grey line are common to traditional product development, while those to the right are
unique to outsourced product development. The grey labels and arrows at the sides are standard concepts
and relationships from product development and customer satisfaction theory.
On the right side, value is hypothesized to drive satisfaction [24], which drives behavioral
intention [20], which in turn influences behavior [26, 27]. Most measures are also likely
influenced by one or more of the exogenous factors identified in Chapter 4, but these are omitted
for now for visual and conceptual clarity.
Specific hypotheses are now derived in turn. Starting from the upper left, unexpected problems
occur for a variety of reasons, discussed in Chapter 4. The resolution of these problems requires
investment of time and resources, which adversely affects schedule and budget performance. If
resources are diverted from other development activities, the meeting of project requirements
may also suffer. If problems are extensive, it is unlikely that all will be resolved by the end of the
consulting project.
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Moving down a stage, fulfillment of requirements reduces the amount of rework that the client
must perform to the consultant's deliverable and increases the likelihood that a product will be
commercialized. Schedule performance should also be positively associated with
commercialization, as an on-time product launch is more likely to hit a market opportunity. A
project that misses its window may be canceled to save production ramp-up costs.
Although not included in past models [10, 11], development process measures may also impact
business performance measures directly. A design that meets requirements should be more likely
to succeed in the market (assuming the requirements were well-specified). Schedule performance
is hypothesized to improve market success by reducing time-to-market [6, 7]. Budget
performance is hypothesized to adversely affect market success through its negative impact on
product performance (not shown explicitly) [5]. Budget performance should positively influence
ROI by reducing the client's investment. Rework increases the investment, reducing ROI.
Rework may also be indicative of poor design work, which has been shown to reduce ROI [14].
Lastly, market success is hypothesized to increase ROI by increasing revenues.
On the right side of the diagram, higher quality of the working relationship between client and
consultant is hypothesized to improve the likelihood that the problems which do occur will be
resolved by the end of the consulting project. Unresolved problems should increase the amount
of rework required. The perceived value of the project to the client should be positively
influenced by the meeting of requirements, as well as budget and schedule performance. These
correspond to two components of performance utilized in the American Customer Satisfaction
Index (ACSI): the meeting of requirements indicates successful customization of the consultant's
service to meet the client's needs, while the achievement of schedule and budget commitments
reflects the reliability of the consultant's service [28]. Budget performance should also positively
influence project value by reducing direct project costs. By similar arguments, project value
should be positively associated with ROI.
Johnson et al. have suggested that perceived value is the primary determinant of customer
satisfaction in complex services [23], but the ACSI model includes direct links from both value
and performance to satisfaction [28]. In the present model, a direct link is hypothesized from
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requirements performance to satisfaction, but not from schedule and budget performance as these
typically show little variation (Chapter 3) and the qualitative interviews suggested that they are
less important in practitioners' mental models of success (Chapter 2). A direct link is
hypothesized from rework to satisfaction. While rework is expected to be closely related to
requirements performance, it may have an independent effect on satisfaction for two reasons.
First, the visibility of requirements and rework differ between client personnel. Project sponsors
and other high-level personnel are more familiar with the original contractual requirements but
less so with the details of their attainment and the rework required. Project engineers are
painfully aware of rework but may be less familiar with the project contract. Both paths are
included to allow prediction of satisfaction across multiple client roles. A second reason to
hypothesize independent effects has to do with the timing of the satisfaction measurement.
Measurements taken shortly after the project may be influenced more by requirements
performance, as the extent of rework required may not yet be fully appreciated. Later satisfaction
measurements might be more heavily influenced by rework due to recency effects.
Finally, satisfaction is hypothesized to be positively influenced by working relationship quality.
Prior models of complex knowledge-based services have not included relationship factors [23,
29], but they figure prominently in models of retail service quality [30]. The interviews
suggested that relationship quality is a distinct dimension from process efficiency and design
quality. Consultants in particular believed that a client might well be satisfied on a project with
poor objective results if the relationship was good (Chapter 2). Given that relationship quality is
evaluated subjectively, even emotionally, it would likely have an independent effect on
satisfaction from performance (an observed quantity) or value (a calculated quantity). In
addition, a good working relationship likely indicates frequent feedback between the two parties
(Figure 4-1), increasing the likelihood that the client's expectations for the project deliverables
were well-managed.
Client satisfaction is hypothesized to positively influence behavioral intentions such as the
client's willingness to rehire or recommend the consultant. Patterson, Johnson and Spreng
demonstrated a strong association between client satisfaction and repurchase intentions in
management consulting [29]. Reichheld, a management consultant himself, has argued that the
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link between satisfaction and willingness to recommend is so strong that the latter can be used to
measure the former [31, 32]. Lastly, the client's willingness to rehire is hypothesized to
positively influence actual repeat business, as suggested by the theory of reasoned action [27].
Altogether, 27 testable hypotheses are illustrated by the arrows in Figure 5-2.
5.3.2 Detailed Model for Client Satisfaction
A detailed causal diagram for client satisfaction is depicted in Figure 5-3. In addition to the four
endogenous relationships included in Figure 5-2, three exogenous and one methodological
influence are hypothesized. The three exogenous factors all relate to client expectations.
Expectations are not modeled explicitly, for both conceptual and methodological reasons. First, it
remains unclear whether expectations, ideals, and/or equity comparisons should be assessed [17].
Second, design consulting clients are a mix of highly experienced and novice individuals. The
former will have well-formed expectations, while the latter will not [23]. Including both in a
single construct will distort the true effect.
Working
Relationship
Reason for
Requirements Outsourcing
Met Experience with
Consulting
RespondentRework Project Role
Required Value
------
~Sample
Type
Client ----------
Satisfaction
Figure 5-3: Detailed causal diagram for client satisfaction. The arrow from sample type is dashed to indicate
that this is a methodological control rather than a substantive effect.
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Finally, accurate assessment of expectations requires pre-purchase measurement of them [29].
Given the nature of the present research design, it was not possible to do so (particularly for the
patent sample, whose respondents were identified via records generated by the project). Post-
purchase measurements of expectations in complex services have been shown to be artifacts of
perceived performance [23]. Analysis of ACSI data suggests that the links between post-
purchase estimates of expectations and satisfaction are weak and can be removed [25].
For these reasons, the expectations construct is replaced by three factors that influence
expectations but are conceptually more precise and easier to measure. The first is the client
firm's reason for outsourcing the project. The outsourcing paradigms described in Chapter 4
generate very different expectations for project deliverables. The client outsourcing for capacity
will have strong ideals of how the project should be performed. Specifically, it should be done
the same way the client would have done it. The client outsourcing for originality expects a
design, and perhaps even a development process, that is markedly different from what it would
have come up with. These are both strong ideals that are easily disconfirmed upon receipt of the
consultant's design. In contrast, the client outsourcing for knowledge is inexperienced in the
activity being performed and will have less well-formed ideals. These differences suggest that
the outsourcing paradigms will have unique patterns of satisfaction. In the capacity case, the best
the consultant can do is to meet the client's ideal; it is unlikely that he will exceed the client's
own performance (unless the client is actually outsourcing for speed rather than capacity). As a
result, client satisfaction with capacity is expected to range from fair to poor. In the originality
case, the consultant might delight the client with a novel design or disappoint with an unoriginal
or original-but-impractical design. Simply meeting the ideal seems less likely. In the knowledge
case, satisfaction will derive less from disconfirmation and more from perceived performance (if
the client has sufficient knowledge to assess performance) and/or the quality of the working
relationship. A wide and continuous range of satisfaction is expected. The following two
hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1 (Hi): Clients outsourcing for knowledge will be more satisfied than those
outsourcing for capacity or originality.
H2: Clients outsourcing for speed will be more satisfied than those outsourcing for knowledge,
capacity, or originality.
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The second expectations-related factor influencing satisfaction is the client firm's experience
with design consulting. Clients with greater direct experience should form more realistic
expectations than those who base their expectations on indirect knowledge. Because design
consulting is a relatively small industry, a novice client will have difficulty obtaining word-of-
mouth recommendations and must base his expectations on the consultant's own marketing
communications, which may overstate the likelihood of success (Chapter 4). As such, the
inexperienced client's expectations may be unrealistically high, leading to greater
disconfirmation and lower satisfaction. The exploratory interviews identified client inexperience
with purchasing design services as a risk factor (Chapter 4), and prior research on management
consulting has found that client satisfaction is positively associated with the experience of
individuals in the organization with similar purchase situations [29]. As such, it is hypothesized
that:
H3: Clients who usually outsource projects similar to the one being assessed will be more
satisfied than those that do not.
The third exogenous factor is the respondent's role on the project. More senior employees will
likely have more realistic expectations due to their greater experience and greater familiarity
with the particular project contract. More importantly, they were more involved in the hiring
decision and purposefully structured the project to meet their desires. They are true customers,
whereas a less-involved junior employee is merely a consumer of their purchase. In addition,
cognitive dissonance theory suggests that the project sponsor may overestimate project
performance so as not to create conflict with her pre-purchase expectations [16]. The low-level
team member, having not been involved in the hiring decision, has no such dissonance to resolve
and can rate performance more critically. For all these reasons, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Client satisfaction will increase with increasing respondent seniority.
Lastly, the results of Chapter 3 suggest that respondents in the patent sample will be significantly
less satisfied than those in the benchmarking sample due to selection, non-response, and/or
"charity" biases. Thus, sample type is included in the model to control for these effects.
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5.4 Methods
The study was conducted using the same research setting and design described in previous
chapters. The hypotheses derived in Section 5.3 were tested on the Phase 3 benchmarking/patent
survey data using ordinary least squares regression. Two levels of analysis were used. The
conceptual framework was tested at the project level. Project-level measures of each project
outcome were generated by averaging the responses of all respondents from that project.
Problems, working relationship quality, and requirements, schedule, and budget performance
were assessed by both client and consultant respondents. Rework, value, product
commercialization, commercial success, and ROI were assessed only by clients as consultants do
not have good visibility of these outcomes. Averaging multiple responses provided greater
resolution for regression while allowing use of relatively coarse, easily answerable measurement
scales. It also made the measures more robust to outlying individual responses. Repeat business
is less ambiguous and was therefore obtained from a single source: the consultancy study
coordinators for the benchmarking projects and the client respondents for the patent projects.
The detailed client satisfaction models were tested at the individual level. While project-
averaged satisfaction has utility as a success measure, satisfaction is an individual-level construct
and should be explained as such. Each client respondent was treated as a unique observation,
allowing inclusion of individual-level explanatory variables such as the respondent's role or
familiarity with the contract. After testing the formally derived hypotheses, inductive models
were created using stepwise regression with all the success factors identified in Chapter 4. A
plausible hypothesis could have been formulated for each of these variables a priori, but the
stepwise approach is far more efficient. The resulting models were validated using n-i cross-
validation, and the cross-validated R2 values used for claims of explanatory power.
Missing explanatory variables in multiple regression models were imputed using the mean value
for that variable. Cases missing the dependent variable were omitted, as were those missing the
explanatory variable in a single regression analysis. As a result, not all models in the conceptual
framework have the same number of observations.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Relationships between Success Measures
Results of the regression models are shown in Figure 5-4 and Table 5-2. Seventeen of the 27
hypothesized relationships were supported, and all but two of the non-significant relationships
were in the hypothesized direction. Starting at the upper left, the occurrence of problems was
found to adversely affect schedule and requirements performance as hypothesized but not budget
performance. The null result is likely due to the limited variation observed in budget
performance (Chapter 3). 62% of projects used fixed-fee contracts, so these clients paid what
they expected to regardless of problems. Greater occurrence of problems did increase the
likelihood of unresolved problems, as hypothesized.
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Figure 5-4: Results of hypothesis tests for relationships between success measures. The numbers are the
standardized regression coefficients. The color of the arrows indicates the hypothesized direction of the
relationship: black for positive, red for negative. The color of the coefficients indicates the direction estimated
by the regression model. Bold numbers and thick arrows indicate relationships significant atp < 0.05,
representing confirmed hypotheses.
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Table 5-2: Details of regression models for relationships between success measures.
Dep. Var. Term Estimate Std Beta t Ratio p-value n R2
Budget Intercept 3.10 0 16.7 <0.0001 89 0.01
Performance PROBLEMS -0.117 -0.105 -0.97 0.333
Schedule Intercept 4.69 0 18.3 <0.0001 96 0.29
Performance PROBLEMS -1.00 -0.541 -6.23 <0.0001***
Requirements Intercept 4.65 0 31.5 <0.0001 96 0.13
Performance PROBLEMS -0.354 -0.367 -3.82 0.0002***
Unresolved Intercept 0.383 0 1.30 
0.196
Problems PROBLEMS 0.281 0.367 3.83 0.0002*** 97 0.28
WORK REL -0.137 -0.256 -2.67 0.009**
Intercept 2.14 0 3.90 0.0002
Rework REQS MET -0.019 -0.017 -0.15 0.882 74 0.05
PROBS NR 0.300 0.222 1.89 0.063
Intercept 1.39 0 1.89 0.062
Product to REQS MET 0.345 0.203 1.71 0.092 88 0.04
SCHE MET -0.141 -0.154 -1.30 0.198
Intercept 3.47 0 1.06 0.298
REQS MET 1.54 0.336 2.15 0.038*
SCHE MET 0.012 0.005 0.03 0.975
BUDG MET -1.24 -0.295 -1.96 0.057
Intercept -1.79 0 -2.25 0.029
BUDG MET 0.293 0.236 2.17 0.035*
VALUE 0.241 0.265 2.61 0.012* 62 0.46
REWORK 0.152 0.077 0.75 0.458
TO MRKT 0.499 0.461 4.46 <0.0001***
MRKT SUC 0.106 0.196 1.84 0.071
Intercept 1.07 0 1.19 0.236
Value REQS MET 0.510 0.263 2.42 0.018* 97 0.22
SCHE MET 0.280 0.272 2.37 0.020*
BUDG MET 0.020 0.012 0.12 0.906
Intercept -16.7 0 -1.08 0.283
WORK REL 5.57 0.182 2.81 0.0060**
Satisfaction REQS MET 15.8 0.333 5.21 <0.0001*** 97 0.68
VALUE 10.1 0.413 6.14 <0.0001***
REWORK -16.7 -0.375 -6.12 <0.0001***
Willingness to Intercept 2.42 0 5.33 <0.0001 97 0.64
Recommend SAT INDEX 0.076 0.800 13.1 <0.0001***
Willingness to Intercept 2.67 0 5.47 <0.0001 97 0.58
Rehire SAT INDEX 0.072 0.764 11.59 <0.0001***
Repeat Intercept 1.02 0 1.56 0.123 90 0.08
Business REHIRE 0.210 0.276 2.69 0.0085**
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Neither requirements performance nor unresolved problems had a significant effect on rework,
though the latter is nearly significant (p = 0.06). The lack of relationship between requirements
performance and rework is surprising and may indicate the difficulty of specifying requirements
accurately in advance. Most projects met or exceeded contractual requirements yet still required
rework relative to what the clients expected (descriptive results in Chapter 3). The original
contractual requirements may not have been detailed enough, or the product's true needs may
have shifted during development, or the clients may simply have underestimated the nearly
inevitable revisions required when re-integrating an outsourced design. Alternatively, the null
result may indicate a difference between "doing the job" and "doing the job right." Consultants
may have fulfilled the letter of the contract while neglecting its spirit. Client responses to open-
ended survey questions suggest that this occurred in only one or two cases.
Neither requirements performance nor schedule performance were found to significantly
influence product commercialization. As with rework, the null result for requirements
performance may reflect inaccuracy of initial product requirements. It may also reflect the fact
that requirements performance is just one small part of getting a product to market. Schedule
performance was found to have a (non-significant) negative association with product
commercialization. Detailed review of the data showed that several of the projects completed
ahead of schedule were on development projects that the client halted or canceled due to market
changes. Those that continued to commercialization often took longer than expected.
Requirements performance was significantly associated with commercial success, and budget
performance nearly so (p = 0.057), but schedule performance was not. The near-zero coefficient
is striking and echoes the inconsistent findings from past research [2, 6, 7]. Any marketing gains
through time-to-market may be offset by reduced technical performance [8, 9].
Project ROI was significantly associated with budget performance, product commercialization,
and project value but not commercial success or rework. The weak link between commercial
success and ROI is likely a methodological artifact: only 43 projects had sent products to market
and earned a valid commercial success score. The other 54 projects were assigned the mean
value for the multiple regression analysis, muting the strength of the actual effect. When the
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regression was performed using only those projects that had commercialized products, the
regression coefficient for market success was closer to 0.37. The hypothesized negative link
from rework to ROI was not supported. The additional costs of rework were likely offset by
improved product performance, but these paths were not modeled.
On the customer satisfaction side of the framework, all but one of the hypotheses were
confirmed. Budget performance was found to have a negligible effect on project value, probably
due to the relative lack of variation in budget performance discussed previously.
The R2 values in the rightmost column of Table 5-2 indicate the amount of variation in each
outcome measure that is explained by the hypothesized relationships with the other outcomes.
For example, the model for budget performance, which consisted solely of an effect due to
problems, explained only 1% of the variation observed in budget performance, a very poor
explanation. In contrast, problems alone explain 29% of variation in schedule performance, a
fairly good result for a single explanatory variable. In general, the customer-satisfaction
outcomes were better explained than the product development outcomes. An exception is repeat
business, for which only 8% of variation was explained by the client project teams' average
willingness to rehire the consultant. When only project sponsors' opinions were considered,
willingness to rehire explained 13% of the variation in repeat business (n = 47, t = 2.64, p =
0.012), a slight improvement. Note that the evaluated projects were generally completed within
the last two years, so some of the clients may not yet have needed additional services. For the
subset of projects more than a year old, project-averaged willingness to rehire explained 13% of
repeat business variation (n = 54, t = 2.60, p = 0.012), and sponsor willingness to rehire
explained 24% (n = 17, t = 2.16,p = 0.047).
5.5.2 Detailed Models for Client Satisfaction
Deductive Model
Results of the detailed client satisfaction model derived from customer satisfaction theory in
Section 5.3.2 are shown in Table 5-3. In contrast to the limited model for satisfaction included in
Figure 5-2, this model was tested at the individual level to allow inclusion of the respondent role
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Table 5-3: Regression results for the detailed model of client satisfaction derived from customer satisfaction
theory.
Term
Intercept
REWORK
REQS MET
WORK REL
VALUE
USUAL
SAMPLE: BENCHMARK vs PATENT
REASON: SPEED
REASON: ORIGINALITY
REASON: CAPACITY
REASON: KNOWLEDGE
ROLE
R2= 0.73, R2adj= 0.70
n = 119 client respondents (one outlier omitted)
Estimate
9.31
-14.9
10.6
7.46
4.87
3.04
1.97
5.08
-3.24
-1.20
-0.057
-1.23
Std Bet
0
-0.353
0.329
0.321
0.219
0.125
0.105
0.101
-0.089
-0.038
-0.002
-0.063
*
a t Ratio
0.83
-5.88
5.31
5.19
3.25
2.09
1.70
1.36
-1.54
-0.64
-0.03
-0.90
p < 0.05, **p <
p-value
0.408
<0.0001***
<0.0001***
<0.0001***
0.0016**
0.039*
0.091
0.178
0.126
0.523
0.975
0.369
0.01, ***p < 0.001
variable. The model explains 73% of the variation in client satisfaction, only slightly better than
the limited model. The four explanatory variables from that model were all highly significant.
Only one of the three exogenous factors had a significant additional effect. Client experience
with consulting, measured by whether they usually outsourced projects similar to the one being
assessed, was positively associated with satisfaction as hypothesized (hypothesis 113). Neither
the respondent's role nor the sample type had a significant independent effect on satisfaction,
which is surprising given the strong direct correlations observed in Chapter 3. The likely
explanation is that respondent role and sample type influence both the explanatory and
dependent variables similarly. As was seen in Chapter 3, senior respondents were more satisfied,
but they were also more likely to rate the project value highly, the working relationship highly,
and so forth. To verify that the explanatory variables are in fact independent of each other,
variance inflation factors were calculated for each. The highest value was 2.18, well below the
typical cutoff of 10, indicating little multicollinearity [33].
The effects of outsourcing motivation were all in the hypothesized directions, but none were
significant. Their effects were likely subsumed by more powerful factors such as rework and
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requirements performance. For example, clients outsourcing for originality or capacity rated
rework higher than those outsourcing for knowledge (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.039) and were
also less satisfied (p = 0.097). Rework shows up as the stronger effect in the regression model,
but this is less practically useful because rework is not known in advance, whereas outsourcing
motivation is.
To verify that outsourcing motivation has an effect on its own, a second regression model was
created that omitted rework, requirements performance, working relationship, and value (Table
5-4). This model finds support for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. On average, clients outsourcing for
speed had satisfaction scores 16.6 points higher than those outsourcing for knowledge, 18.4
points higher than those outsourcing for capacity, and 22.1 points higher than those outsourcing
for originality. Satisfaction was higher for knowledge than capacity and originality, but not
significantly so (as evidenced by the overlap of the 95% confidence intervals for those terms),
thus disconfirming hypothesis 1.
Table 5-4: Regression results for deductive model of client satisfaction, exogenous factors only. The estimates
for the outsourcing reasons are all relative to the ID knowledge/ME capacity paradigm, which is a relatively
neutral base case. 95% confidence intervals are shown to make explicit the differences between outsourcing
motivations.
Term Estimate 95% CI Std Beta t Ratio p-value
Intercept 51.8 40.1 to 63.5 0 8.78 <0.0001
USUAL 7.53 3.27 to 11.8 0.309 3.50 0.0007***
SAMPLE: BENCHMARK 1.92 -1.52 to 5.36 0.102 1.10 0.272
REASON: SPEED 13.8 3.42 to 24.1 0.275 2.64 0.0096**
REASON: ORIGINALITY -8.27 -14.6 to -1.97 -0.228 -2.60 0.0106*
REASON: CAPACITY -4.59 -10.3 to 1.08 -0.147 -1.60 0.112
REASON: KNOWLEDGE -2.77 -8.28 to 2.74 -0.097 -1.00 0.322
ROLE 5.68 1.97 to 9.39 0.291 3.04 0.003**
R 2 = 0.32, R2adj0.28 * <0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
n = 119 client respondents (one outlier omitted)
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Three Inductive Models
To supplement the models derived from satisfaction theory, three additional models were
identified from the data itself. The first model, shown in the left column of Table 5-5, sought to
explain client satisfaction expost, using all available information. As in the customer satisfaction
deductive models, value, rework, and requirements performance all had strong effects. Working
relationship quality was displaced from the model by two related client assessments of the
consultant project team: its consistency of team membership and its technical competence.
Consistency in particular had a strong effect, as perceived inconsistencies were strongly
associated with client dissatisfaction. A fifth success measure, the extent of problems perceived
by the client, adversely affected satisfaction but less strongly than the other success measures.
The remaining four factors are characteristics of the project rather than outcomes of it. Client
satisfaction decreased with increasing part count of the product being developed. Part count is
commonly used as a measure of product complexity [34, 35], but in this case an additional force
may be responsible. High part count products tend to be highly technological, whereas low part
count products tend to compete on appearance, usability, and/or production process efficiency.
The consultancies in the study are experts at user-centered design and would be expected to add
more value in market-oriented products than high-tech products.2 Perhaps for similar reasons,
satisfaction was negatively associated with the extent of product requirements known to the
client firm at the start of the project. That is, after accounting for all other factors in the model
(value, problems, etc.), projects starting with just marketing requirements produced greater
satisfaction than those starting with technical requirements or detailed technical specifications.
Three forces may have been at work. The consultants may add more value during the "fuzzy
front end" of product development, as suggested above. In addition, more extensive requirements
represent more well-formed expectations, which are more easily disconfirmed upon inspection
and/or testing of the consultant's deliverable. Finally, clients having extensive project
requirements tended to be outsourcing for capacity, and therefore been harder to delight, or were
seeking specific technical expertise which the consultant may or may not have had.
2 Other consultancies do specialize in specific high-technology areas, however none were included in the study
sample.
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Table 5-5: Inductive models of client satisfaction.
Exnlanation Model
Estimate Std Beta p-value
Estimation Model
Estimate Std Beta p-value
Prediction Model
Estimate Std Beta p-value
Intercept -0.520 0 0.973 0.451 0 0.978 32.0 0 0.022
VALUE
CONS. TEAM CONSISTENCY
REWORK
REQS MET
PROBLEMS (according to client)
PARTS
REQUIREMENTS (a/t client)
REASON: ORIGINALITY
CONS. TEAM TECH. COMP.
CONS. EXP. w/ ACTIVITY
STABILITY OF REQUIREMENTS
ADEQUACY of BUDGET (a/t cons.)
CLI. EXP. w/ CONSULTING (a/t cons.)
ROLE
PROBLEMS (according to consultant)
MANUFACTURER
INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATION
PROJECT SCOPE: FINAL PHASE
CONS. EXP. w/ PRODUCT TYPE
SAMPLE: BENCHMARKING
CLIENT EXP. w/ NPD (a/t consultant)
EXTENT OF MFG INVOLVEMENT
PHYSICAL DISTANCE (miles)
CLI OFFERING: DISCRETE PRODS
EMPOWERMENT OF CLIENT PM
Root Mean Square Error
R 2 adj
R cross-validation
9.18
6.48
-12.0
6.10
-6.17
-0.109
-3.08
-8.48
2.69
6.97
0.411
0.302
-0.251
0.173
-0.170
-0.164
-0.161
-0.157
0.147
0.131
<0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
0.0108
0.0044
0.0062
0.0046
0.0058
0.0295
0.0236
119
7.71
0.87
0.84
0.79
-12.4
11.8
6.97
9.56
-18.3
5.70
7.90
5.83
3.37
-0.675
0.584
0.512
0.481
-0.507
0.488
0.387
0.336
0.217
<0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
<0.0001
< 0.0001
<0.0001
0.0023
0.0070
0.0281
66
7.27
0.85
0.80
0.72
-12.1
11.0
9.24
-11.5
0.0082
-7.16
9.25
-0.224 0.037
0.528
0.438
-0.396
0.365
-0.313
0.232
< 0.0001
0.0003
0.0012
<0.0001
0.0030
0.021
119
14.4
0.52
0.46
0.36
Term
Clients outsourcing for originality were significantly less satisfied than those outsourcing for
other reasons. As discussed previously, outsourcing for originality generates simultaneously
vague yet easily disconfirmed expectations. What's more, few client firms outsource for
originality routinely, so their expectations may be inflated by consultant marketing [36-39] or
even academic research [40, 41]. While the occasional success may bring client delight, on the
whole this outsourcing paradigm appears to be less successful than the others. Lastly, satisfaction
was higher on projects in which the consultant was more experienced with the activity it was
hired to perform, as assessed by the consultants themselves. This effect is actually stronger than
the numbers suggest, as it was mean-imputed for all the projects in the patent sample.
While this particular explanatory model provided the greatest power, variants on it did nearly as
well. Additional variables appearing frequently in the stepwise regression included: the
consultant team's communication skill, as assessed by the client (positively associated with
satisfaction), the length and budget of the project (positive association), projects focusing on
industrial, rather than consumer or medical products (negative association), the client's trust of
the consultant (positive), the client firm's age (negative), and the identity of the consultancy.
The second model, shown in the middle column of Table 5-5, estimates client satisfaction using
only information that would be known to the consultant by the end of the project. Because the
data were taken primarily from the consultant surveys, this model omits the patent sample
projects as well as sixteen from the benchmarking study for which consultant responses were not
available. The most powerful variable is counter-intuitive: client satisfaction decreased with
increasing stability of requirements throughout the course of the project, as assessed by the
consultants. This surprising result is likely due to the same forces driving the negative effect of
the extent of requirements known at the start of the project that was seen in the previous model.
Clients with stable requirements have very strong expectations that are easily disconfirmed.
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Satisfaction increased with budget adequacy, with the client's experience with consulting, and
with the consultant's experience with the type of product being developed. Satisfaction also
increased with client role and involvement in project planning and negotiation. 3 Client
satisfaction decreased sharply with the extent of problems perceived by the consultants, much
more so than with problems perceived by the client in the previous model. It may be that
consultants are more attuned to what types of problems are serious and which are not.
The final two factors are surprising. Satisfaction increased with increasing organizational
distance between the client firm and the manufacturer of the product being designed. On average,
and accounting for all other factors in the model, clients were more satisfied with projects with
an international contract manufacturer than a domestic manufacturer, and more satisfied with
projects with a domestic contract manufacturer than those manufactured by the client firm itself.
This result should be interpreted with care, and likely not at face value. It seems unlikely that
clients would be more satisfied with greater manufacturer organizational distance per se. Rather,
they may be more satisfied with the type of products whose production is internationally
outsourced. These include simple products such as housewares but also complex products such
as consumer electronics that are now produced almost exclusively overseas. In contrast, medical
and industrial products are more often produced domestically and by the client firm. Industrial
products in particular produced less satisfaction than other types, which may account for the
observed effect. Another explanation is that client firms having production capabilities generally
also have design capabilities, and are therefore outsourcing for capacity or originality, which
tend to produce lower satisfaction. The fact that the regression algorithm prioritized
manufacturer type over these other factors is likely a measurement artifact: manufacturer type
had three ordinal levels (client firm, domestic third party, overseas third party) whereas product
type had thirteen nominal categories. Nonetheless, the effect demonstrates that increasing
manufacturer integration is not necessarily correlated with better outcomes.
Lastly, client satisfaction increased the further through the development process the project
extended. That is, all else equal, clients were more satisfied with a project that included detail
3 Role and involvement were actually provided by the clients, but since they would typically be known to the
consultants as well they were included in the estimation model.
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design and manufacturing support than one that stopped after user research or concept
development.
Cross-validation suggests that the estimation model can explain over 70% of the variation in
actual client satisfaction, a marked improvement over consultants' current estimates. As part of
the consultant survey, each respondent was asked to estimate the average satisfaction of the
client stakeholders. The responses of multiple consultants on a given project were averaged, and
the average estimates regressed against the actual average satisfaction from the client survey
(Table 5-6). Overall the estimates are quite poor (top row of the table), accounting for just 3% of
the variation, with a mean error of 14.5 satisfaction index points. Interestingly, when separate
regressions were performed for each participating consultancy (lower rows), dramatically
different estimation accuracy resulted. The best performing consultancy in terms of satisfaction
was also the most accurate at estimating satisfaction. The worst performing in terms of
satisfaction was also the worst at estimation. While the individual consultancy sample sizes are
small and therefore susceptible to sampling error, it may be that an ability to accurately estimate
satisfaction improves one's ability to deliver it. If so, the estimation model in Table 5-5 may help
consultant practitioners to better manage client satisfaction. If they feel the project is
experiencing problems, or is short on budget, the client may well be dissatisfied.
Table 5-6: Regressions of consultant-estimated project-averaged client satisfaction against actual project-
averaged client satisfaction. Only one of the four consultancies estimated client satisfaction with any
accuracy, though it had a very small sample size and so this result may simply be due to chance.
Model Intercept Estimate p-value n R2 RMSE Mean Satisf.
All Consultancies 106.2 -3.04 0.206 56 0.030 14.5 80.4
Consultancy A 58.1 2.94 0.104 a 0.092 7.40 82.9
Consultancy B 77.8 0.61 0.931 a 0.001 10.7 83.0
Consultancy C -51.7 16.7 0.0005 a 0.964 1.85 92.6
Consultancy D 153.1 -10.3 0.073 a 0.347 19.3 63.0
a Individual consultancy sample sizes withheld to preserve consultancy anonymity
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The third model, shown in the rightmost column of Table 5-5, attempts to predict satisfaction
before the project even begins, using only variables that would be known during project
negotiation. Only two of the factors are intuitive: satisfaction increased significantly with the
client's experience with new product development, as assessed by the consultant, and with the
degree to which the client project manager was empowered (reported by the client). So-called
"heavyweight project managers" [42] may be better able to manage the client organization to
provide resources needed by the consultant, better able to provide timely feedback to the
consultant, and may even be able to help shepherd the consultant design back into the client
organization.
Counter-intuitively, satisfaction decreased with increasing involvement of the manufacturer in
the project. This may reflect similar phenomena as the manufacturer distance result from the
estimation model: simpler products require less manufacturer involvement while producing
greater client satisfaction. It may also be a statistical anomaly. Even so, it suggests that increased
manufacturer involvement is not necessarily essential for success.
Satisfaction was also negatively associated with physical distance between the client and the
consultant. Several explanations are possible. Clients may choose to use a more distant
consultancy only when there is good reason to do so: a particular expertise or a pre-existing
relationship that outweighs the coordination disadvantage of increased distance. In contrast, an
inexperienced client or someone simply needing a "hired gun" may default to using a local
consultant, who may not be best-suited for the job. Alternatively, increased distance may
motivate both client and consultant to work harder to overcome it. More research is needed to
fully explain this counter-intuitive result.
As with the explanation model, clients outsourcing for original perspectives were less likely to
be satisfied. Lastly, satisfaction was significantly lower for clients whose firm's primary
offering is discrete (i.e., assembled) products rather than bulk (continuous, process-driven)
products or services. This can be explained in terms of the reason-for-outsourcing framework.
Clients whose primary business is not discrete products are generally seeking consumer
understanding or "productization" knowledge - general knowledge that the consultancies can
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readily provide. For example, projects in the patent study included drug delivery devices for
pharmaceutical companies and packaging for a large food company. In contrast, clients whose
primary business is discrete products are likely outsourcing for capacity or originality, reasons
associated with lower satisfaction (Table 5-3).
5.6 Discussion
The various models suggest that consulting project outcomes can be very well explained and
even partially predicted. Testing of the overarching conceptual framework (Figure 5-2)
demonstrated that ultimate outcomes such as return-on-investment and client loyalty are driven
by intermediate outcomes such as problems, requirements performance, and perceived value.
The framework illustrates why practitioners report so many distinct dimensions of success: in
addition to traditional product development measures, clients of outsourced development must
also consider rework and project value, while consultants must balance client satisfaction against
measures of their own success (profit, capability development, etc.). In addition, the key
measures vary throughout the course of the project. In the midst of development, relationship
quality and schedule/budget performance will be front of mind. Towards the end of the project,
focus shifts to requirements performance and value. After the project, clients focus on the quality
of the deliverable - measured in terms of rework required - while consultants eagerly wait to see
if a product will come to market. Thus each measure has its purpose, and each might be
thoroughly examined as was done for client satisfaction. Such examination is left for future
work.
The results of the hypothesis tests suggest that product commercialization and commercial
success might be the best place to continue explanation. Whereas all but one of the hypotheses
on the client satisfaction side of the framework were supported, very few of those pertaining to
commercialization were. Several factors may account for the difference. First, the science of
customer satisfaction is more developed than that of product development, with more certain
conceptual relationships and more refined measurement instruments. Second, the product
development side of the framework may have been hindered by statistical issues. In particular,
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the scales used for commercialization and positive ROI were quite crude, consisting of just three
levels: yes, not yet, and no. In addition, commercial success could only be modeled for the
products that had already gone to market, and the survey was conducted fairly early relative to
commercialization timelines. Third, it may be that customer satisfaction is inherently more
explainable. Product development outcomes are factual, and subject to many random and chaotic
influences. Satisfaction is a cognitive judgment that may account for these idiosyncrasies,
attenuating their influence. Finally, it may be that client satisfaction is already the prevailing
outcome concept among practitioners, and so the other success measures they suggested are
geared towards it. It is possible that a more focused examination of commercialization might
yield additional intermediate success measures that would improve ex post explanation of
commercial success. Prediction of commercial success would remain quite difficult, as it is
subject to many factors that are beyond the control of the consultants and clients, such as the
actions of the client's competitors.
Turning now to the detailed models of client satisfaction, the results clearly indicate that project
value, requirements performance, and rework are the key drivers of client satisfaction. Each has
a strong effect independent of the others, suggesting that practicing consultants must balance all
three to deliver satisfaction. Satisfaction is likely to be mediocre for both "boutique"
consultancies that deliver high quality but poor value, as well as "low-cost" consultancies that
deliver value but not quality. Beyond these three factors, the quality of the working relationship
appears to have its own independent effect. While this will come as no surprise to practicing
consultants, prior academic models of professional services have not included it, but may well
benefit from doing so. At present it is unclear whether working relationship quality affects
satisfaction by influencing client assessments of performance or their expectations (Figure 5-1).
Additional research, with explicit pre- and post-purchase measurements of expectations, might
shed light on the mechanism.
The inductive models demonstrate that it is possible to explain, estimate, and even predict client
satisfaction with reasonable accuracy. The three models presented in Table 5-5 are not meant to
be definitive, but rather illustrative of what is possible. A savvy consultancy might improve on
them by studying its own projects in detail. Client firms too might benefit from statistical
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analysis of their own projects. Longitudinal examination of projects would allow more accurate
collection of both near- and far-term outcomes and their influences. Inclusion of just one
company's projects would control for many exogenous factors.
For academics, the inductive models suggest several interesting findings. Several effects that
were thought to be well understood, such as the positive influence of early and extensive
manufacturer involvement in product design, the importance of mature initial specifications in
systems engineering, and the detrimental effects of physical distance in distributed development
all had the opposite effects on client satisfaction in design consulting. Other variables that would
be expected to have strong effects, such as product novelty or client firm size, had little effect.
Still other variables that have not been previously studied, such as working relationship quality
and the client's reason for outsourcing, had significant effects. These findings suggest that
conventional wisdom about the design consulting industry is mistaken. It is not a form of
systems engineering, in which products are pre-specified, modularized, and divided up among
multiple parties for development [43]. The data suggests the best results occur when
requirements are developed jointly by client and consultant and revised frequently throughout
development. Though it was not included in the models in Table 5-5, the degree to which the
consultants felt their clients treated them as partners rather than vendors was positively
associated with client satisfaction. While consultancies can and do provide additional
development capacity, this is not their best value add.
Nor, despite recent suggestions to the contrary, is the industry most effective at radical
innovation [38, 44], "creative generalism," knowledge brokering [40], "design-inspired
innovation" [41], or other forms of originality-for-hire. In both the ex post explanatory and ex
ante predictive models, clients outsourcing for originality were less satisfied than those
outsourcing for other reasons. As one experienced client interviewee noted,
"You can't, in my opinion, outsource [creative] innovation. If you're the experts and
you don't know how to do it, just because some other guy has a pedigree, he ain't
going to be able to do it any better." 
- Client Director of Engineering
The effectiveness of outsourced creativity has likely been overstated in both consultant
marketing and academic analysis of the industry [40, 41, 44].
204
Where the industry does shine is in providing expertise, much like other professional services
such as law, accounting, or medicine. The models suggest that satisfaction was higher on
projects in which the consultant was experienced in the activity being performed and the type of
product being developed. As one client engineering director put it, "the best use of outsourced
design is when you are outsourcing to somebody who has real expertise or capability in
something in which you are merely knowledgeable." Several effective paradigms were observed
in the data. Most effective of all was speed - the ability to perform a task the client may be
capable of, but far more quickly. The client can appreciate the quality of the work and the fact
that his own firm could not have met the schedule. A second particularly effective model is that
of the "time-shared" development group. Several client firms in the sample do not maintain
internal development teams because they do not require enough development work to support
them. Instead, they build long-lasting relationships with a key consultancy who services them
and other key clients as necessary. The consultancy develops sufficient expertise in each client's
products, markets, and production capabilities, while maintaining enough variety to satisfy its
own staff, and is effectively a time-shared resource between the various client firms. A third role
in which the consultancies add high value is the understanding of product users - everyday
people. This is a specific expertise, indeed the root of the industrial design profession, yet one
that is broadly applicable. Products as diverse as computer peripherals, housewares, and
disposable food packaging are all used by the same types of people, and understanding of these
users applies equally well to all the products. The data suggest that client satisfaction was highest
for consumer products, particularly non-durables, and lowest for industrial products. The latter
are not used by everyday people but rather by specialists, and require understanding of special
needs and regulatory constraints. The data also indicate higher satisfaction for low part count
products - those whose value derives from market orientation rather than technological
superiority.
Market orientation may also partially explain the unexpected result that client satisfaction is not
hindered (and may even be helped) by limited manufacturing involvement. Because many of
these products are "high-touch" and moderate- to low-tech, the engineering to manufacturing
interface is less critical than the industrial design to engineering interface. Given that it is nearly
impossible to fit all the contributors to product development under one roof, the consultancies
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emphasize the design-to-engineering interface over the engineering-to-manufacturing interface.
For low- to moderate tech products, the consultant design engineers are more than capable of
designing the product for standard manufacturing processes. Indeed, this strategy was advocated
by Dean and Susman decades ago [45], but was lost in the clamor for physical co-location of
design and manufacturing personnel.
Lastly, the results of the inductive models challenge conventional wisdom about design
outsourcing as a whole. While physical distance is often cited as one of the downsides of
outsourcing and offshoring, in this study it actually improved satisfaction (within the limited
range of distance in the sample, generally capped at a 2900 mile cross-country trip). Similarly,
corporate cultural distance has been suggested as a cause of problems in distributed development
[46], but the data suggests it has little effect (when assessed by the clients) or even a positive
effect (when assessed by the consultants). Big lumbering clients are highly dissimilar to the
consultancies yet do quite well when outsourcing for speed or user-centered expertise. Small
start-ups are perceived to have similar cultures yet often fail to respect the consultants' expertise
and leave unsatisfied. These findings suggest that scholars of other types of outsourced product
development may need to look for alternate explanations of the causes of poor outcomes.
Perhaps distance does matter above 2900 miles, or perhaps it is actually the time zones that hurt.
Corporate cultural distance may not be a problem, but ethnic cultural distance may be. Or
perhaps distance is not the problem at all, but rather the client's cost-saving motivations for
offshoring. The results of the present study suggest that examining client satisfaction with such
forms of outsourcing, which has not been done to date, may generate useful understanding.
5.7 Conclusions
The present chapter developed a framework illustrating how the various success measures in
design consulting influence one another. The model consists of elements from both product
development and customer satisfaction theory, united by three key measures: project value,
requirements performance, and design quality (as assessed by rework). Detailed models of client
satisfaction demonstrated that satisfaction can be explained, estimated, and even partially
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predicted. Several of the explanatory and predictive factors defy conventional wisdom. In
particular, outsourcing for originality does not appear to be effective, and organizational,
cultural, and physical distance are less problematic than commonly assumed.
These counter-intuitive results were enabled by several unconventional details of the study
design. First, a broad range of potential explanatory variables were simultaneously considered in
statistical analysis. More focused hypothesis testing might have taken the distance effects for
granted and not bothered to check them. Second, to guard against random effects or relationships
that were perceptual rather than real, data were gathered from multiple respondents per project
and the project-averaged results used in analysis. In the benchmarking sub-sample, both client
and consultant perspectives were considered. Such efforts are quite rare in product development
research. Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss claimed that "obtaining multiple respondents for each
project for data this detailed [less so than the present study] and a sample size this large
[comparable to the present study] is essentially infeasible" [2], but with an effective study design
it can be accomplished. Lastly, a variety of methodological controls, including sample type,
respondent role, measurement timing, and response promptness were included in the analysis to
help bring out the real relationships in the data.
The chief limitation of the study is that all the data were collected after the completion of the
consulting projects, making it impossible to accurately measure client expectations. Other
measures may suffer hindsight or recollection bias as well. A second limitation is that the cross-
sectional, single time point design prevented accurate assessment of both near- and far-term
project outcomes and influences. A shorter-term measure was made, enabling more accurate
collection of project characteristics and development performance, at the expense of long-term
outcomes such as commercial success. Third, the individual-level satisfaction models utilize as
many as three observations (respondents) from the same project, which could lead to minor
distortions as the individual responses are not truly independent of each other. Lastly, measures
of contract performance, value, and return-on-investment were made qualitatively rather than
quantitatively. Hart, among others, has shown that qualitative assessments are generally valid
and far easier for the academic researcher to access [47].
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The study makes valuable contributions to both the academic understanding of design consulting
and its practice. For the scholar of customer satisfaction, the study provides relatively unique
data on satisfaction in business-to-business professional services. The results confirm the
predictions of value-percept based satisfaction models but suggest that working relationship
quality may have an additional, independent effect. For scholars of product development, the
study suggests that client satisfaction might be a useful tool with which to understand other types
of outsourced product development. It also suggests need for a more careful evaluation of the
strategies and tactics of design consultancies. These companies are often cited as expert product
developers [44], yet little quantitative research has been conducted on them. The present results
suggest that the industry is indeed effective, but not for the reasons commonly assumed.
For the practicing consultant or client, the conceptual framework provides a useful means of
simplifying the daunting task of explaining project outcomes. In addition, the detailed client
satisfaction models provide both specific insights and a demonstration of the power of simple
statistical analyses to predict outcomes. Just as the Oakland Athletics used statistical thinking to
gain competitive advantage over their rivals [48], a progressive consultancy or client firm might
do the same to optimize its project outcomes.
The study suggests numerous avenues for further investigation. A larger study would allow
better consideration of multi-valued nominal explanatory factors such as the identity of the
sponsoring department within the client firm, the technical disciplines involved in development,
or the identity of the consultancy. A larger study would also allow the use of more sophisticated
modeling techniques such as structural equations modeling to refine the specification of the
conceptual framework. Pre-project measurements would enable direct inclusion of client
expectations and disconfirmation constructs. These variables might help to explain the dramatic
differences in satisfaction observed between multiple client respondents on the same project. The
present client survey assessed only three individual-level variables: role, involvement in project
planning, and familiarity with the project contract. These explain part of the intra-project
variation but some individuals still appear unusually dissatisfied. Inclusion of additional
individual-level variables might help to define what makes them so. Finally, it should be recalled
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that client satisfaction is just one of fifteen success measures in the conceptual framework.
Detailed models could be developed for each of the others to provide additional insights.
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6 Summary, Contributions, and Future Work
6.1 Summary
This dissertation set out to improve understanding of success and failure in outsourced product
development. Although this topic is discussed extensively in both academic and industrial
circles, imprecise use of the terms outsourcing and success has hindered communication and
created misunderstandings, including a perception that outsourced product development is
frequently unsuccessful. To establish clarity, the dissertation began by distinguishing several
distinct modes of outsourced product development, including integrated design-and-
manufacturing outsourcing (also known as black-box outsourcing or original design
manufacturing) and design consulting (also known as design and innovation consulting). Further
distinctions were drawn between domestic outsourcing and international outsourcing (or
offshoring). Domestic design consulting was then chosen for detailed investigation, because it
allowed isolation of the effects of outsourcing design separate from production; because it
allowed for study of many projects, each of moderate complexity; and because informants were
reasonably accessible to the investigator. All the results in the dissertation pertain specifically to
design consulting, though some generalize to other types of outsourced product development as
well.
Having specified the type of outsourcing that would be investigated, the first empirical study
clarified the meaning of success in this domain. Consultant, client, and scholarly perspectives
were described and synthesized to identify seven distinct dimensions of success: the impact of
the project on the client's business performance, the quality of the product design, the non-
financial benefits to the client firm, the efficiency and effectiveness of the development process,
the quality of the relationship between client and consultant, the client's overall satisfaction with
the project, and the benefits of the project to the consultant. Each dimension encompasses several
commonly used measures of success. Consultants and clients prioritize these measures
differently, which may lead to misaligned objectives and wasted effort. Scholarship on
outsourced development has focused primarily on measures that are not prioritized highly by
either consultants or clients, such as schedule performance and the occurrence of problems. The
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different meanings of success used by each of these three groups highlights the need for
conceptual clarity in research and in practice.
In addition to conceptual imprecision, a second factor that complicates understanding of
outsourcing effectiveness is the dearth of published data on project outcomes. To fill this gap, the
second study used the identified success measures to assess the outcomes of 134 recently
completed projects. The results suggest that outcomes in domestic design consulting are
generally good but vary significantly between projects. In addition, many outcome measures are
significantly influenced by the seniority of the respondent and the incentives and protections
afforded him during assessment. These results suggest that previously reported results should be
interpreted cautiously, as most studies used limited cross-sections of respondents and did not
incentivize participation by both satisfied and dissatisfied individuals.
Even when these methodological effects are controlled for, significant variation in project
outcomes persists. The third study sought to identify factors that might explain this variation.
Although several factors had been suggested in the literature [1-7], relatively few of these
resonated with the author's personal experience working on both the client and consultant sides
of the industry. Most academic characterizations of the design consulting industry seemed
inaccurate, biased perhaps by over-reliance on senior consultant testimony [8-11]. Rather than
simply testing the literature's propositions, or relying on the author's own potentially biased
perspective, an inductive approach was used to identify potentially superior factors. The results
of interviews and cross-case analysis were extensive, suggesting over fifty major factors and
scores of minor ones, many of which do not appear in the literature. While it is impossible to
reduce the complexity of consulting project planning and management to a few simple
guidelines, two frameworks were described that can help practitioners order the chaos. The first
describes the consulting process as a sequence of activities, allowing focus on one subset of
factors at a time. The second framework examines the client's reason for outsourcing the project,
and filters the complete set of factors to yield more manageable subsets for each outsourcing
motivation. Clustering analysis of the data suggested that a handful of distinct paradigms
describe most consulting projects. Some of these, such as outsourcing for originality, second
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opinion, or development speed, are relatively unique to design outsourcing compared to
production outsourcing.
With conceptual and methodological foundations in place, the fourth study began to explain the
outcomes of particular projects. First, elements from product development and customer
satisfaction theory were combined to hypothesize causal relationships between intermediate
project outcomes such as schedule performance and perceived project value, and ultimate
outcomes such as commercial success and repeat business between consultant and client. These
relationships alone account for up to 68% of the observed variation, depending on the outcome.
Additional success factors were then incorporated to improve explanation of client satisfaction.
While not the only measure of project success, it factors heavily in consultants' definitions of
success, and is highly correlated with the factors that clients prioritize most: value, rework, and
trust. Detailed regression models were developed that could account for as much as 79% of the
variation in client satisfaction. Models built only from data obtained from the consultants could
explain 72%, which could reduce consultants' error in estimating client satisfaction by half.
Finally, 36% of the variation in satisfaction can be predicted before the project even begins, a
finding with strong implications for consulting project planning. Due to space limitations, the
other project outcomes were not examined in such detail, but rather are left for future work.
6.2 Key Findings and Implications
The dissertation's key conceptual, methodological, and substantive results are reviewed in turn.
The findings themselves are highlighted in bold, while supporting discussion and existing
evidence are in plain text. References are provided to the section in which the result is presented
and/or discussed.
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6.2.1 Conceptual Findings
- Consultants and clients define and prioritize success very differently: consultants
tend to reference a broad range of indicators while clients focus narrowly on
deliverable quality and value (Chapter 2). This result is surprising because experienced
consultants should align their definitions to those of their clients to ensure client
satisfaction, repeat business, and/or referral to new clients. The abundance of factors
considered by the consultants in evaluating success may indicate that they do not know
exactly which they should focus on. This lack of alignment may contribute to
unsatisfactory project outcomes. Comments from the benchmarking study suggest that
objectives are not grossly misaligned (e.g., consultant cutting corners to preserve its
profit margin), but rather are subtly so. For example, most consultant practitioners take
great pride in design elegance and novelty, but the clients generally prefer production
readiness. In both the interviews and the survey responses, consultants frequently
complained that the client had failed to preserve key elements of the design during
refinement after the consulting engagement. It is debatable whether the consultant
delivered more elegance than the client needed or the client failed to protect the elegance
it had sought and paid for, but in either case value was destroyed. Exceptions to this
general trend do occur, of course, including cases in which the client was outsourcing for
an original design and the consultant believed it was outsourcing for capacity and
delivered a design that the client deemed unoriginal. Again, value was destroyed. The
implication of this finding for practitioners is to make sure that objectives are clearly
understood at the start of the project, including what types of design elements the client
values and will preserve, and which would be a waste of development effort. The
implication for scholars is that perspectives on success will differ depending who is
asked.
- Client satisfaction correlates highly with most consulting project outcomes (Section
2.5.2) and is already part of consultants' mental models of success (Section 2.5.1).
Compared to other holistic measures, client satisfaction has greater conceptual clarity and
a more refined methodological literature (Section 3.2.2). Satisfaction has not been
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utilized to date in research on outsourced product development, but it appears to be a
highly relevant and useful variable.
- Client-identified problems do not correlate highly with client assessments of overall
project success or with client satisfaction (Sections 2.5.2 and 5.5.2). Problems and
"interruptions to routine activity" have been proposed as important concepts in design
consulting [3] and distributed product development [4], but their importance may have
been over-stated. While about half of all projects experienced problems (Section 3.4.5),
half to three-quarters of these were resolved (Section 4.5.3), and the remainder had little
effect on client appraisals of project success (Section 2.5.2).
- Working relationship quality has an independent effect on customer satisfaction in
complex, heterogeneous, infrequently consumed services (Section 5.5.2). Theories of
customer satisfaction in knowledge-based services are not well developed. Prior models
have not included a working relationship construct [12, 13], but it appears to have an
effect on satisfaction, independent of perceived performance and value.
6.2.2 Methodological Findings
- Nearly all project outcome measures are significantly influenced by the role (i.e.,
project sponsor, project manager, team member, other) of the respondent on the
project (Section 3.5.3). Past research in traditional product development has tended to
use just one type of respondent [14], as have the few studies of outsourced product
development that specified the roles of their respondents [5, 11, 15]. Other studies have
not provided respondent characteristics at all [2, 3]. The present study suggests that the
use of any one group alone will produce bias, not only in subjective outcomes such as
client satisfaction, but also in seemingly objective outcomes such as the meeting of
project requirements and the extent of rework required to the project deliverable.
- Nearly all subjective outcome measures are significantly influenced by the system of
incentives and protections afforded the respondent during assessment (Section
3.5.1). Specifically, confidential closed-loop client feedback studies may generate
significantly more favorable results than anonymous open-loop measurements in which
client responses are not shared with the consultant. Scholars of customer satisfaction have
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hypothesized such effects but not demonstrated them [16]. Prior studies that attempted to
do so found little evidence of such an effect [17]. It remains unclear which method
(closed- or open-loop feedback) produces less biased results. The implication for
descriptive research is obvious: results depend heavily on methods. The implication for
explanatory research is more beneficial: use of a combination of closed- and open-
feedback approaches may generate greater variation in the gathered data, allowing for
more powerful statistical analysis.
Unlike customer satisfaction with most products and services, client satisfaction
with design consulting services does not appear to vary within the first few years
after the project (Section 3.5.4). Most customer satisfaction research indicates a decline
in satisfaction with time post-consumption [18], but the observed results were very stable.
The difference may be due to the relative fluidity of the "product" of consulting services.
Whereas a new car is relatively unchanging, and thus only novel to the buyer for a few
months after purchase, the product of design services change over a several year period,
starting perhaps as a conceptual design, maturing into a physical product, then
transforming into financial return for the client. This metamorphosis implies that the
customer is actually evaluating a different product at each point in time. Additional
research is warranted to better understand this interesting finding. For the moment, the
implication is that client satisfaction is a timing-robust measure of success.
- Use of client perspectives alone can lead to misdiagnosis of project failure modes
(Section 4.6.1). Much research on outsourced product development has assigned blame
for poor project outcomes to failings by the design service provider, such as poor design
work and ignorance of the brief. The failure modes framework developed in Section 4.6.1
illustrates that one party alone cannot accurately assess the source of failure, as certain
modes resemble others when viewed from a single perspective. Comparison of client and
consultant commentary on the same projects confirms this model. The implication of this
finding is that past indictments of supplier design work may be biased by measurement
artifact.
220
6.2.3 Substantive Findings
- Design consulting outcomes compare favorably to benchmark data from traditional
product development (Section 3.4). While much of the discussion of outsourced
product development highlights the risk of "pitfalls" [19] and "disasters" [2], rates of
product commercialization and commercial success in domestic design consulting
compare favorably to the best available data for conventional (i.e., in-house) product
development. Consulting is just one type of outsourced product development, and it is
possible that other types have worse results, but the finding highlights the need for
precision when discussing outsourcing effectiveness.
- Levels of client satisfaction with design consulting are comparable to those of other
services (Section 3.4.7). Although very little data is publicly available for satisfaction in
business-to-business or knowledge-intense services, the results of the benchmarking and
patent samples are comparable to high- and low-performing business-to-consumer
service industries, respectively, in both American Customer Satisfaction Index and Net
Promoter Score results. Again, satisfaction may differ for other types of outsourced
product development, but these results challenge the air of suspicion that surrounds
outsourced product development in the trade press.
- The occurrence of problems does impact schedule and budget performance, but
these in turn do not have strong effects on perceived project value (Section 5.5.1).
While problems may not be as central a concept as some have suggested, they may be
valuable in explaining development process performance. They may also be useful in that
they are concrete manifestations of more abstract phenomena such as client capability or
outsourcing motivation. During the interview phase, respondents sometimes had trouble
describing general characteristics of successful or unsuccessful projects. Most had no
trouble, however, in describing the specific problems that occurred on a recent project.
The researcher can use questions about problems as a prompt for elucidating clues from
which more fundamental theories can be induced.
- Clients outsourcing for an original perspective reported worse satisfaction than
those outsourcing for rapid product development, specific expertise, or additional
development capacity (Section 5.5.2). Consultant marketing and academic publications
have touted design and innovation consultancies as "superstars of innovation" [9] who
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use specialized techniques [9, 20-22] and knowledge brokering across diverse client
industries [10] to deliver original solutions to old problems. While such projects are
sometimes successful, the results suggested that on average clients outsourcing for
originality had lower satisfaction than those outsourcing for all other reasons. It appears
that the industry has been mischaracterized. It is particularly effective when the
consultant brings a specific and unique expertise in an area in which the client is
competent enough to specify, verify, and appreciate the results. Closely related to
expertise is speed - the ability to perform tasks requiring moderate expertise, much faster
than the client can do so, because of the absence of bureaucracy and other trappings of
large organizations. Outsourcing for capacity can be effective but rarely produces delight.
Success factors suggested by the literature were often not the most predictive of
client satisfaction, and many had an opposite effect than suggested (Section 5.5.2).
For example, product novelty and the inclusion of stakeholders on the project team had
little association with client satisfaction. Increased manufacturing integration and
involvement were negatively associated with satisfaction, as was corporate cultural
similarity. Increased geographic distance was actually positively associated with client
satisfaction. These surprising results suggest that design consulting is a unique beast,
requiring different models from those used for conventional product development and
systems engineering. In addition, the positive associations of geographic and corporate
cultural distance on client satisfaction suggest that other factors might be responsible for
hints of lower client satisfaction with international integrated design-and-manufacturing
outsourcing than with domestic consulting [19].
- Consultant estimates of client satisfaction are poor but can be improved
substantially by considering just a few simple factors: the client's role and
involvement in hiring the consultant, the consultant's own perception of project
budget adequacy, and the consultant's perception of the extent of problems on the
project (Section 5.5.2). For the consultant, who must balance client satisfaction against
the benefits of the project to her own business, an ability to accurately estimate client
satisfaction offers significant competitive advantage. There is an inherent trade-off
between the value of a project to the client firm and the profit generated by it for the
consultant. Over-delivering client value can be as bad for business as under-delivering it.
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The finding that client satisfaction can be reasonably well estimated implies that
consultants might use the present model or develop their own to do so, helping them to
tread the fine line between super-pleasing and disappointing their clients. The fact that
the statistical model performed better than the estimates of individuals who had first hand
experience with the projects under study confirms the significance of the finding.
6.3 Strengths of the Research Design
The validity of the above findings is supported by several aspects of the research design. These
were cited in the concluding sections of each of the four studies as appropriate, and are briefly
summarized here:
- A precise research setting: domestic design and innovation consultancies specializing in
consumer, medical, and industrial product development [23].
- Combination of qualitative and quantitative methods: in-depth interviews and cross-
case analysis were first used to establish conceptual understanding and generate testable
hypotheses, followed by statistical analysis of survey data to confirm the hypotheses.
- Multiple units of observation and analysis: the interview phase considered the
cumulative beliefs and values of individual consultants and clients, whereas the pilot and
survey phases observed and analyzed the outcomes of specific projects. The use of both
abstract and particular units of analysis allowed for semi-independent corroboration of
the observed effects.
- Use of standard, tested measurement items: wherever possible, standard items were re-
used from prior research, both for reliability and to allow approximate comparisons to
published results.
- Pre-testing of measurement instruments: the questionnaire used in the Phase 3 survey
had been pre-tested on thirty projects during the pilot study and revised to incorporate
suggestions from the pilot respondents. The refined questionnaire was then reviewed by
several members of the lead consultancy in the benchmarking study, who themselves
were highly experienced in survey research. Their input was incorporated as well before
full-scale deployment.
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- Collection of data from multiple perspectives: interviews were conducted with both
clients and consultants, at a range of experience levels, both currently and formerly
employed in their respective industries. Survey data were collected from both client and
consultant participants of the projects under study. Project demographic data were
collected from consultancy records. The use of multiple perspectives provided rich data,
allowing comparison of the perspectives, demonstration of the methodological effects of
respondent role and type, and evidence of the misunderstandings that are often at the core
of unsuccessful inter-firm development efforts.
- Use of multiple samples to reach all corners of the population: while each sample
generated a wide range of satisfaction, the benchmarking sample in particular generated
responses from highly satisfied respondents, while the patent sample generated responses
from many who were only moderately satisfied.
- Multiple respondents per project: survey data were collected from up to five different
individuals who had participated in the project. The use of multiple respondents improves
reliability by reducing the influence of any one. It also enabled estimation of non-
response bias, by calculating per-project response rates and comparing the results from
high-response and low-response projects.
6.4 Additional Contributions
In addition to the findings discussed above, the dissertation makes several other contributions to
scholarship and practice.
6.4.1 Academic Contributions
- Called attention to the distinction between two forms of outsourced product development
- design consulting and integrated design-and-manufacturing outsourcing - that have
been commingled in past research.
- Demonstrated the utility of design consulting as a research setting.
- Identified important outcome variables that have been overlooked to date, including
perceived project value, rework, and client satisfaction.
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- Documented previously unreported consultant perspectives on the meaning and sources
of success in outsourced product development.
- Developed a novel method of using trace evidence in patent records and other public
records to locate consulting projects participants.
- Devised a system of incentives and protections to encourage feedback from a broad range
of satisfaction levels.
- Provided a much-needed public-domain source of empirical data on outsourced project
outcomes (also a practical contribution, as developers can reference it as benchmark
data).
- Developed and published survey instruments that can be used or adapted by future
scholars (or practitioners, to measure their own performance).
6.4.2 Practical Contributions
- Developed several conceptual frameworks that can help to simplify the complex problem
of planning and managing outsourced development projects.
- Mediated the collection of client satisfaction data for five participating consultancies.
Analyzed the data and provided interpretive reports.
- Developed a statistical model to help consultants estimate client satisfaction with
reasonably good accuracy.
- Demonstrated that client satisfaction can be partially predicted in advance of the project.
6.5 Limitations and Future work
6.5.1 Limitations
The chief limitation of the research is the modest sample size of the Phase 3
benchmarking/patent study. Although novel methods were devised to locate projects for study,
consulting remains a small, somewhat secretive industry, and so only 104 projects were
analyzed, too few to employ advanced statistical techniques such as structural equations
modeling. In addition, the modest number of observations makes it difficult to test the effect of
explanatory variables that can take many different nominal values (e.g., the department which
sponsored the project, or the precise industry the client firm competes in). Nonetheless, the
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sample size was large enough to identify many powerful effects, including some that have been
overlooked by past research. Finally, the modest sample makes the descriptive results imprecise,
though the benchmarking and patent samples likely provide high and low estimates, respectively.
A second limitation is that respondents' assessments of project return on investment appear to be
somewhat unreliable. The answers provided by multiple client respondents on the same project
often differed, and in some cases the answer to the ROI question appeared to be inconsistent with
answers to other questions (e.g., a large-budget project that had already produced a positive
return, just months after completion, without sending a product to market). In light of these
issues, the descriptive and explanatory results for ROI should be interpreted with caution. It
should also be noted that difficulty in assessing consulting project ROI does not appear to be
unique to this study. While recruiting consultancies to participate in the benchmarking study, one
consultancy owner noted that he was already running his own client satisfaction program but felt
that what the industry really needs is a way to quantify the financial return on its output.
Although quantitative ROI data could not be obtained, reliable data were gathered from
consultancy records on such variables as project length, budget, start and completion date, extent
of previous and repeat business with the client, and others.
A third limitation of the study design is that consultant participants on the patent sample projects
were not surveyed out of respect for their employers' decisions not to participate in the
benchmarking study. This precludes the possibility of comparing their perspectives to those of
their clients, many of whom were moderately dissatisfied.
6.5.2 Future Work
This dissertation has generated many hypotheses and tested only a small fraction of them. In
particular, detailed explanation models were only derived for client satisfaction. While
satisfaction is one of the most important outcomes, additional understanding might be gained by
explaining the origins of perceived value in greater detail, or working relationship quality, and so
forth.
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In addition, the limitations addressed previously naturally suggest avenues for improvement,
including the collection of additional data and the use of more refined techniques such as path
modeling and factor analysis. The understanding gained from the present results could be used in
refining the novel measurement items used on the questionnaires and rigorously testing their
validity and reliability.
After verifying the soundness of the methods, the study might be extended to other forms of
outsourced product development, such as international consulting, or integrated design-and-
manufacturing outsourcing. At least one prior study has hinted that such forms have lower
satisfaction than consulting [19], which could account for the negativity surrounding design
outsourcing in the trade press. On the other hand, prior results may simply be negatively biased
because they collected data from low- to mid-seniority clients, while providing them with
complete anonymity and a soap box upon which to vent their frustrations. Direct comparison of
client satisfaction and other project outcomes, measured using identical methods, could help to
resolve the question.
It would also be instructive to directly compare outsourced projects to non-outsourced projects,
using both objective and subjective measures. The dissertation made comparisons to traditional
product development wherever possible using published benchmarks from the literature, but a
more rigorous test would be to directly measure the outcomes of comparable outsourced and
non-outsourced projects from the same companies. It would also be interesting to apply some of
the measures suggested by the study of outsourcing to traditional product development. How
would client respondents rate their trust of their co-workers? How satisfied are product
development directors with their own teams? What fraction of in-house product development
projects experience problems? Are "pitfalls" [19] and "disasters" [2] unique to outsourcing, or
merely an inevitable aspect of new product development?
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Appendices
Appendix A: Phase 1 Interview Template
Case Number:
Title:
Experience:
Interview Date:
Company: 
_
Client
PART I: OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS ABOUT PROJECT SUCCESS AND FAILURE
1. People talk about successful projects, unsuccessful projects. What does "project success"
mean to you?
- [Consultants only] How important is repeat business to your business model?
- Do you have a formal process for tracking project outcomes?
2. What kinds of projects are more likely to be successful?
- [Additional prompt, if necessary] When negotiating a project, are there any red flags
that raise concerns? Any green lights?
3. [Clients] How does your company decide whether to outsource a project or keep it internal?
[Consultants] How do your clients decide whether to send a project out or keep it inside?
- Who makes the decision?
- What factors do they consider?
4. When projects are less successful, what are the typical causes?
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Consultant
5. [Clients only] I'd like you to think about the design and manufacturing vendors you've used
recently. For each vendor, on a scale of 0 to 10, how likely is it that you would recommend
them to a friend or colleague? Why did you give them that score? [Can be anonymous -
respondent need not name the vendor, just provide a description]
Vendor Vendor Description Rating Reason
1
2
3
4
5
6
PART II: IN-DEPTH DESCRIPTION OF A SPECIFIC PROJECT
6. Have you ever participated in a consulting project that struggled or failed? What happened?
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PART III: FOCUSED QUESTIONS TO EXPLORE WORKING HYPOTHESES
7. How would you characterize the typical project handoff?
- [How does the consultant transfer the knowledge it has developed during the project?]
8. What does the client do with the project after the handoff?
- And after that?
- [How does the client internalize the knowledge developed by the consultant?]
9. How frequently do you co-locate client and consultant personnel? Why or why not?
10. Do you see a difference between managing a design vendor vs. a production vendor?
11. In your experience, what percentage of consulting projects fail?
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PART IV: FOCUSED QUESTIONS ON SUCCESS AND FAILURE
A. Causes of Poor Project Outcomes
In your experience with design consulting, how often do you encounter the following situations?
Please estimate the frequency on a 5 point scale:
Almost Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Nearly Always
I I I I |
1. During the negotiation or sales phase:
on the part of
the Consultant:
on the part of
the Client:
Client is not a knowledgeable buyer of design services ....
Poor design brief/statement of work/project proposal .....
A 'penny wise, pound foolish,' mentality ..............
Consultant oversells their services ....................
Difficult to price project accurately ...................
N/A
1 2 3 4 5
N/A.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3
2. During the project itself:
on the part of
the Consultant:
Poor or infrequent communication ....................
Poor project management ...........................
Significant internal divisions (within the consultant or the
client firm) over the project direction ...
Inadequate capabilities to perform the work they were
tasked w ith ......................................
Inadequate motivation, interest, or emotional investment. .
Inadequate time to perform the work they were tasked with
Personnel don't enjoy working collaboratively ..........
Poor version control ...............................
Decisions not documented ..........................
Consultant ignores the brief, 'does their own thing' ......
on the part of
the Client:
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
N/A
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3
3
3
N/A
4 5
2. During the project itself (continued):
on the part of
the Consultant:
on the part of
the Client:
Consultant passes work on to inexperienced junior staff ... 1
Consultant's work is poor or fails to satisfy the design brief 1
Consultant's ideas are impractical to manufacture ....... 1
A 'penny wise, pound foolish,' mentality .............. 1
Client has trouble specifying what they want ...........
Client is overly aggressive on speed, compromises quality.
Misunderstandings about project objectives/expectations . .
Design is not divided cleanly enough to enable multi-party
development .................................
Organizational barriers between consultant and client ....
Cultural barriers between consultant and client ..........
Geographic barriers between consultant and client .......
Incompatible IT tools, software, and practices (including
CAD) ................................ ........
Unexpected changes of scope .......................
Unexpected changes in client's senior management
direction or financial situation .....................
Outsourcing distracts, threatens, or de-motivates client
personnel ......................................
Persistent outsourcing degrades client's abilities .........
Misalignment of objectives between consultant and client.
Rivalries between vendors (design or other) ............
Excessive use of modularity (to simplify multi-party
development) limits holistic innovation ...............
3. During the project, or in between phases of a multi-phase project:
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
N/A
N/A
1
1
1
2 3 4
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
on the part of
the Consultant:
on the part of
the Client:
Opportunistic behavior (e.g. opportunistic contract
renegotiation, scope creep, etc.) ......................
Discontinuity of service (different personnel used on
subsequent phases of the project) .....................
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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4. At the completion of the project:
Poor project handoff ...............................
Not-Invented-Here syndrome limits acceptance of
consultant's ideas ................................
Client fails to perform necessary follow-on work ........
Difficult to document and transfer design intent .........
Misunderstandings about degree of project completeness..
Architectural mismatch between the consultant's design
and the client's organization (the interpersonal
coordination required by the new product design doesn't
match the interpersonal coordination that is encouraged
within the client's existing organizational structure) ......
on the part of
the Consultant:
1 2 3 4 5
N/A.
N/
on the part of
the Client:
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
3 4 52 | 13
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
B. Determinants of Project Success
In your experience with design consulting, are certain types of projects more likely to succeed
than others? Please estimate the likelihood of the following types of projects to succeed.
Very unlikely Unlikely
2
Neutral
3
Likely Very likely
5
1. Characteristics of the client:
Client is experienced with design consulting ................
Client is inexperienced with design consulting ...............
Client is dependent on the consultant for specific knowledge or
expertise ................................ ..........
Client is dependent on the consultant for additional capacity
(AKA "extra development bandwidth")....................
Client is dependent on the consultant for an original view (AKA
"a fresh perspective")..................................
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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2. Characteristics of the project structure:
on the part of on the part of
the Consultant: the Client:
The project is strategically important to consultant or client 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
The project has low importance to consultant or client .... 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Consultant is highly responsible for the design .......... 1 2 3 4 5
Consultant is marginally responsible for the design ...... 1 2 3 4 5
The project is about "blue-sky" innovation ............. .... 1 2 3 4 5
The project is about "nuts and bolts" product development 1 2 3 4 5
Manufacturing is performed by the client .............. .... 1 2 3 4 5
Manufacturing is performed by the consultant .......... 1 2 3 4 5
Manufacturing is performed by a third party ............ .... 1 2 3 4 5
3. Characteristics of the product or innovation:
The product is highly complex........................... 1 2 3 4 5
The product is fairly simple............................. 1 2 3 4 5
The product architecture is highly modular ................. . 1 2 3 4 5
The product architecture is highly integral .................. . 1 2 3 4 5
The innovation poses technical challenges for the client ....... 1 2 3 4 5
The innovation poses marketing challenges for the client ...... 1 2 3 4 5
The innovation poses both technical and marketing challenges . . 1 2 3 4 5
The innovation poses neither technical nor marketing challenges 1 2 3 4 5
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FOR THE NEXT FOUR ITEMS, REFER TO THE TEXT AND FIGURE BELOW
The innovation is incremental in nature ....................
The innovation is modular in nature .......................
The innovation is architectural in nature ....................
The innovation is radical in nature ........................
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
Product architecture refers to the way in which a product's components (subsystems, parts, etc)
are arranged and how they interact with one another. For example, a personal computer system
consists of several components (display, input devices, CPU, etc) interconnected via standard
interfaces (USB, TCP/IP, etc). A modular innovation is one that is confined to one component,
or module, such as an LCD screen replacing a CRT monitor on a desktop computer. An
architectural innovation keeps the basic component technologies intact, but connects them in
novel ways. For example, an upright vacuum is architecturally different from a canister vacuum,
even though both use the same basic component technologies (vacuum generator, filter bag, etc).
Figure 1. A framework for defining Innovation.
Core Concepts
Reinforced Overturned
T Unchanged "s "t Gi muurar
Changed Architectural Radical0 Innovation Innovation
0
Source: R.M Henderson and K.B. Clark, "Architectural innovation.. . Administrative Science
Quarterly, v. 35, pp. 9-30, 1990.
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PART V: MISCELLANEOUS
1. Is there anything else you'd like to tell me that we haven't discussed?
2. Do you know anyone else who might be interested in participating in this study?
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Appendix B: Benchmarking Study Recruitment Letter and Prospectus
Massachusetts Institute of Technology William J. Palm, PE 77 Massachusetts Ave, Room 3-471
Doctoral Candidate Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
Department of Mechanical Engineering Phone (617) 319-0105
Email wjpalm@mit.edu
http://web.mit.edu/wjpalm/www
[Date]
[Addressee's Name]
[Consultancy Name]
[Street Address]
[City, State Zip]
Dear [Addressee's Name],
I am writing to invite [Consultancy Name] to participate in a benchmarking study that Dr. Daniel Whitney and
I are conducting on client satisfaction in design and innovation consulting. Our research to date suggests that
client satisfaction varies widely between projects and consultants. The benchmarking study presents an
opportunity for you to assess [Consultancy]'s own client satisfaction performance, while contributing to our
effort to explain the causes of variation in consulting project outcomes. Questions we hope to answer with this
study include: How is client satisfaction influenced by characteristics of the client firm, the consultancy, and
the project? How might it be predicted before the project and managed during it? How does client satisfaction
relate to other project outcomes such as repeat business, design awards, and product success in the market?
Benefits of participation: Participating in the study will enable you to receive candid feedback on
[Consultancy Name]'s client satisfaction performance and a comparison of its performance to that of the
consulting industry as a whole. Unlike commercial satisfaction surveys, the study has been tailored specifically
for design and innovation consulting, based on our research as well as our professional experience in technical
consulting. In addition, there is no cost to participate, as the study is funded by the Portuguese Foundation for
Science and Technology.
What participation entails: If you choose to participate in the study, we will partner with you to conduct a
client satisfaction survey of 15-30 recent projects. You will distribute the surveys and we will collect and
analyze the responses. A coding system will be employed so that you need not disclose the identities of your
clients to us, and the clients can provide anonymous, candid feedback to you.
Confidentiality: Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with
[Consultancy Name] will remain confidential. At no time will the identities of study participants be revealed. If
you desire, a non-disclosure agreement can be implemented to guarantee confidentiality.
The enclosed brochure contains additional detail about the study. Please feel free to share it with others within
[Consultancy Name] as appropriate. If you would like to learn more or are interested in participating, please
contact me at (617) 319-0105 or wjpalm@mit.edu. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
William J. Palm
Doctoral Candidate, Mechanical Engineering
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"I """'I II Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Study Prospectus
Client Satisfaction in Design & Innovation Consulting
William J. Palm, PE and Daniel E. Whitney, PhD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Client satisfaction with design and innovation consulting varies widely between projects. This
study seeks to explain the factors that influence client satisfaction and other project outcomes, as
part of a larger effort to understand effective management of inter-firm product development.
A benchmarking approach will be used to provide participating consultancies with confidential
feedback on their client satisfaction performance while simultaneously addressing the broader
research questions. The study will survey both client and consultant employees on recently
completed projects to describe levels of client satisfaction, relate them to other project outcomes
such as repeat business and product success in the market, and explain how project outcomes
might be predicted before the project and influenced during it.
All data, including the identities of study participants, will be anonymized to protect company
confidentiality.
BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION
Participating in this study will enable your company to:
- Obtain candid feedback from your clients, without revealing their identities
- Benchmark your client satisfaction against that of other study participants and the design
and innovation consulting industry as a whole
- Contribute to the development of best practices to help clients make better use of design
and innovation consultants
- Receive reports on research findings
Unlike commercial satisfaction surveys, there is no cost to participate in this study. In addition,
the survey has been tailored specifically to design and innovation consulting by the investigators,
who together have over twenty five years professional experience in technical consulting.
sponsored bv: FCT Fundagio para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia MIT
MINSTRIODACI$NCIA ITCNOLOGIA E ENSIMN) SUPITOR.(
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INTRODUCTION
Firms that develop, brand, and sell products increasingly contract design services from
consultants and original design manufacturers. Academic research is limited but the trade and
popular press have portrayed such "design outsourcing" as highly problematic. For example,
- A recent article in the Harvard Business Review states that two-thirds of outsourced
design projects studied at Fortune 1,000 companies struggled or failed.'
- A survey of EE Times readers finds that one third of those at large companies view
design outsourcing as a net liability to their companies. 2
Is the situation really this bad? Do clients not know how to manage external product
development or is past research not telling a complete story? Our own research suggests that
prior studies contain several flaws that may cause them to overstate client dissatisfaction:
- Prior studies imprecisely define key concepts such as "success" and "failure."
- Prior studies do not distinguish between different types of inter-firm development, often
including cost-driven offshoring with expertise-based consulting.
- Prior studies survey low- to mid-level client personnel exclusively; the perspectives of
the project sponsor and the design provider are not represented.
Our research design improves upon these studies by carefully defining project outcome
measures, distinguishing between collaboration types, and gathering balanced data from multiple
perspectives within both the client firm and the consultancy. Initial results suggest that client
satisfaction with design consulting is better than reported, but nevertheless highly variable
(Figure 1). The present study seeks to explain the observed variation in project outcomes and
develop recommendations to help optimize outcomes for both clients and consultants.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Specific questions addressed by this study include:
1. What factors influence client satisfaction in design and innovation consulting?
- To what extent can satisfaction be predicted before the project begins, based on
characteristics of the client, the consultant, the project, and the contract?
- What events during the project most strongly impact satisfaction?
- How can satisfaction be actively managed during the project?
2. How does client satisfaction relate to other project outcomes such as repeat business,
design awards, and product success in the market?
3. How does client satisfaction vary between individual stakeholders within the client firm?
How can the satisfaction of multiple stakeholders be balanced? Is satisfaction of the
project sponsor sufficient to achieve repeat business?
4. How does the appraisal of project success vary between the client and the consultant?
How accurate are consultants' estimates of client satisfaction?
J. Amaral and G. Parker, "Prevent disasters in design outsourcing," Harvard Business Review, September 2008.
2 B. Rayner, "Design outsourcing: Beware of pitfalls," EE Times, January 31, 2005.
242
20 -
10 ----- ---3
0
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all likely Neutral Extremely likely
Figure 1: Client responses to the question, "How likely is it that you would recommend your
design consultant to a friend or colleague?"
STUDY PROCEDURES
1. Sampling: If you choose to participate, we will first ask you to compile a list of projects
completed in the last two years. You will assign each project an arbitrary code number so
that you need not reveal the identities of your clients or the projects. Using the code numbers,
we will draw a stratified random sample of approximately 20% (or fifteen, whichever is
larger) of the projects for study.
2. Data collection: Next, a representative from your company will complete an Excel
worksheet with basic factual information (e.g., contract type, work scope) about each project.
This reduces the number of questions for the client respondents to answer, while providing
important contextual information for interpreting their responses. For each project in the
sample, we will provide you with a questionnaire and postage-paid return envelope to mail
with an explanatory cover letter to the client project sponsor, project manager, and a project
team member. The questionnaires will be labeled with the project code number so that we
can associate the clients' responses with the project information you provided in the Excel
worksheet. To preserve the respondents' anonymity, the questionnaire will not ask them for
any other identifying information.
3. Data analysis: The client respondents will return their completed questionnaires directly to
us for analysis. We will anonymize their responses, compile them, and report the results to
you. In this way, client respondents can provide completely candid feedback. Among other
results, our report to you will include your Net Promoter® Score,3 your American Consumer
Satisfaction Index performance, the issues clients identified with their projects, as well as
their recommendations for improvements.
4. Supplemental data collection: To gain further insights, we can also anonymously survey
consultant members of each project team. Comparison of client and consultant perspectives
on the same project helps to shed light on the root-causes of any identified issues.
5. Benchmarking analysis: At the conclusion of the study we will provide an analysis of your
performance relative to the entire study sample and other, anonymized, study participants.
3 F. Reichheld, "The one number you need to grow," Harvard Business Review, December 2003.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THIS STUDY
Your company was selected as a possible participant in this study because of its experience in
design and innovation consulting for consumer, medical, and industrial products. You should
read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before
deciding whether or not to participate.
- Identification of investigators: This study is being conducted by William J. Palm, PE,
and Daniel E. Whitney, PhD, of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
- Participation: Your participation in the study is voluntary. If you choose to participate
you may subsequently withdraw at any time without penalty or consequences.
- Compensation: There is no cost to participate, and no payment will be provided to you.
- Confidentiality: Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that
can be identified with your company, your clients, or your employees will be disclosed
only with your permission or as required by law. In particular, your company's
participation in the study and client satisfaction performance will be considered
confidential. For benchmarking purposes, your overall performance may be disclosed
anonymously, but at no time will your company's identity be revealed. If you desire, a
non-disclosure agreement can be implemented to guarantee confidentiality. In addition,
you have the right not to provide any requested information.
Individual survey responses will be considered confidential and will not be disclosed by
the investigators except as required by law. All respondent data will be anonymized and
aggregated before being reported to you.
- Publication of results: Data from your company will be anonymized and combined with
data from other study participants to describe the design and innovation consulting
industry. Industry-level data may be included in Mr. Palm's doctoral dissertation and/or
reported in academic, trade, and/or popular publications, but at no time will the identities
of any participating companies or individuals be revealed.
- Rights of research participants: you are not waiving any legal claims, rights or
remedies because of your participation in this research study. If you have questions
regarding your rights as a study participant, you may contact the Chairman on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects, MIT, Room E25-143B, 77 Massachusetts Ave,
Cambridge, MA 02139, phone (617) 253-6787.
FOR MORE INFORMATION
If you would like to participate in the study or receive additional information about it, or if you
have any questions or concerns about the research, please contact Bill Palm at (617) 319-0105 or
wjpalm@mit.edu.
You may also visit the study website, where you may download papers on research to date, at:
http://web.mit.edu/ipd
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Appendix C: Benchmarking Survey Respondent Cover Letter Template
[Consultancy letterhead]
[Date]
[Recipient Name]
[Company Name]
[Street Address]
[City, State, ZIP]
Dear [Recipient Name],
[Consultancy name] is participating in a study of client satisfaction with design and innovation consulting
that is being conducted by William Palm and Daniel Whitney of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). Because you recently took part in a project related to [project description] with
[Consultancy name], I invite you to anonymously assess the project. Your feedback will help
[Consultancy name] improve its service to you and will help Mr. Palm and Dr. Whitney advance
scientific understanding of inter-firm product development.
Enclosed is a brief questionnaire about the project and its outcome. I ask you to look it over and, if you
choose to do so, complete it and return it to Mr. Palm at MIT using the enclosed postage-paid envelope. I
expect that this will take you no more than twenty minutes to complete. Your participation is completely
voluntary and I will not find out if you participate or not, but I value your opinion and hope you will
choose to take part.
Benefits of participation: Participating in the study will grant you exclusive access to research results
and reports in the participant section of the study website, http://web.mit.edu/ipd. The results will help
you to benchmark your own consulting experiences against those of other clients, and improve your
company's use of design and innovation consultants in the future.
Confidentiality: the study has been carefully designed to protect your anonymity. The questionnaire does
not ask for your name or any other identifying information, nor has [Consultancy name] given such
information to anyone at MIT. Your anonymous responses will be pooled by Mr. Palm with data from
other [Consultancy name] clients, and only the combined results will be reported back to [Consultancy
name]. I hope that this will allow you to provide us with candid feedback on your project experience.
For more information: if you have questions or concerns about the study, you may reference the study
website (http://web.mit.edu/ipd) or contact [Consultancy contact name] at [Consultancy name] ([phone
number, email]), or William Palm at MIT (617-319-0105, wjpalm@mit.edu).
Thank you for helping us to serve you better. I look forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely,
[Consultancy contact name]
[Consultant contact title]
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Appendix D: Benchmarking Study Questionnaire - Client Version
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MIT
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN SURVEY RESEARCH
Explaining and Improving Project Outcomes in Design and Innovation Consulting
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by William J. Palm, PE, and
Daniel E. Whitney, PhD, from the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of variation in
the outcomes of design and innovation consulting projects. The results of the study will be
included in Mr. Palm's doctoral dissertation. You were selected as a possible participant in the
study because of your involvement in the consulting project referenced in the enclosed cover
letter. You should read the information below before deciding whether or not to participate.
Participation: this survey is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question. We
expect that it will take you about twenty minutes to complete the questionnaire.
Benefits: your participation in the study will help the consultancy to improve its service to you.
You will also gain advance access to the study results at the study website, which will help you
to benchmark your own project experience against those of other consulting clients, and help
you to optimize your use of design and innovation consultants in the future.
Confidentiality: this questionnaire was sent to you by the consultancy referenced in the
accompanying cover letter. To ensure your anonymity, the consultancy has not revealed and
will not reveal your name, your employer's name, or any other identifying information to Mr.
Palm, Dr. Whitney, or anyone else without your permission. Likewise, the questionnaire does
not request any identifying information. Thus, your working history with the consultancy has not
been and will not be disclosed to anyone outside the consultancy.
Your survey responses will be collected and analyzed only by Mr. Palm and Dr. Whitney at MIT.
Your responses will remain confidential and will not be disclosed to the consultancy or anyone
else without your permission, except as required by law. In analyzing the data, your responses
will first be combined with those from others involved in your project, using the project
identification number on the first page of your questionnaire. These responses will then be
combined with those from other clients of the consultancy, and the overall results reported to the
consultancy alone. Data from your consultancy will be combined with data from other
consultancies to describe the consulting industry. Industry-level data may be disclosed publicly,
but at no time will the identities of the consultancies or any other participating company or
individual be revealed.
Identification of Investigators: if you have any questions or concerns about the research,please feel free to contact William Palm (617-319-0105, wjpalmdmit.edu) or Daniel Whitney(617-253-6045, dwhitneygmit.edu). You may also learn more at the study website,
http://web.mit.edu/ipd
Rights of Research Participants: you are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies
because of your participation in this research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly,
or you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you may contact theChairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, MIT, Room E25-
143B, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 617-253-6787.
Consent: by returning the questionnaire, you indicate that you understand the above
information and voluntarily consent to participate in the study.
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DESIGN AND INNOVATION CONSULTING SURVEY 2011
Instructions: All questions on this survey pertain to the consulting project referenced in
the accompanying cover letter. Please answer each question to the best of your
knowledge. If you would like to add additional information or qualify an answer, please
feel free to write comments in the margins.
SECTION A - Your Company
Questions in this section refer to the company employing you at the time of the project.
1. Approximately what was your
company's annual revenue at the
time of the consulting project?
O Less than $1 million
O $1 million to $9.9 million
O $10 million to $99 million
E $100 million to $999 million
E $1 billion to $9.9 billion
E $10 billion or more
2. At the time of the consulting project,
how many new products had your
company ever developed?
E This was our first new product
E We had developed one or two
E We had developed several
E We had developed many new
products
3. How many products had your
company developed that were similar
in type to the one developed with the
consultancy?
E This was our first product of this type
O We had developed one or two
E We had developed several
E We had developed many products of
this type
4. How many times had your company
utilized product development
consultants?
E This was our first project with a
consultant
E We had done one or two projects
with consultants
E We had done several projects with
consultants
E We had done many projects with
consultants
5. How often did your company itself
perform activities of the sort that the
consultancy was hired to perform?
E We had never performed such
activities ourselves
E We infrequently performed such
activities ourselves
E We occasionally performed such
activities ourselves
E We frequently performed such
activities ourselves
6. Compared to other companies of
similar size, how agile do you
consider your company to be?
E Above average agility
E Average agility
E Below average agility
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SECTION B - The Consulting Project
Questions in this section refer to the
7. What department within your
company sponsored the consulting
project?
8. What was the primary reason your
company hired a consultant rather
than doing this project internally?
9. Did your company usually outsource
projects such as this one?
O Usually outsourced
l A mix of outsourced and in-house
E Usually performed in-house
Go to Questions 10 - 12 in right column
project the consultancy was hired to perform.
10. What project requirements were
known by your company at the start
of the project? (check all that apply)
E Few or none
E A strategic vision
E Marketing requirements
E Technical requirements
E Detailed technical specifications
11. How novel was the product?
E New to the world
E New for my company
E A new variant on an existing product
made or sold by my company
E Incremental improvement or cost
reduction of an existing product
12. What is the approximate sales price
of the finished product?
13. How familiar are you with the terms of the consulting contract?
E I read the contract E I read our statement of work E I didn't see either document
14. How challenging did you think it would be for the consultant to meet the project
requirements?
Not very
challenging
E E E Very
3 4 5 challenging
What particular aspects made it challenging or not?
15. How adequate was the schedule allotted by your company for the consulting project?
Not at all
adequate
E E E More than
3 4 5 adequate
16. How adequate was the budget allotted by your company for the consulting project?
E E E More than
3 4 5 adequate
E
Unfamiliar with budget
249
Not at all
adequate
SECTION C - Your Company's Project Team
Questions in this section refer to
17. What was your role on the consulting
project?
O Project sponsor: negotiated contract,
supervised project manager
O Project manager: responsible for
day-to-day management of project
O Project team member: contributed
technical expertise to the project
E Other:
18. Were you involved in the evaluation
and selection of the consultancy for
the project?
E I made the decision
E I was consulted in the decision
E I was not involved in the decision
19. Approximately how many employees
of your company were on the core
project team?
20. What departments were represented
on the core project team?
21. Were all necessary stakeholders
included on the core project team?
E Yes E No* Who was missing?
the project team within your company.
22. To what extent did the stakeholders
agree on the project objectives?
E Substantial agreement
E Partial agreement
E Little agreement
23. How empowered was the project
manager during the project?
E Substantial authority over project
E Some authority over project
E Little authority over project
24. How experienced was the project
team with new product development?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
25. How experienced was the project
team with the type of product you
were developing?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
26. How experienced was the project
team with utilizing product
development consultants?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
27. How experienced was the project
team with the activities that the
consultancy was hired to perform?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
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SECTION D - The Consultancy's Project Team
Questions in this section refer to the project team at the consulta
28. How satisfied were you with the consultancy project team's...
Technical competence? Not very E l O O ElSatisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Communication skills? Not very E E O E El
Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Project management? Not very E E E E El
Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Commitment? Not very E E E E El
Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Flexibility? Not very E O E E El
Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Consistency of team Not very E O E E El
membership? Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
ncy.
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Comments:
SECTION E - Relationship with the Consultancy
Questions in this section explore the familiarity of the consultancy and your company.
29. In your opinion, how similar or dissimilar were your company's and the consultancy's
Corporate cultures? Very E E E E E VeryDissimilar 1 2 3 4 5 Similar
Objectives for the project? Very El E El El E Very
Dissimilar 1 2 3 4 5 Similar
Expectations for project Very El El El El E Very
deliverables? Dissimilar 1 2 3 4 5 Similar
30. How good was your working relationship with the consultancy on this project?
Not very good El E E E El Very good
Relationship 1 2 3 4 5 Relationship
31. How confident are you that the consultancy will always act in your best interest?
Not very E E E E E Very
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 Confident
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SECTION F - Evaluation of the Consulting Project Experience
These questions refer to your experience on the project before, during, and after the
actual engagement with the consultancy.
32. To what extent did the consultancy's service'on this project meet your expectations?
Fell short of your O O O O O O O O O E Exceeded your
expectations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 expectations
What aspects of the project went particularly well?
What expectations did you have that were not met?
33. How well did the consultancy's service compare with the ideal consulting service?
Not very close 0 O E El O E E El E O Very close
to the ideal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 to the ideal
34. Did you experience any problems related to the consulting project?
0 No substantial problems (skip to Question 37)
E Some problems
E Serious problems
35. During which phase(s) of the consulting project did you experience problems?
E Specification of, and agreement upon, project requirements by my company
E Selection of the consultancy
E Negotiation of the project contract
E Briefing the consultancy on project requirements
E Development work by the consultancy
E Development work by my company
E Communication with the consultancy
E Coordination with the manufacturer
E Transfer (i.e., delivery) of the consultancy's work to my company
E Dissemination and acceptance of the consultancy's work within my company
E Refinement of the work by my company after the conclusion of the engagement
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36. What problems did you experience?
In what phase(s) did they occur?
How severe was each problem?
Was the problem resolved?
37. To what degree do you consider this project a success?
Not very E E E E E E E E
Successful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Very
successful
Why or why not?
SECTION G - Evaluation of Contractual Performance
Please assess the degree to which the consultant fulfilled the requirements of the
project contract. If you are unfamiliar with the terms specified in the contract, check the
box to the right of the question.
38. To what extent were the performance requirements specified in the contract fulfilled?
Failed to meet
requirements
E E E Exceeded E
3 4 5 requirements Unfamiliar w/ contract
39. When was the project completed relative to the schedule specified in the contract?
Behind El
schedule 1
E E E Ahead of
3 4 5 schedule
E
Unfamiliar w/ contract
40. How much did the project cost relative to the budget specified in the contract?
E E El Under
3 4 5 budget
E
Unfamiliar w/ contract
41. Considering both the cost of the project and the benefits you obtained from it, how
would you rate the value of the consulting project to your company?
o El El
3 4 5
Excellent
value
E
Unfamiliar w/ contract
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Over
budget
E El
1 2
Poor
value
E El
1 2
Not Very Very
Severe E E O El El Severe
1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? El Yes E No
Not Very Very
Severe O E E El E Severe
1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? El Yes El No
Not Very Very
Severe E El El E El Severe
- 1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? El Yes E No
SECTION H - Project Outcomes
Questions in this section refer to outcomes related to the consultancy's work on the
project. The outcomes may have occurred after the actual consulting engagement.
42. Did any patents result from the consultancy's work on the project?
(check all that apply)
O Utility patent(s) granted A utilitypatent protects the way an
E Utility patent application(s) pending article is used and works.
o Design patent(s) granted
. DA design patent protects the visualO Design patent application(s) pending appearance of an article.
O No
O I don't know
43. Did any awards result from the consultancy's work on the project?
E Yes E No E 1 don't know
44. Did the project continue at your company after the consultancy's involvement ended?
E Yes E No -- Why not?
45. Was the consultancy's work implemented in the project?
E Yes E No -* Why not?
How much rework by your company was required relative to what was expected?
E None E Minor changes E Major changes
46. Considering the revenues and/or cost savings generated by the consultant's work,
did the consulting project yield a positive return-on-investment for your company?
E Yes E No E Not yet E Company doesn't track E I don't have the data
What was the payback period?
E Company doesn't track E I don't have the data
47. Did product(s) resulting from the consultancy's work go to market?
E Yes
E Still in development
E No, but this was not a project objective
E No, project was cancelled or halted -+ Why?
48. If you answered Yes to Question 47, to what degree was the product a success?
Fell far short of E E E E E E E O E Far exceeded
objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 objectives
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SECTION I - Overall Evaluation of the Consulting Project
Please provide your overall evaluation of the project. If you have worked with the
consultant on other projects, please try to answer the questions below based on your
experience on this project alone.
49. What is your overall satisfaction with the consultancy's service on this project?
Very dissatisfied O Ol
1 2
o Very satisfied
10
50. If you have need for consulting services in the future, how likely is it that you would
hire the consultancy again?
Not at all likely 0 O
1 2
Very likely
51. Based on this project, how likely are you to recommend the consultancy to a friend or
colleague?
Not at all likely E E El
0 1 2
Neutral
El
5
Extremely likely
52. What is your primary reason for your rating in Question 51?
What improvements would make you rate the consultancy closer to a ten?
53. Is there anything else you would like to add?
Please create an account to anonymously access study results at http://web.mit.edu/ipd
User Name: Password:
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This concludes the survey. We appreciate the time and effort you have taken to answer
our questions.
As a token of our appreciation, we would like to share our study results with you. They
will be posted under password protection at the study website:
http://web.mit.edu/ipd
To access the results, please create an anonymous User Name and Password and
write them at the bottom of the opposite page of the questionnaire. Your account will be
activated when we receive the questionnaire in the mail. Please do not choose a User
Name which compromises your anonymity to us.
You may wish to write the login information below, and remove and save this cover
page for future reference.
User Name:
Password:
_ (min. 6 characters, including one letter and one number)
(min. 6 characters, including one letter and one number)
Please use the enclosed postage-paid envelope to mail your survey to:
William Palm
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Ave., Room 3-471
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
Surveys should be mailed by
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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Appendix E: Benchmarking Study Questionnaire - Consultant Version
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MIT
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN SURVEY RESEARCH
Explaining and Improving Project Outcomes in Design and Innovation Consulting
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by William J. Palm, PE, and
Daniel E. Whitney, PhD, from the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of variation in
the outcomes of design and innovation consulting projects. The results of the study will be
included in Mr. Palm's doctoral dissertation. You were selected as a possible participant in the
study because of your involvement in the consulting project referenced in the enclosed cover
letter. You should read the information below before deciding whether or not to participate.
Participation: this survey is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question. We
expect that it will take you about fifteen minutes to complete the questionnaire.
Benefits: your participation in the study will help you and your employer to better understand
and improve the outcomes of your projects, including client satisfaction, product success in the
market, and profitability for your firm. You will gain advance access to study results at the study
website, where you can learn how client employees perceive design and innovation consulting,
and compare your own perceptions to those of other study participants.
Confidentiality: this survey is anonymous. Your employer has not revealed and will not reveal
your name or any other identifying information to Mr. Palm, Dr. Whitney, or anyone else without
your permission. Likewise, the questionnaire does not request any identifying information from
you.
Your survey responses will be collected and analyzed only by Mr. Palm and Dr. Whitney at MIT.
Your responses will remain confidential and will not be disclosed to your employer or anyone
else without your permission, except as required by law. In analyzing the data, your responses
will first be combined with those from others involved in your project, using the project
identification number on the first page of your questionnaire. These responses will then be
combined with those from other projects of your company, and the overall results reported to
your employer alone. Data from your company will be combined with data from other
consultancies to describe the consulting industry. Industry-level data may be disclosed publicly,
but at no time will the identities of any participating company or individual be revealed.
Identification of Investigators: if you have any questions or concerns about the research,
please feel free to contact William Palm (617-319-0105, wjpalm@mit.edu) or Daniel Whitney
(617-253-6045, dwhitney@mit.edu). You may also learn more at the study website,
http://web.mit.edu/ipd
Rights of Research Participants: you are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies
because of your participation in this research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly,
or you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, MIT, Room E25-
143B, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 617-253-6787.
Consent: by returning the questionnaire, you indicate that you understand the above
information and voluntarily consent to participate in the study.
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DESIGN AND INNOVATION CONSULTING SURVEY 2011
Instructions: All questions on this survey pertain to the consulting project referenced in
the accompanying cover letter. Please answer each question to the best of your
knowledge. If you would like to add additional information or qualify an answer, please
feel free to write comments in the margins.
SECTION A - Your Company
Questions in this section refer to the company employing you at the time of the project.
1. At the time of the project, how many products had your company developed that were
similar in type to the product being developed in this project?
O This was our first product of this type
" We had developed one or two products of this type
E We had developed several products of this type
O We had developed many products of this type
2. At the time of the project, how often did your company itself perform activities of the
sort that it was hired to perform on this project?
O We had never performed such activities ourselves
O We infrequently performed such activities ourselves
O We occasionally performed such activities ourselves
O We frequently performed such activities ourselves
SECTION B - The Client Company
Questions in this section refer to the company that hired your company for this project.
3. Compared to other client companies, how experienced was this company with ...
New product development? Not very El El E El El VeryExperienced 1 2 3 4 5 Experienced
Using design consultants? Not very E E E E E Very
Experienced 1 2 3 4 5 Experienced
4. Compared to other companies of similar size, how agile do you consider the client
company to be?
E Above average agility Agility can be thought of as the ability of an
E Average agility organization to rapidly adapt to market and
environmental changes in productive ways.
E Below average agility I
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SECTION C - The Consulting Project
Questions in this section refer to the project your company was hired to perform.
5. In your opinion, what was the primary
reason the client hired a consultant
rather than performing this project
internally?
Go to Questions 6 - 7 in right column
6. What project requirements were
known by your company at the start
of the project? (check all that apply)
O Few or none
o A strategic vision
E Marketing requirements
" Technical requirements
" Detailed technical specifications
7. How novel was the product?
O New to the world
E New to the client company
E A new variant on an existing product
made or sold by the client company
E Incremental improvement or cost
reduction of an existing product
8. How familiar are you with the terms of the project contract?
E I read the contract E I read the request for proposal E I didn't see either document
9. How challenging did you think it would be to meet the project requirements?
Not very
challenging
E E E Very
3 4 5 challenging
What particular aspects made it challenging or not?
10. How adequate was the schedule allotted for the consulting project?
E E El More than
3 4 5 adequate
11. How adequate was the budget allotted for the consulting project?
E E E E More than
2 3 4 5 adequate
E
Unfamiliar with budget
12. How adequate was the background information provided by the client in helping you
understand the project objectives and constraints?
E More than
5 adequate
E
Unfamiliar with briefing
Not at all
adequate
Not at all
adequate
Not at all
adequate
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SECTION D -Your Company's Project Team
Questions in this section refer to
13. What was your role on the project?
O Program developer: negotiated the
contract, supervised client relations
E Project manager: responsible for
day-to-day management of project
O Project team member: contributed
technical expertise to the project
E Other:
14. Were you involved in negotiating and
planning the project?
E I led the negotiations/planning
El I was consulted
E I was not involved
15. Approximately how many employees
of your company were on the core
project team?
16. Were all necessary contributors
included on the core project team?
E Yes E No -+ Who was missing?
20. Overall, how qualified
to perform?
the project team within your company.
17. To what extent did team members
within your company agree on the
project objectives?
E Substantial agreement
E Partial agreement
E Little agreement
18. How experienced was your project
team with the type of product you
were developing?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
19. How experienced was your project
team with the activities you was hired
to perform?
E No prior experience
E Some prior experience
E Extensive prior experience
do you feel your project team was for the work you were hired
Not very El
Qualified 1
Comments:
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Very
Qualified
SECTION E - The Client's Project Team
Questions in this section refer to the project team at the client company.
21. Which of the following roles were represented on the client team? (Check all that
apply, and note that individual team members may have filled more than one role)
E A leader
0 A decision maker
E A project manager
E A diplomat to the rest of the client company
E A champion for the project
E A champion for your company
E A clear point-of-contact for your company
0 I did not have sufficient visibility to answer this question accurately
22. How satisfied were you with the client project team's ...
Technical competence?
Communication skills?
Project management?
Commitment?
Flexibility?
Consistency of team
membership?
Unity of objectives?
Inclusion of all necessary
stakeholders?
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisfied 1
Not very El
Satisf ied 1
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisfied
Very
Satisf ied
Comments:
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SECTION F - Relationship with the Client
This section explores the familiarity of your company and the client.
23. In your opinion, how similar
Corporate cultures?
Objectives for the project?
Expectations for project
deliverables?
or dissimilar were
Very El
Dissimilar 1
Very El
Dissimilar 1
Very El
Dissimilar 1
your company's
E El
2 3
E El
2 3
O El
2 3
and
El
4
El
4
El
4
the client's ...
E Very
5 Similar
El Very
5 Similar
E Very
5 Similar
24. How would you describe the
More like a 0Supplier
client's treatment of your company?
O O O 0 More like aPartner
SECTION G - Evaluation of the Consulting Project Experience
These questions refer to your experience during the consulting project itself.
25. How well did the consulting project compare with the ideal consulting project?
Not very close O E E O E l E O El E Very close
to theideal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 totheideal
26. Did you experience any problems related to the consulting project?
E No substantial problems (skip to question 29)
O Some problems
E Serious problems
27. During which phase(s) of the project did you experience problems?
E Specification of, and agreement upon, project requirements by the client
E Negotiation of the project contract
E Briefing of my company/project team on the project requirements
E Development work by my company
E Development work by the client
E Communication with the client
E Coordination with the manufacturer or other parties
E Transfer (i.e., delivery) of my company's work to the client
E Dissemination and acceptance of my company's work within the client
E Refinement of my company's work by the client after the conclusion of the project
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SECTION G - Evaluation of the Consulting Project Experience (Continued)
28. What problems did you experience?
In what phase(s) did they occur?
How severe was each problem?
Was the problem resolved?
Not very Very
Severe 0 O 0 O E Severe
1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? O Yes O No
Not very Very
Severe O 0 E E E Severe
1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? 0 Yes E No
Not very Very
Severe 0 0 E E 0 Severe
1 2 3 4 5
Resolved? E Yes E No
29. Compared to other projects you
project?
Not very El
Involved 1
have worked on, how involved was the client in this
E E E Very
3 4 5 Involved
30. How consistent were the project requirements over the course of the project?
Not very
Consistent
E E E Very
3 4 5 Consistent
31. How good was your working relationship with the client on this project?
Not very good
Relationship
O E El Very good
3 4 5 Relationship
32. How confident are you that the client will always act in your best interest?
Not very El
Confident 1
E E E Very
3 4 5 Confident
33. To what degree do you consider this project a success?
Not very E E E E E O 0 E
Successful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 E
Why did you answer Question 33 the way you did?
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Very
Successful
SECTION H - Evaluation of Contractual Performance
Please assess the degree to which the requirements of the project contract were met. If
you are unfamiliar with the terms specified in the contract, check the box to the right of
the question.
34. To what extent were the performance requirements specified in the contract fulfilled?
Failed to meet 0 O O O E Exceeded E
requirements 1 2 3 4 5 requirements Unfamiliar w/ contract
35. When was the project completed relative to the schedule specified in the contract?
Behind E E O E El Ahead of E
schedule 1 2 3 4 5 schedule Unfamiliar w/ contract
36. How much did the project cost the client relative to the budget specified in the
contract?
Over E O E O E Under O
budget 1 2 3 4 5 budget Unfamiliar w/ contract
37. Considering both the cost of the project and the benefits the client obtained from it,
how would you rate the value of the consulting project to the client?
Poor E E E E El Excellent E
value 1 2 3 4 5 value Unfamiliar w/ contract
SECTION I - Project Outcomes
Questions in this section refer to outcomes related to your company's work on the
project. The outcomes may have occurred after the actual consulting engagement.
38. Did any awards result from your company's work on the project?
E Yes E No E 1 don't know
39. How satisfied do you think the client is with your company's work on this project?
Very dissatisfied El El El El El E E E E E Very satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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SECTION J - Project Outcomes for Your Company
Please evaluate the impact of the consulting project on your company.
40. Compared
project for
to other projects with similar budgets, how financially profitable was this
your company?
Not very El
Profitable 1
E O O Very
3 4 5 Profitable
41. Compared to other projects with similar budgets, to what degree did this project ...
Lead to additional business?
Well below
Average
O El
1 2
O O O Well above
3 4 5 Average
Contribute to your company's sales and marketing efforts?
Well below
Average 1 2
Enhance your company's capabilities?
Well below E El
Average 1 2
O Well above
5 Average
E Well above
5 Average
Contribute to your staff's morale and personal development?
Well below
Average 1 2
Well above
Average
42. What is your overall satisfaction with this project?
Very dissatisfied El Very satisfiedE E E El
2 3 4 5
43. Is there anything else you would like to add?
Please create an account to anonymously access study results at http://web.mit.edu/ipd
User Name: Password: ___
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This concludes the survey. We appreciate the time and effort you have taken to answer
our questions.
As a token of our appreciation, we would like to share our study results with you. They
will be posted under password protection at the study website:
http://web.mit.edu/ipd
To access the results, please create an anonymous User Name and Password and
write them at the bottom of the opposite page of the questionnaire. Your account will be
activated when we receive the questionnaire in the mail. Please do not choose a User
Name which compromises your anonymity to us.
You may wish to write the login information below, and remove and save this cover
page for future reference.
User Name: (min. 6 characters, including one letter and one number)
Password: _- - - - - - - (min. 6 characters, including one letter and one number)
Please use the enclosed postage-paid envelope to mail your survey to:
William Palm
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Ave., Room 3-471
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
Surveys should be mailed by .
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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